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1 Introduction  
Shenghui Ma  
 
1.1 CEO Post-Succession as an Area of Research 
As a result of its significant impact on organizational life, CEO succession has been the focus 
of substantial attention in the fields of strategy, organization, and corporate finance in the last 
few decades (for reviews see: Giambatista, Rowe, and Riaz, 2005; Kesner and Sebora, 1994). 
The literature shows that as a general phenomenon CEO succession is constituted by different 
episodes, which are characterized by different themes and dynamics. The literature has 
contributed to a rich understanding of the factors explaining CEO dismissal (Fredrickson, 
Hambrick, and Baumrin, 1988; Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2006; Shen and Cho, 2005), the 
complex dynamics of choosing a successor (Ocasio, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Zhang 
and Rajagopalan, 2003), and the impact of succession on organizational outcomes (Miller, 
1993; Shen and Cannella, 2002; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004). Over the last decade or so, 
scholars have been taking an increasing interest in what happens after the arrival of a new 
CEO, a phenomenon that can be called the CEO post-succession process (Denis, Langley, 
and Pineault, 2000; Fondas and Wiersema, 1997; Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, and Greger, 
2012; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Miller, 1993; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; Weng and Lin, 
2014; Xuan, 2009). This process represents an important episode of organizational life, which 
is typically characterized by a high level of disruption and instability due to the development 
of new policies, strategies, norms, and interpersonal relationships (Friedman and Saul, 1991; 
Grusky, 1960; Haveman, 1993; Helmich and Brown, 1972). It also represents a considerable 
challenge for new CEOs, as they may need to manage the changes and disruptions to 
immediately establish personal influences in organizations (Denis et al., 2000; Gabarro, 
1987). As a result, the CEO post-succession process is a topic both of scholarly interest and 
of central importance to practitioners (Gilmore, 1988; Harvard Business Review, 2009; 
Porter, Lorsch, and Nohria, 2004). 
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  Because of its importance in organizations, the CEO post-succession process has 
been studied with various interests and from various perspectives. While corporate finance 
researchers focus on the changes of financial policies (Pourciau, 1993; Xuan, 2009) and 
strategy scholars emphasize the transformation of strategic directions (Bigley and Wiersema, 
2002; Greiner and Bhambri, 1989; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013), 
organizational researchers are more interested in how new CEOs adjust and adapt to the 
internal structures (Denis et al., 2000; Gabarro, 1987; Miller, 1993). In line with the diversity 
of interests, the existing studies have drawn on a wide array of theoretical lenses, such as 
upper echelons and managerial cognition (Boeker, 1997; Datta, Rajagopalan, and Zhang, 
2003; Ndofor, Priem, Rathburn, and Dhir, 2009; Weng and Lin, 2014; Wiersema, 1992), 
organizational evolution (e.g., Miller, 1993; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994), socialization 
(e.g., Denis et al., 2000; Fondas and Wiersema, 1997; Gabarro, 1979), and agency theory 
(Berger and Ofek, 1999; Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, and Nemec, 2004). These diverse research 
interests and theoretical perspectives suggest that the CEO post-succession process is a 
multifaceted phenomenon.  
A close examination of this diverse literature reveals that the CEO post-succession 
studies are centrally concerned with the question of how the match between the CEO, the 
organization, and the environment is created or maintained in the period ensuing the arrival 
of the new leader. On the one hand, researchers have examined the dynamics of personal 
integration, i.e., how new CEOs manage to create a fit between themselves and the 
organization, which is crucial for effective leadership (Denis et al., 2000). This often involves 
developing relationships with different social groups (Gabarro, 1979; Grusky, 1969; Xuan, 
2009) and reconfiguring the top management team (TMT) (Helmich and Brown, 1972), in 
order to gain support and establish authority. On the other hand, researcher are interested in 
the dynamics of strategic change, i.e., how new CEOs realign the organization with the 
environment, taking into account that new CEOs typically have low commitment to the status 
quo and tend to introduce new perspectives (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). The effort of 
strategic change often involves transforming the strategic direction, the asset portfolio, the 
structure, and the control system of the organization (Barker and Mone, 1998; Boeker, 1997; 
Miller, 1993; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Wiersema, 1992, 1995). While the purpose of 
personal integration is to create a fit at the group level, i.e., between the CEO and different 
groups of individuals, the purpose of strategic change is to create a fit at the organizational 
level, i.e., between the organization and its environment.  
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This dissertation focuses on the CEO post-succession process and strives to generate a 
deeper, richer, and more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of personal 
integration and strategic change. Before introducing the three studies that constitute this 
dissertation, I will provide a brief review of the theoretical perspectives in the existing 
research and sketch out a practice perspective that underlies all of my studies.  
1.2 Existing Theoretical Perspectives for Studying CEO Post-Succession 
As shown in Table 1, various theoretical perspectives have been applied in the existing 
research with each focusing on particular aspects of the CEO post-succession process. One 
prominent perspective is upper echelons theory, which is centrally concerned with how top 
managers affect strategic outcomes. Seeing the organization as a reflection of its top 
managers, upper echelons theory argues that the experiences, values, and personalities of 
TMT members will influences how they perceive the environment and their strategic choice 
(Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Applying an upper echelons perspective, 
researchers have examined how new CEOs’ demographic background and job experiences 
influence the changes of product and market strategies, organizational structures, decision-
making processes, and the TMT (Boeker, 1997; Datta et al., 2003; Ndofor et al., 2009; Weng 
and Lin, 2014; Wiersema, 1992, 1995; Wischnevsky and Damanpour, 2008). For example, in 
contrast to internally promoted CEOs, new CEOs recruited from outside are found more 
likely to initiate such changes as they tend to bring in a cognitive perspective that is different 
from the dominant perspective within the organization and to have a low commitment to the 
status quo (Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Wiersema, 1992; Zhang and 
Rajagopalan, 2010). Another prominent theoretical perspective in the literature is agency 
theory, through which researchers examine the ways in which new CEOs realign 
management interests with the firm by refocusing strategy and divesting unprofitable assets 
(Berger and Ofek, 1999; Weisbach, 1995), engage in self-interested behaviors, such as 
earnings management, to secure their position (Harrison and Fiet, 1999; Pourciau, 1993), or 
are mandated to conduct strategic change (Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). The studies that 
draw on upper echelons or agency theory sometimes incorporate a power perspective in order 
to understand how the power a new CEO possesses influences his or her latitude of initiating 
strategic change or engaging in self-interested behaviors (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; 
Davidson et al., 2004; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; Xuan, 2009).  
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Some other studies adopt the perspective of organizational evolution and learning to 
explain how CEO succession as a mechanism to break inertia and to subsequently trigger 
change for  strategic reorientation or organizational transformation (Lant, Milliken, and 
Batra, 1992; Miller, 1993; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). Adopting an institutional theory 
perspective, Kraatz and Moore (Kraatz and Moore, 2002) even find that the executive 
exchange among organizations can help generate and diffuse new strategic programs and 
contribute to institutional change in a highly institutionalized field. While these studies 
investigate strategic change as an outcome of CEO succession, some scholars focus on the 
process of such change by taking a strategic intervention perspective (Greiner and Bhambri, 
1989). For example, Greiner and Bhambri (1989) conceptualize deliberate strategic change as 
an intervention and identify a “comprehensive/collaborative” intervention approach through 
which a CEO successfully made an intended change in the case they studied. The authors 
develop a six-stage model of change intervention, in each different stage of which the CEO 
needs to focus on specific issues. Moreover, some studies use a management control 
perspective to study the ways in which new CEOs enact formal control systems in order to 
initiate the desired strategic change (Barker and Mone, 1998; Simons, 1994). For example, 
Simons (1994) finds that new CEOs mobilize and change four types of formal control 
systems to initiate and implement new strategies.  
 
Table 1: Existing theoretical perspectives on studying the CEO post-succession process 
Theoretical lens Focus  Exemplary studies  
Agency theory Strategic refocusing and 
divestiture; 
Self-interest behaviors, such 
as earnings management, 
coalition building, etc.;  
Influence of the Board on 
strategic choice 
 
Berger and Ofek (1999)  
Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, and 
Nemec (2004) 
Harrison and Fiet (1999) 
Pourciau (1993) 
Weisbach (1995) 
Westphal and Fredrickson 
(2001) 
 
Discourse Use of language in gaining 
positive perception and 
external support 
Fanelli and Grasselli (2006) 
Fanelli, Misangyi, and Tosi 
(2009) 
 
Institutional theory Influence of executive 
migration on institutional 
change  
 
Kraatz and Moore (2002) 
 
Management control system Change of formal control 
systems 
Barker and Mone (1998) 
Simons (1994) 
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Organizational evolution, 
organizational learning 
Strategic reorientation, 
organizational 
transformation; 
Change of structure and 
decision-making process 
Lant, Milliken, and Batra 
(1992) 
Miller (1993) 
Romanelli and Tushman 
(1994) 
   
Power Influence of power on the 
latitude of CEO’s activities, 
such as strategic change, 
earnings management, etc. 
Bigley and Wiersema (2002) 
Davidson, Jiraporn, Kim, and 
Nemec (2004) 
Quigley and Hambrick (2012) 
Xuan (2009) 
 
Resource dependence, social 
embeddedness 
 
Influence of resource 
dependence on 
reconstituting external 
relationships 
 
Westphal, Boivie, and Chng 
(2006) 
Role theory, socialization Influence of CEO 
socialization on strategic 
change; 
Process of CEO socialization 
and integration 
 
Denis, Langley, and Pineault 
(2000) 
Fondas and Wiersema (1997) 
Gabarro (1979) 
 
Strategic intervention Process of intervening in the 
organization for strategic 
change 
 
Greiner and Bhambri (1989) 
 
Upper echelons, managerial 
cognition 
Influence of CEO 
demographic background 
and job experiences on 
strategic change, structural 
change, and TMT change  
Boeker (1997)  
Datta, Rajagopalan, and 
Zhang (2003) 
Ndofor, Priem, Rathburn, and 
Dhir (2009) 
Weng and Lin (2014) 
Wiersema (1992) 
Wischnevsky and Damanpour 
(2008) 
 
 
 Role theory and its extension organizational socialization are further perspectives 
used to examine the CEO post-succession process. From a role theory lens, an organization is 
constituted by a system of interrelated roles (Katz and Kahn, 1978). Therefore, taking charge 
involves enacting the various role relationships that will constrain or enable what the new 
CEO can do (Denis et al., 2000). While some scholars focus on the importance of the new 
CEO’s socialization and the socialization context in the current organization to predict the 
likelihood of strategic change initiated by the CEO (Fondas and Wiersema, 1997), others 
emphasize the importance of the CEO gaining acceptance in and being integrated into the 
organization, which is crucial for effective leadership (Denis et al., 2000; Gabarro, 1979). 
While the studies taking a role theory perspective focus on interpersonal relationships within 
the organization, others focus on the new CEO’s relationship to external stakeholders by 
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engaging two different perspectives: one is resource dependence, by which scholars examine 
why new CEOs tend to establish personal relationships with the leaders of some 
organizations and not others (Westphal, Boivie, and Chng, 2006). The other perspective 
focusing on external stakeholders is discourse theory, which is adopted to study how new 
CEOs use particular language to create a positive impression among external stakeholders 
(Fanelli and Misangyi, 2006; Fanelli, Misangyi, and Tosi, 2009). For example, Fanelli and 
Grasselli (2006) find that using categories and labels, as well as prototypical and emotional 
language, in external communication helps CEOs to project charisma and thereby be 
positively perceived by investors.   
 While existing research has yielded many important insights by adopting various 
perspectives, there is a lack of focus on the activities of new CEOs as most of them examine 
post-succession outcomes and their relevant conditions. In fact, as Miller (1993: 656) noted, 
“most past research […] has failed to examine what new leaders do.” The reason can be that 
many perspectives in existing studies are better suited to examine static relationships than 
dynamic phenomena. In the next section, I will introduce a practice perspective that underlies 
my three studies and seems to be complementary to the existing perspectives by emphasizing 
the doings of new CEOs in the post-succession process.   
1.3 A Practice Perspective on CEO Post-Succession 
Corresponding to the practice turn in social theories (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny, 
2001), practice theory has been increasingly applied to various areas of organizational and 
management research, such as strategy, knowledge, routines, technology, and institutionalism 
(Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011). While the term “practice” is used slightly differently in 
different streams of practice theory, it essentially denotes a socially shared, recurrent pattern 
of activities (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011; Reckwitz, 2002; Whittington, 2006). It is such 
patterns of activities that make up the “internal life of process” (Brown and Duguid, 2000: 
95) in organizations. A practice perspective emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
actual activities that constitute any larger social phenomenon of interest (Feldman and 
Orlikowski, 2011; Whittington, 2006). Applied in strategy research, for example, a practice 
perspective directs scholarly attention to investigating the “doing” of strategy practitioners 
(Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, and Vaara, 2010; Jarzabkowski, 2003; Johnson, Langley, Melin, 
and Whittington, 2007; Vaara and Whittington, 2012; Whittington, 2006). 
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As the development of the post-succession process depends very much on the specific 
activities of the CEO, it seems important to examine these activities in order to generate a 
deep understanding of this process. Practice theory provides a particularly fruitful perspective 
for studying the CEO post-succession process because it is able to take into account the 
micro-level activities of new CEOs. This is also stressed by Orlikowski when she writes: “A 
practice perspective, because it entails a theoretically grounded understanding of recursive 
interaction among people, activities, artifacts, and contexts, is particularly well positioned to 
address organizational phenomena that are posited to be relational, dynamic and emergent” 
(Orlikowski, 2010: 26-27). While a comprehensive review of practice theory goes beyond the 
scope of this introduction (for an overview see Nicolini 2012), I want to draw on some basic 
principles shared by different streams of practice theory (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011; 
Nicolini, 2012) to illustrate the potential of a practice perspective for studying the CEO post-
succession process. 
First, a practice perspective directs our attention to the practices and the actual 
activities of performing them in the CEO post-succession process. For example, the literature 
suggests that new CEOs often enact practices of strategic change, but many studies examine 
the change as an outcome without looking at how it is actually carried out (Greiner and 
Bhambri, 1989). As a result, we know little about the particular challenges new CEOs face 
and how they deal with them when initiating strategic change in the post-succession process. 
A practice perspective sensitizes us to understand what and how practices are employed by 
new CEOs and other actors who are directly involved in the post-succession process. 
Moreover, a practice perspective emphasizes that practices are always embedded in a web of 
other practices that influence each other mutually (Nicolini, 2012). This suggests that each 
practice acts as a context for other practices, which in turn suggests that practices are likely to 
be co-constructed and to co-evolve. In this sense, a practice perspective allows us to see how 
different practices are performed in relation to each other in the post-succession process, an 
aspect that has not gained enough attention in the existing studies.  
Second, a practice perspective directs our attention to the role of the actors, or 
“practitioners” as Whittington (2006) says, who are involved in specific practices in the post-
succession process. The existing literature has largely focused on new CEOs as the 
practitioners, showing how their characteristics influence the likelihood of them engaging in 
particular post-succession practices. However, little attention has been paid to other 
practitioners, such as other TMT members or board of directors. For example, although some 
studies suggest that new CEOs replace TMT members to initiate strategic change (Karaevli, 
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2007; Lin and Liu, 2011; Wischnevsky and Damanpour, 2008), we know little about how the 
existing and newly appointed TMT members engage in carrying the intended change. In 
addition, practice theorists have shown that characteristics of practitioners often change as a 
result of their engagement in practices (Jarzabkowski, Balogun, and Seidl, 2007). Therefore, 
adopting a practice perspective allows us to examine various practitioners and how they 
influence and are influenced by the CEO post-succession process.  
Third, a practice perspective points to the co-evolution of practices and the contexts in 
which both the practices and practitioners are embedded (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011; 
Jarzabkowski, Kaplan, Seidl, and Whittington, 2015; Nicolini, 2012). The existing research 
largely takes contexts as static in the post-succession process. For example, recent research 
has shown that a particular context can enable or constrain the new CEOs’ efforts to engage 
in particular practices aimed at strategic change or personal integration (Karaevli, 2007; 
Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Krieger and Ang, 2013).  However, these studies have not looked 
at without how the context can be enacted by new CEOs and therefore enable or constrain 
how they engage in particular practices in the future. A practice perspective can sensitize us 
to understand better how activities and contexts shape each other in the CEO post-succession 
process.  
Although in each study of this dissertation I draw on particular conceptual foundations, 
the practice perspective serves as a sensitizing device (Blaikie, 2000; Bowen, 2006; Charmaz, 
2003) for all three studies by directing my attention to and accounting for the doings of new 
CEOs. This is likely to result in a more sophisticated theorization of the post-succession 
process that is able to account for its complex and dynamic nature.  
1.4 Overview of the Three Studies 
All informed by a practice perspective, the three papers that constitute this dissertation 
examine the different aspects of the CEO post-succession process. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the three papers by summarizing their focuses, conceptual foundations, and 
methods. The first paper, co-authored with David Seidl and Stéphane Guérard, was accepted 
for publication in the International Journal of Management Reviews. In this paper, I adopted 
a practice perspective to critically access the existing literature and outline directions for 
future research on what new CEOs do in the post-succession process. The existing research 
on this important process has grown rapidly over the last decade focusing particularly on the 
question of how the match between the CEO, the organization and the environment is 
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created. Yet, the respective literature is highly fragmented by diverse research interests and 
theoretical perspectives. This diversity has made it difficult for scholars to build on each 
other’s work, hampering progress in this important field of research. Against this 
background, a comprehensive review of the available research seemed both necessary and 
timely. Adopting the conceptual vocabulary of the practice perspective, this paper reviews 
this literature in terms of what it reveals about (1) the practices adopted by new CEOs and 
other actors involved in the post-succession process, (2) the properties of the key 
practitioners involved, and (3) the practical context of the post-succession process. The 
review suggests that new CEOs are primarily involved in practices aimed at integrating the 
new CEO into the organization and practices aimed at realigning the organization with its 
environment. This paper identifies the important insights that the existing literature affords 
and highlights the gaps in this body of research. On this basis, I develop a concrete research 
agenda in terms of topics, methodologies, and theories.  
 
Table 2: Dissertation components 
Title Focus Conceptual 
foundations 
Methods Main data 
1. The new CEO and 
the post-succession 
process: an 
integration of past 
research and future 
directions 
 
Review of the 
literature on 
new CEOs and 
development 
of future 
directions 
  
A practice 
framework 
(for 
literature 
analysis)  
Literature 
analysis of 
existing 
studies 
59 articles  
2. New CEOs and 
their immediate 
collaborators: 
divergence and 
convergence 
between the 
strategic apparatus 
and the top 
management team 
 
Establishment 
and evolution 
of new CEOs’ 
group of 
immediate 
collaborators 
Role theory; 
upper 
echelons 
theory 
(implicit: 
practice 
theory) 
Longitudinal 
comparative 
case study of 
eight firms 
130 interviews; 
233 documents 
3. The role of 
substantive actions 
in sensegiving 
during strategic 
change 
Mechanisms of 
substantive 
actions 
contributing to 
new CEOs’ 
sensegiving  
Sensemaking 
and 
sensegiving  
(implicit: 
practice 
theory) 
Longitudinal 
comparative 
case study of 
three firms 
(two firms 
from study 2) 
76 interviews 
(31 from 
study 2); 
1,149 pages of 
documents 
 
With this review of research on the CEO post-succession process my first paper 
contributes to the literature in two ways: first, mobilizing conceptual categories of the 
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practice perspective it provides a comprehensive overview of the fragmented literature in 
terms of what we know about the ways in which the match between CEO, organization and 
environment is created in the post-succession process. The paper thereby also revealed 
manifest and latent linkages between previously unconnected lines of inquiry. This will make 
it easier for researchers to build on the existing works and thus create a cumulative body of 
knowledge. Second, in this paper I developed a research agenda on the CEO post-succession 
process, providing some guidelines for future studies in terms of topics, methodologies, and 
theories. I believe that these will help in generating a richer, broader, and deeper 
understanding of this complex and dynamic process.  
 The second paper, co-authored with David Seidl, is currently under review at the 
Strategic Management Journal for the special issue “Strategy Processes and Practices: 
Dialogues and Intersections.” In this paper, I draw on role theory to examine new CEOs’ 
practices of establishing a group of immediate collaborators in order to direct their 
organization. Role theory is mobilized because it has been adopted by practice scholars and 
proven fruitful in generating novel insights into the dynamics of strategic leadership (Denis, 
Lamothe, and Langley, 2001; Denis et al., 2000; Denis, Langley, and Sergi, 2012). An 
important challenge of new CEOs is to establish an effective group of close collaborators 
within the organization, which I call the “strategic apparatus” because of its function in 
shaping organizational strategy. The members of the strategic apparatus are in direction 
collaboration with the CEO and involved in multiple strategic issues and decisions in contrast 
to their peers who were either involved in only a particular strategic issue or in charge of only 
operational responsibilities. Drawing on a longitudinal qualitative study of eight firms, I 
examine how the strategic apparatus of new CEOs evolves over time. In particular, I show 
that the composition of the strategic apparatus initially tends to differ from that of the top 
management team (TMT) because of constraints on the CEO in terms of changing the TMT. 
In some cases, the strategic apparatus simply consists of a subgroup of the TMT, whereas in 
other cases it consists of members of the TMT and individuals not on the TMT, such as staff 
members, lower-level managers and/or members of the board. In addition, this paper shows 
that discrepancies between the composition of the strategic apparatus and the TMT can lead 
to tensions that can trigger a process of convergence between the two, particularly as 
restrictions on changing the TMT are alleviated and as the functions of the apparatus change.  
With these findings my second paper contributes to the CEO succession literature by 
showing how, when, and why new CEOs change their TMT, the constraints they face, and 
how they deal with them in order to direct the organization. Thereby, this research helps to 
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uncover the black box between the CEO succession event and its organizational outcomes 
(Miller, 1993; Pitcher, Chreim, and Kisfalvi, 2000). Furthermore, my study contributes to the 
upper echelons literature by identifying the mechanisms underlying the development of the 
TMT, responding to recent calls for studies on how the TMT is formed and how it evolves 
(Hambrick, 2007: 338). 
 In the third paper, which is to be submitted to the Academy of Management Journal, I 
study how new CEOs enact practices of strategic change by drawing a sensemaking 
perspective (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Weick, 1995), which has been used by many 
practice scholars in examining strategic change process (Balogun and Johnson, 2004, 2005; 
Cornelissen and Schildt, 2015; Rouleau, 2005; Rouleau and Balogun, 2011; Vaara, 2003). 
This paper focuses on new CEOs’ sensegiving activities that are aimed at creating meaning 
for the intended change. This paper systematically investigates how substantive actions, 
defined as any significant decision or activity of implementing the strategic change (Thomas, 
Clark, and Gioia, 1993), contribute to the adjustment of interpretive schemes during strategic 
change. Drawing on a longitudinal comparative case study of three firms, I find that by 
creating contexts and resources for sensegiving, substantive actions can be used to adjust the 
interpretive schemes of organizational members. In a direct way, top managers use actions 
for sense breaking, sense specification, and sense anchoring. In an indirect way, actions 
influence scheme change through the substantive outcomes they produced: such outcomes 
can be used to reinforce the new schemes that top managers promote and could lead to the 
further adjustments of these new schemes. In general, my findings show a pattern of 
sensegiving as scheme change while taking actions, which is in contrast to the typical pattern 
of scheme change before taking actions described in the literature (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 
1991; Mantere, Schildt, and Sillince, 2012).  
 With these findings my third paper contributes to the literature by showing the 
mechanisms of how substantive actions contribute to scheme change in top managers’ 
sensegiving. Existing studies typically focus on scheme change before taking substantive 
actions, for example through mobilizing symbols, metaphors, and narratives (Bartunek, Krim, 
Necochea, and Humphries, 1999; Corley and Gioia, 2004; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Gioia, Thomas, Clark, and Chittipeddi, 1994; Maitlis and Christianson, 2014; Mantere et al., 
2012). However, the role of substantive actions in sensegiving has been largely neglected. 
Our findings show that the two aspects of sensegiving, scheme change and action taking, are 
interwoven during strategic change, even though in a particular phase, one might be more 
prominent than the other. Therefore, our study contributes to a fuller understanding of top 
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managers’ sensegiving by showing additional ways in which schemes and actions can grow 
closer during strategic change.  
1.5 Overall Contributions 
The three papers compiled in this dissertation contribute to a deeper and richer understanding 
of the CEO post-succession process. Together they shed light on the dynamics of personal 
integration and strategic change in the post-succession process. In the following, I structure 
the overall contributions of my dissertation around the core concepts of practice theory 
(Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011; Jarzabkowski et al., 2015; Nicolini, 2012; Whittington, 
2006) by showing how it contributes to our understanding of: (1) the interrelations between 
practices of personal integration and practices of strategic change, (2) the interaction between 
multiple practitioners involved in the post-succession process, and (3) the co-evolution of 
new CEOs’ activities and the post-succession contexts.       
 First, this dissertation shows the interrelations between new CEOs’ practices of 
personal integration and strategic change as a major feature of the CEO post-succession 
process. The first paper evaluates the existing literature and finds that the post-succession 
practices are aimed at two main purposes: personal integration that creates a fit between the 
CEO and the organization, and strategic realignment that creates a fit between the 
organization and its environment. The paper points out that although existing research 
typically focuses exclusively on one type of practices, the interrelation between them should 
be a promising area for future research. The second paper shows that the concerns of personal 
integration and strategic change are intermingled in the new CEOs’ practices of creating a 
strategic apparatus, i.e., a group of immediate collaborators. This paper illuminates that new 
CEOs strive to create a strategic apparatus that can satisfy strategic orientation requirements, 
such as installing competence and commitment necessary for pursing new strategies, and 
personal integration requirements, such as gaining critical information and idea testing. Both 
papers point to the importance of understanding the interrelations between personal 
integration and strategic change to capture the dynamics of the post-succession process.  
 Second, this dissertation shows the important role of multiple practitioners and their 
interaction in shaping the post-succession process. By systematically analyzing the existing 
studies, the first paper identifies that new CEOs use various practices to integrate with 
different social groups internally and externally, and suggests the need to study 
systematically the integration of new CEOs into four distinct groups: the TMT, the board of 
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directors, the group of middle managers, and the group of external stakeholders. The second 
paper shows that new CEOs collaborate closely with their strategic apparatus in order to 
direct their organization. Their strategic apparatus often includes individuals outside of the 
TMT, such as staff members or members of the board of directors. This paper also shows that 
the discrepancies between the strategic apparatus and the TMT frequently result in increasing 
interpersonal tension that over time leads to a gradual convergence between the strategic 
apparatus and the TMT. The third paper shows that when making strategic change, new 
CEOs often engage in sensegiving activities that are aimed at adjusting the interpretive 
schemes of organizational members in order to facilitate the intended change. Together, the 
three papers broaden our view of who is involved in the CEO post-succession process and 
show how the involved individuals interact with each other over time.  
 Third, this dissertation shows that new CEOs’ activities and the post-succession 
contexts mutually influence each other. The first paper points out that researchers so far have 
largely treated the practical context as objectively given and as directly impacting the post-
succession process but have failed to capture how the post-succession contexts are enacted 
and co-evolve with the practices that enact them. The second paper shows that when creating 
the strategic apparatus, new CEOs enact the contexts in which their practices are embedded. 
In order to direct the organization, they deliberately establish a configuration of relationships 
around them for personal integration and strategic orientation. They often cope with 
constraints of TMT change by excluding some TMT members and/or including individuals 
outside of the TMT for close collaboration. However, this paper shows that this coping often 
creates new contextual factors, i.e., tensions among TMT members and the strategic 
apparatus members, which lead to the further adjustment of the relationship between the two 
groups. The third paper shows that the actions of implementing change taken by new CEOs 
create new contexts and resources that significantly shape their sensegiving activities and 
further actions of change implementation.  With these findings of the three studies, this 
dissertation suggests that in order to fully capture the dynamics of the CEO post-succession 
process, it is necessary to pay attention to the co-evolution between activities and contexts 
and how they mutually shape each other over time.  
1.6 Limitations and Future Research 
Like all research, this dissertation has limitations, which at the same time provide 
opportunities for future research. First, although the first paper suggests the cultural influence 
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on the CEO post-succession process as a promising avenue for research, the second and the 
third paper have not focus on this aspect. In the second paper, the firms investigated are all 
based in Europe, even though some of them are multinationals. In the third paper, although 
one firm is based in China and the others are based in Europe, I have not explicitly compared 
the cases in terms of cultural influences. As a result, we do not know the cultural influence on 
the findings of this dissertation in specific and on the post-succession dynamics in general. 
However, we know particularly from practice theory that social practices are shaped by larger 
societal institutions and cultural norms in which they are embedded (Suddaby, Seidl, and Le, 
2013). Some research also suggests that within different cultures new CEOs might exhibit 
somewhat different behavioral patterns (Nakauchi and Wiersema, 2015; Sakano and Lewin, 
1999). For example, Sakano and Lewin (1999) find that in Japan strategic or structural 
changes are not observable in the first two years in contrast to the US where they are often 
observed in the first year of a new CEO’s tenure. This suggests that the patterns of 
divergence and convergence between the strategic apparatus and the TMT found in the 
second paper and the pattern of sensegiving found in the third paper may appear differently in 
different cultures. Given that the international mobility of CEOs is increasing, researchers 
should explore more extensively how different national and cultural contexts affect what new 
CEOs are expected to do, are able to do, and cannot do during the post-succession process.  
 Second, an important topic that has not been examined in this dissertation but appears 
critical for understanding the dynamics of personal integration and strategic change is CEO 
identification. Recently there has been an increasing interest in CEOs’ identification and its 
consequence on their strategic behaviors (Galvin, Lange, and Ashforth, 2015; Lange, Boivie, 
and Westphal, 2015; McDonald and Westphal, 2010, 2011). For example, some studies show 
that CEOs’ identification with particular groups influences their willingness to provide 
strategic support to the members of those groups (McDonald and Westphal, 2010, 2011). 
This suggests that in order to fully understand what new CEOs do, it is necessary to look at 
who they think they are and in which way they identify with their new organization. For 
example, if a manager sees him- or herself as a turnaround manager, the CEO may enact the 
organization in a particular way. In addition, future research should also look at how new 
CEOs’ identity and their identification with the organization are shaped by the practices they 
take. Practice theorists have shown that characteristics of practitioners often change as a 
result of their engagement in practices (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). For example, there is 
evidence that the identity of strategists tends to change when they engage in processes of 
strategic transformation (Beech and Johnson, 2005; Johnson, Balogun, and Beech, 2010). 
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Therefore, by investigating the mutual influence between new CEOs’ identity and their 
activities in the post-succession process future research can generate a richer understanding 
on the interrelation between practitioners and practices.   
 Third, this dissertation examines the post-succession process largely from the 
perspective of the new CEO and has not focused on that of the stakeholders. As mentioned in 
the contribution sections, my thesis shows that new CEOs interact intensively with other 
individuals for personal integration and strategic change, such as working with individuals of 
different levels in their strategic apparatus shown in the second paper and as sensegiving 
aimed at influencing organizational members to support their intended change shown in the 
third paper. However, the two papers have not taken the perspective of those stakeholders 
directly involved in the post-succession process. For example, we do not know what the 
particular concerns of other top managers are when a new CEO arrives and how they cope 
with the post-succession challenges. In general, as shown in the first paper, current studies 
have mainly focused new CEOs and their activities without paying enough attention to other 
important actors in the post-succession process (see also Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012). 
Hence, future research should acknowledge the active role of various stakeholders in shaping 
the post-succession process. For example, a recent work by Graffin, Boivie, and Carpenter 
(2013) investigated how members of the board of directors draw on contextual heuristics to 
evaluate the new CEOs’ performance. This study found that, because of the uncertainty 
associated with CEO succession, it is difficult for the board of directors to evaluate a new 
CEO on the basis of financial performance and its members often draw on various heuristics 
to judge the new CEO’s ability. Acknowledging the active role of multiple stakeholders in 
the post-succession process, future studies should investigate the practices that various 
stakeholders use to actively cope with or influence the incoming CEO, how various 
stakeholders influence the dynamics of personal integration and strategic change, and how 
different stakeholders influence each other in the post-succession process.  
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2 The New CEO and the Post-succession Process: An 
Integration of Past Research and Future Directions1 
Shenghui Ma, David Seidl, and Stéphane Guérard 
Abstract  
The early tenure of a new CEO, also referred to as “the CEO post-succession process,” is a 
critical phase in the history of an organization, because it is associated with a high rate of 
organizational failure and CEO dismissal. Research on this important process has grown 
rapidly over the last decade focusing particularly on the question of how the match between 
the CEO, the organization and the environment is created in the post-succession process. Yet, 
the respective literature is highly fragmented, which suggests that there is a need for a 
systematic review and evaluation of existing works. Adopting the conceptual vocabulary of 
the practice perspective, we review this literature in terms of what it reveals about (1) the 
practices adopted by new CEOs and other actors involved in the post-succession process, (2) 
the properties of the key practitioners involved, and (3) the practical context of the post-
succession process. Our review suggests that new CEOs are primarily involved in practices 
aimed at integrating the new CEO into the organization and practices aimed at realigning the 
organization with its environment. We identify the important insights that the existing 
literature affords and highlight the gaps in this body of research. On this basis, we develop a 
concrete research agenda in terms of topics, methodologies, and theories. 
Keywords 
CEO succession; integration; new CEO; post-succession; practice theory; realignment; 
review; strategic change 
                                                
1 This paper is published as Ma, S., Seidl, D., and Guérard S. 2015. The New CEO and the Post-succession 
Process: An Integration of Past Research and Future Directions. International Journal of Management Reviews 
17(4): 460-482. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1960s, the topic of CEO succession has received significant attention from scholars 
in the fields of strategy, organization, and corporate finance and accounting (for reviews see 
Giambatista et al., 2005; Kesner and Sebora, 1994). These works have addressed numerous 
aspects of this complex phenomenon, such as the factors that lead to CEO dismissal 
(Fredrickson et al., 1988; Haleblian and Rajagopalan, 2006; Shen and Cho, 2005), the 
dynamics of selecting a successor (Ocasio, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Zhang and 
Rajagopalan, 2003), and the impact of succession on organizational outcomes (Miller, 1993; 
Shen and Cannella, 2002; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004). Over the last decade or so, scholars 
have been taking an increasing interest in what happens after the arrival of a new CEO, a 
phenomenon that can be called the CEO post-succession process (Denis et al., 2000; Fondas 
and Wiersema, 1997; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Miller, 1993; 
Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; Weng and Lin, 2012; Xuan, 2009).  This research  has 
centrally been concerned with the question of how the match between the CEO, the 
organization and the environment is created or maintained in the period ensuing the arrival of 
the new leader. More specifically, researchers have examined how new CEOs manage to 
create a fit between themselves and the organization, which is crucial for effective leadership 
(Denis et al., 2000), and how they realign the organization with the environment, taking into 
account that new CEOs typically have low commitment to the status quo and tend to 
introduce new perspectives (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1993). How new CEOs 
manage these relationships on different levels, i.e. between the CEO and the organization and 
between the organization and the environment, is a question both of scholarly interest and of 
central importance to practitioners (Gilmore, 1988; Harvard Business Review, 2009; Porter et 
al., 2004). 
Because there are many facets to the CEO post-succession process and diverse 
research interests and theoretical perspectives, the existing literature on this process is highly 
fragmented. For example, while research on corporate finance focuses on changes in 
financial policies (Pourciau, 1993; Xuan, 2009), research on strategy emphasizes changes in 
strategic directions (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; Greiner and Bhambri, 1989; 
Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013) and research on organization 
concentrates on how new CEOs adjust the organization’s internal structures and processes 
(Denis et al., 2000; Gabarro, 1985; Miller, 1993). The theoretical approaches underlying 
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these studies range from the “upper echelons” theory (Boeker, 1997; Wiersema, 1992) to 
managerial cognition (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; Ndofor et al., 2009), organizational 
evolution (Miller, 1993; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994), socialization (Denis et al., 2000; 
Fondas and Wiersema, 1997; Gabarro, 1979), and agency theory (Berger and Ofek, 1999; 
Davidson et al., 2004; Weisbach, 1995). This diversity has made it difficult for scholars to 
build on each other’s work, hampering progress in this important field of research. Against 
this background, a comprehensive review of the available research seems both necessary and 
timely.  
As the development of the post-succession process (i.e. the creation or maintenance of 
a match between the CEO, the organization and the environment) depends very much on the 
specific activities of the CEO, it seems appropriate to review the existing literature in terms 
of what it says about these activities. After all, Miller (1993) emphasized that researchers 
interested in the post-succession process need to understand “what new leaders do” (Miller, 
1993: 656). In that respect, the practice perspective (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011) offers 
some particularly fruitful conceptual distinctions that can be employed to structure the review 
of the existing literature. Taking a practice perspective we can analyze the post-succession 
process in terms of the interaction between its (1) practices, (2) practitioners and (3) practical 
contexts. While the term “practice” is used slightly differently in different practice theories, it 
essentially denotes a socially shared, recurrent pattern of activities (Feldman and Orlikowski, 
2011; Reckwitz, 2002; Whittington, 2006). It is such patterns of activities that make up the 
“internal life of process” (Brown and Duguid, 2000: 95)—in our particular case, the internal 
life of the post-succession process. The term “practitioner”, in turn, refers to the particular 
actors involved in specific practices. Depending on their characteristics different practitioners 
might enact different practices or enact them differently. Finally, the term “practical context” 
describes the contextual factors in which the practitioners and their respective practices are 
embedded. 
Adopting the conceptual vocabulary of the practice perspective, we will review the 
existing literature on post-succession in terms of what we know about (1) the practices (What 
practices are employed by new CEOs and other actors that are directly involved in the post-
succession process?), (2) the practitioner (How do the particular properties of new CEOs and 
other directly involved actors affect how they enact post-succession practices?), and (3) the 
practical context (How does the practical context affect the way in which new CEOs and 
other involved actors enact post-succession practices?). On this basis, we will take stock of 
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research on how new CEOs manage the relationship between themselves, the organization, 
and the environment and will outline directions for future research. 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Identifying the Literature 
The scope of our literature search encompassed all scientific works that deal with the early 
stage of a new CEO’s tenure. We identified the relevant literature in three steps: first, using 
the Boolean search engine of the SSCI (Social Science Citation Index) database, we searched 
within the subject areas of “management,” “business,” and “business finance” for the 
following terms in the title, abstract, or keywords of each publication: “CEO succession,” 
“CEO turnover,” “new CEO,” “newly appointed CEO” “new manager,” “executive 
succession,” “new executive,” “executive turnover,” and “executive migration.” This initial 
search yielded 543 papers on CEO succession in general, published between 1960 and 2013. 
The second step, then, involved identifying within this large set the subsample of studies that 
dealt specifically with the topic of post-succession. Having read the abstract of each paper, 
and the introduction or even full text wherever necessary, we identified 54 empirical and 
theoretical studies as relevant. The majority of papers in our initial sample were excluded 
either because they did not address the post-succession process or because they were 
concerned with the particularities of the post-succession process in family businesses, which 
should be treated as a distinct research topic in its own right (Cabrera-Suarez, 2005; Le 
Breton-Miller et al., 2004). In the third step, we examined the references of all studies in our 
refined sample and identified three additional studies. To capture also the most recent studies, 
we searched for online versions of forthcoming papers on our topics in journals in 
management, business, and business finance. For pragmatic reasons, we limited the search 
for forthcoming papers to the top 50 journals (ranked by their 5-year impact factor) in these 
areas. This search led to the inclusion of two additional studies. Overall, we identified 59 
studies as relevant to this review. Among the 59 studies, 29 (49%) had been published after, 
2000, indicating a growing interest in the post-succession process.  
2.2.2 Structuring the Literature Analysis  
Employing central concepts from the practice perspective (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011; 
Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki et al., 2001; Whittington, 2006), we reviewed the studies in terms of 
(1) what practices were adopted and (2) how the properties of the involved actors and (3) the 
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practical context influenced the adoption of these practices. Table 3 summarizes the selected 
studies on the basis of these three themes. Analyzing closely this literature, we were able to 
identify two types of practices in terms of their telos (Nicolini, 2012); that is, in terms of the 
purpose for which they are employed: integration practices and realignment practices. 
Integration practices concern the social integration of the new CEO and are geared towards 
creating a match between the new CEO and the organization, which is crucial for effective 
leadership (Denis et al., 2000). In contrast, realignment practices are concerned with the 
realignment between the organization and its changing environment. Thus, the purpose of 
integration practices is to create a fit at the group level, between the CEO and different 
groups of individuals, while the purpose of realignment practices is to create a fit at the 
organizational level, between the organization and its environment. 
2.3 Integration of the New CEO 
Various scholars have emphasized that a key challenge for new CEOs is their integration into 
the role structures, social norms, and interpersonal relationships of the organization (Denis et 
al., 2000; Gabarro, 1979). In this section, we review studies that examine the various 
practices whose purpose is to create a match between the new CEO and the organization and 
the effect of the new CEO’s properties and of the practical context on creating this match.  
2.3.1 Practices of Integration 
The recurrent patterns of activities that a new CEO undertakes in order to gain acceptance 
and support from organizational members and external stakeholders are described as 
“practices of integration.” In the literature we identified four types of integration practices. 
Practices of Building Networks with Top Managers. Building networks with top 
managers is a critical step in a new CEO’s effort to establish effective leadership (Gabarro, 
1979). Two practices have been found to achieve this purpose: personnel replacement and 
relationship building. Helmich and Brown (1972) and Kelly (1980) found that one of the first 
actions of many new CEOs is to replace some top managers in order to establish a TMT that 
they can rely on. This enables the CEO to create complementarity among TMT members in 
terms of personality, interpersonal relations, and skills (Hayes et al., 2006). Hayes et al. 
(2006) found that new CEOs tend to replace particularly TMT members who have a close 
relationship with the former CEO. They also found that these replacements were not 
associated with subsequent strategic changes, which suggests that the CEO’s primary
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tra
te
gi
es
, a
nd
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l s
tru
ct
ur
es
. 
 
 
La
nt
 e
t a
l.,
 1
99
2 
 
N
ew
 C
EO
s o
fte
n 
re
al
ig
n 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
nd
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l s
tru
ct
ur
es
 to
 th
e 
ch
an
gi
ng
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t. 
 
 
M
ill
er
, 1
99
3 
 
In
 a
ll 
ca
se
s, 
ne
w
 C
EO
s t
en
d 
to
 d
ec
en
tra
liz
e 
po
w
er
 a
nd
 to
 u
se
 m
or
e 
so
ur
ce
s o
f i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
in
 d
ec
is
io
n-
m
ak
in
g.
 
  
 
R
om
an
el
li 
an
d 
Tu
sh
m
an
, 1
99
4 
 
N
ew
ly
 a
pp
oi
nt
ed
 C
EO
s a
re
 li
ke
ly
 to
 tr
an
sf
or
m
 st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
nd
 k
ey
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l s
tru
ct
ur
es
 w
ith
in
 a
 sh
or
t p
er
io
d.
 
 
 
Si
m
on
s, 
19
94
 
 
N
ew
 C
EO
s u
se
 fo
ur
 ty
pe
s o
f f
or
m
al
 c
on
tro
l s
ys
te
m
s t
o 
in
tro
du
ce
 a
nd
 im
pl
em
en
t n
ew
 st
ra
te
gi
es
. 
 
R
ec
on
fig
ur
in
g 
th
e 
TM
T 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l d
em
an
ds
 
 
 
B
ar
ro
n 
et
 a
l.,
 2
01
1 
 
C
ha
ng
in
g 
th
e 
TM
T 
en
ab
le
s n
ew
 C
EO
s t
o 
ac
hi
ev
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
or
de
r t
o 
re
al
ig
n 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
to
 it
s 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
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T
ab
le
 3
 (C
on
tin
ue
d)
 
St
ud
ie
s 
  
M
ai
n 
In
si
gh
ts
 
 
 
H
el
m
ic
h 
an
d 
B
ro
w
n,
 1
97
2 
 
N
ew
 C
EO
s c
an
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
TM
T 
to
 b
rin
g 
in
 n
ew
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
es
 a
nd
 sk
ill
s t
ha
t a
re
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 d
ire
ct
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n.
 
 
 
K
ec
k,
 1
99
3 
 
N
ew
 C
EO
s a
re
 li
ke
ly
 to
 re
co
nf
ig
ur
e 
th
e 
TM
T 
to
 c
re
at
e 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
m
em
be
rs
 a
nd
 e
na
bl
e 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 to
 
m
ee
t e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l d
em
an
ds
. 
 
 
Li
n 
an
d 
Li
u,
 2
01
1 
 
Po
st
-s
uc
ce
ss
io
n 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
th
e 
TM
T 
en
ab
le
 th
e 
ne
w
 C
EO
s t
o 
ch
an
ge
 th
e 
st
ra
te
gy
 fo
r e
nt
er
in
g 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l m
ar
ke
ts
. 
 
 
Sh
en
 a
nd
 C
an
ne
lla
, 2
00
2 
 
C
ha
ng
in
g 
TM
T 
m
em
be
rs
 a
fte
r s
uc
ce
ss
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
s t
he
 n
ew
 C
EO
s’
 im
pa
ct
 o
n 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
nd
 th
us
 o
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
 
 
Tu
sh
m
an
 a
nd
 R
os
en
ko
pf
, 1
99
6 
 
W
he
n 
m
ak
in
g 
TM
T 
ch
an
ge
s, 
ne
w
 C
EO
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
th
an
 n
ot
 to
 in
iti
at
e 
di
sc
on
tin
uo
us
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
ch
an
ge
. 
 
R
ec
on
st
itu
tin
g 
ex
te
rn
al
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
 
 
W
es
tp
ha
l e
t a
l.,
 2
00
6 
 
N
ew
 C
EO
s r
ec
on
st
itu
te
 th
ei
r p
re
de
ce
ss
or
s’
 fr
ie
nd
sh
ip
s w
ith
 th
e 
le
ad
er
s o
f i
m
po
rta
nt
 b
us
in
es
s p
ar
tn
er
s. 
 
Se
qu
en
ce
s o
f r
ea
lig
nm
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
 
 
 
G
ab
ar
ro
, 1
98
5 
 
A
 fi
ve
-s
ta
ge
 m
od
el
 o
f h
ow
 n
ew
 C
EO
s t
ak
e 
ch
ar
ge
, w
ith
 th
re
e 
w
av
es
 o
f i
ni
tia
tin
g 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l c
ha
ng
es
. 
 
 
G
re
in
er
 a
nd
 B
ha
m
br
i, 
19
89
 
 
A
 si
x-
st
ag
e 
m
od
el
 o
f h
ow
 a
 n
ew
 C
EO
 su
cc
es
sf
ul
ly
 c
ha
ng
es
 th
e 
st
ra
te
gy
 o
f a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n.
 
T
he
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 n
ew
 C
E
O
’s
 p
ro
pe
rt
ie
s o
n 
po
st
-s
uc
ce
ss
io
n 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
 
Su
cc
es
so
r o
ri
gi
n 
 
 
B
ar
ro
n 
et
 a
l.,
 2
01
1 
 
O
ut
si
de
rs
 w
ho
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
TM
T 
an
d 
in
si
de
rs
 w
ho
 a
re
 c
on
te
nd
er
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
t s
tra
te
gy
 th
an
 
su
cc
es
so
rs
 o
f d
iff
er
en
t o
rig
in
. 
 
 
B
ig
le
y 
an
d 
W
ie
rs
em
a,
 2
00
2 
 
“H
ei
rs
 a
pp
ar
en
t”
 (i
ns
id
er
s)
 a
re
 le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 th
an
 th
ei
r p
ee
rs
 to
 re
fo
cu
s t
he
 fi
rm
’s
 b
us
in
es
s p
or
tfo
lio
. 
 
 
C
ar
ls
on
, 1
96
1 
 
O
ut
si
de
rs
 a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
th
an
 in
si
de
rs
 to
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
ne
w
 ru
le
s a
nd
 e
xp
an
d 
th
ei
r a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
of
fic
e 
(s
ch
oo
l c
as
e 
st
ud
y)
.  
 
 
Fr
ie
dm
an
 a
nd
 S
au
l, 
19
91
 
 
Ex
te
rn
al
 su
cc
es
so
rs
 a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 m
ak
e 
ch
an
ge
s t
o 
th
e 
TM
T 
th
an
 in
te
rn
al
 su
cc
es
so
rs
. 
 
 
H
el
m
ic
h 
an
d 
B
ro
w
n,
 1
97
2 
 
C
om
pa
re
d 
to
 in
si
de
rs
, o
ut
si
de
rs
 a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
m
em
be
rs
 a
nd
 p
os
iti
on
s o
f t
he
 T
M
T.
 
 
 
K
es
ne
r a
nd
 D
al
to
n,
 1
99
4 
 
C
om
pa
re
d 
to
 in
te
rn
al
 su
cc
es
so
rs
, e
xt
er
na
l s
uc
ce
ss
or
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
TM
T 
m
em
be
rs
. 
 
 
N
do
fo
r e
t a
l.,
 2
00
9 
 
A
 n
ew
 le
ad
er
 fr
om
 a
 d
iff
er
en
t c
og
ni
tiv
e 
co
m
m
un
ity
 is
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 in
iti
at
e 
ch
an
ge
s t
ha
n 
a 
le
ad
er
 fr
om
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
gn
iti
ve
 c
om
m
un
ity
. 
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T
ab
le
 3
 (C
on
tin
ue
d)
 
St
ud
ie
s 
 
M
ai
n 
In
si
gh
ts
 
 
 
Sh
im
iz
u 
an
d 
H
itt
, 2
00
5 
 
O
ut
si
de
rs
 a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
th
an
 in
si
de
rs
 to
 m
ak
e 
ch
an
ge
s t
o 
pr
od
uc
t s
tra
te
gi
es
 a
nd
 m
ar
ke
t s
tra
te
gi
es
. 
 
 
W
en
g 
an
d 
Li
n,
 2
01
2 
 
Pr
ev
io
us
 to
p-
jo
b 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
in
si
de
 th
e 
fir
m
 d
ec
re
as
es
 th
e 
te
nd
en
cy
 o
f n
ew
 C
EO
s t
o 
en
ga
ge
 in
 re
al
ig
nm
en
t. 
 
 
W
ie
rs
em
a,
 1
99
2 
 
Ex
te
rn
al
ly
 re
cr
ui
te
d 
C
EO
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
th
an
 in
si
de
rs
 to
 m
ak
e 
ch
an
ge
s t
o 
th
e 
fir
m
’s
 b
us
in
es
s l
in
es
. 
 
 
Zh
an
g,
 2
00
8 
 
In
si
de
rs
 a
nd
 o
ut
si
de
rs
 m
ay
 c
ha
ng
e 
di
ff
er
en
t a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f s
tra
te
gy
 a
nd
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l s
tru
ct
ur
e.
 
 
Su
cc
es
so
r p
ow
er
 
 
 
B
ig
le
y 
an
d 
W
ie
rs
em
a,
 2
00
2 
 
Th
e 
gr
ea
te
r t
he
 p
ow
er
 o
f n
ew
 C
EO
s, 
th
e 
gr
ea
te
r t
he
ir 
la
tit
ud
e 
in
 a
dj
us
tin
g 
th
e 
op
er
at
io
na
l b
us
in
es
s l
in
es
. 
 
 
D
av
id
so
n 
et
 a
l.,
 2
00
4 
 
Po
w
er
fu
l C
EO
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
th
an
 th
ei
r p
ee
rs
 to
 e
ng
ag
e 
in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s m
an
ag
em
en
t t
o 
se
cu
re
 th
ei
r p
os
iti
on
s. 
 
 
Q
ui
gl
ey
 a
nd
 H
am
br
ic
k,
 2
01
2 
 
R
et
ai
ni
ng
 th
e 
pr
ed
ec
es
so
r a
s c
ha
irm
an
 re
st
ric
ts
 th
e 
ne
w
 C
EO
 in
 re
al
ig
ni
ng
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
to
 it
s e
nv
iro
nm
en
t. 
 
E
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
 fa
ct
or
s 
 
 
B
oe
ke
r, 
19
97
 
 
N
ew
 C
EO
s f
ro
m
 o
ut
si
de
 a
re
 li
ke
ly
 to
 le
ad
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
to
 e
nt
er
 n
ew
 p
ro
du
ct
 m
ar
ke
ts
 o
f w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e.
 
  
 
D
at
ta
 e
t a
l.,
 2
00
3 
 
Th
e 
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
s (
te
nu
re
, a
ge
, e
du
ca
tio
n)
 o
f n
ew
 C
EO
s a
ff
ec
t w
he
th
er
 th
ey
 k
ee
p 
or
 c
ha
ng
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
st
ra
te
gi
es
. 
 
 
Fo
nd
as
 a
nd
 W
ie
rs
em
a,
 1
99
7 
 
A
 th
eo
re
tic
al
 m
od
el
 o
f h
ow
 so
ci
al
iz
at
io
n 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
s i
nf
lu
en
ce
 th
e 
ne
w
 C
EO
s’
 in
te
nt
io
ns
 to
 re
al
ig
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
an
d 
th
ei
r a
bi
lit
y 
to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 th
at
. 
 
 
K
ra
at
z 
an
d 
M
oo
re
, 2
00
2 
 
In
 th
ei
r n
ew
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 n
ew
 C
EO
s t
en
d 
to
 a
do
pt
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
pr
og
ra
m
s t
he
y 
ad
op
te
d 
in
 th
ei
r p
re
vi
ou
s o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n.
 
T
he
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
f p
ra
ct
ic
al
 c
on
te
xt
s o
n 
po
st
-s
uc
ce
ss
io
n 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
 
Su
cc
es
si
on
 c
on
te
xt
s 
 
 
B
ar
ke
r a
nd
 M
on
e,
 1
99
8 
 
In
 c
as
es
 o
f p
oo
r p
re
-s
uc
ce
ss
io
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, n
ew
 C
EO
s t
en
d 
to
 c
en
tra
liz
e 
co
nt
ro
l s
ys
te
m
s a
nd
 c
ha
ng
e 
m
ar
ke
t 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
du
ct
 st
ra
te
gi
es
. 
 
 
D
av
id
so
n 
et
 a
l.,
 2
00
4 
 
N
ew
 C
EO
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 e
ng
ag
e 
in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s m
an
ag
em
en
t t
o 
se
cu
re
 th
ei
r p
os
iti
on
 w
he
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 is
 p
oo
r 
th
an
 w
he
n 
it 
is
 g
oo
d.
 
 
 
D
en
is
 a
nd
 D
en
is
, 1
99
5 
 
Po
or
 p
re
-s
uc
ce
ss
io
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 le
ad
s n
ew
 C
EO
s t
o 
do
w
ns
iz
e 
an
d 
ex
it 
ex
is
tin
g 
pr
od
uc
t l
in
es
 o
r m
ar
ke
ts
. 
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T
ab
le
 3
 (C
on
tin
ue
d)
 
St
ud
ie
s 
 
M
ai
n 
In
si
gh
ts
 
 
 
Fa
rr
el
l a
nd
 W
hi
db
ee
, 2
00
0 
 
W
he
n 
th
e 
fo
rm
er
 C
EO
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
di
sm
is
se
d,
 n
ew
 C
EO
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 re
pl
ac
e 
th
e 
ou
ts
id
e 
di
re
ct
or
s t
ha
n 
in
 o
th
er
 
ca
se
s. 
 
 
G
oo
ds
te
in
 a
nd
 B
oe
ke
r, 
19
91
 
 
A
 c
ha
ng
e 
of
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
of
 d
ire
ct
or
s d
ur
in
g 
su
cc
es
si
on
 e
na
bl
es
 th
e 
ne
w
 C
EO
 to
 in
iti
at
e 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
or
de
r t
o 
re
al
ig
n 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n.
 
 
 
G
ra
ff
in
 e
t a
l.,
 2
01
3 
 
B
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 h
ig
h 
un
ce
rta
in
ty
 in
 th
e 
po
st
-s
uc
ce
ss
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s, 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
us
es
 h
eu
ris
tic
s a
nd
 d
ra
w
s o
n 
va
rio
us
 
su
cc
es
si
on
 c
on
te
xt
s t
o 
ev
al
ua
te
 th
e 
ne
w
 C
EO
. 
 
 
K
ar
ae
vl
i, 
20
07
 
 
Po
or
 p
re
-s
uc
ce
ss
io
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 re
st
ric
ts
 th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 o
f n
ew
 C
EO
s t
o 
m
ak
e 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
or
de
r t
o 
al
ig
n 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
to
 it
s e
nv
iro
nm
en
t. 
 
 
K
ar
ae
vl
i a
nd
 Z
aj
ac
, 2
01
3 
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 st
ab
ili
ty
 a
llo
w
s o
ut
si
de
rs
 to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 a
 h
ig
he
r d
eg
re
e 
of
 re
al
ig
nm
en
t. 
 
 
K
en
se
r a
nd
 D
al
to
n,
 1
99
4 
 
In
 c
as
es
 o
f p
oo
r p
re
-s
uc
ce
ss
io
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, n
ew
 C
EO
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
TM
T 
th
an
 in
 o
th
er
 c
as
es
. 
 
 
Po
ur
ci
au
, 1
99
3 
 
In
 c
as
es
 o
f n
on
-r
ou
tin
e 
su
cc
es
si
on
, n
ew
 C
EO
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 m
an
ip
ul
at
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
 th
an
 in
 c
as
es
 o
f r
ou
tin
e 
su
cc
es
si
on
. 
 
 
W
ie
rs
em
a,
 1
99
5 
 
In
 c
as
es
 o
f n
on
-r
ou
tin
e 
su
cc
es
si
on
 n
ew
 C
EO
s a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 d
iv
es
t p
oo
rly
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
bu
si
ne
ss
es
 th
an
 in
 c
as
es
 o
f 
ro
ut
in
e 
su
cc
es
si
on
. 
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l c
on
te
xt
s 
 
 
B
oe
ke
r, 
19
97
 
 
Lo
ng
 T
M
T 
te
nu
re
 a
nd
 la
rg
e 
TM
T 
si
ze
 c
on
st
ra
in
 th
e 
ef
fo
rts
 o
f n
ew
 C
EO
s t
o 
le
ad
 th
e 
fir
m
 to
 e
nt
er
 n
ew
 p
ro
du
ct
 
m
ar
ke
ts
. 
 
 
D
en
is
 e
t a
l.,
 2
00
0 
 
In
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
w
ith
 h
ig
hl
y 
di
ff
er
en
tia
te
d 
so
ci
al
 g
ro
up
s, 
ne
w
 C
EO
s m
ay
 u
se
 d
iff
er
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
 to
 in
te
gr
at
e 
w
ith
 
ea
ch
 g
ro
up
. 
 
 
Fo
nd
as
 a
nd
 W
ie
rs
em
a,
 1
99
7 
 
Th
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s o
f t
he
 T
M
T 
an
d 
its
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 n
ew
 C
EO
 c
an
 in
flu
en
ce
 a
 n
ew
 C
EO
’s
 in
te
nt
io
n 
to
 m
ak
e 
ch
an
ge
s a
im
ed
 a
t r
ea
lig
nm
en
t. 
 
 
Li
n 
an
d 
Li
u,
 2
01
2 
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l s
la
ck
 g
iv
es
 n
ew
 C
EO
s m
or
e 
di
sc
re
tio
n 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 st
ra
te
gy
 fo
r e
nt
er
in
g 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
m
ar
ke
ts
. 
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T
ab
le
 3
 (C
on
tin
ue
d)
 
St
ud
ie
s 
 
M
ai
n 
In
si
gh
ts
 
 
 
K
rie
ge
r a
nd
 A
ng
, 2
01
3 
 
Th
e 
hi
gh
er
 th
e 
pr
es
su
re
 o
f m
ee
tin
g 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 a
bo
ut
 c
om
pa
ny
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
, t
he
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
th
at
 th
e 
ne
w
 C
EO
 w
ill
 
m
an
ip
ul
at
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
. 
 
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l c
on
te
xt
s 
 
 
D
at
ta
 e
t a
l.,
 2
00
3 
 
N
ew
 C
EO
s f
in
d 
it 
ea
si
er
 to
 a
pp
ly
 re
al
ig
nm
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
 in
 in
du
st
rie
s c
ha
ra
ct
er
iz
ed
 b
y 
hi
gh
 d
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n,
 h
ig
h 
gr
ow
th
, a
nd
 lo
w
 c
ap
ita
l i
nt
en
si
ty
. 
 
 
K
ar
av
el
i, 
20
07
 
 
Th
e 
tu
rb
ul
en
ce
 a
nd
 m
un
ifi
ce
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t a
m
pl
ify
 o
ut
si
de
r C
EO
s' 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
st
ra
te
gy
 a
nd
 th
us
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
. 
 
 
Li
n 
an
d 
Li
u,
 2
01
1 
 
A
 m
un
ifi
ce
nt
 o
r c
om
pl
ex
 in
du
st
ry
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t e
na
bl
es
 n
ew
 C
EO
s t
o 
in
tro
du
ce
 c
ha
ng
es
 to
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t s
tra
te
gy
. 
 
 
N
ak
au
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intention was to become integrated into the TMT, rather than to initiate strategic change. 
Such changes allow new CEOs to bring in their own allies, who can help them gain support 
in the company and to adapt more easily by facilitating the flow of information across 
different levels (Grusky, 1969). This tendency has been often described in the business press. 
In BlackBerry, for example, when John Chen took the CEO position in November 2013, he 
immediately recruited some key top managers he used to work with at Sybase (CBC, 2014). 
New CEOs may occasionally replace even some board members for similar reasons: as 
Farrell and Whidbee (2000: 607) suggest, new CEOs typically “seek to replace those 
directors that force CEO turnover with directors that are less likely to challenge [their] 
decisions.”  
Although the replacement of top managers can be an effective way of creating a fit 
between the CEO and the organization, it may not always be feasible, especially when these 
managers are powerful and hold valuable firm-specific knowledge. Kelly (1980) found that 
new CEOs tend to build a team with an equal number of new and old executives. In such 
cases, gaining support from the existing members is essential: as Xuan (2009) has argued, 
new CEOs may use capital allocation as a means of building relationships with powerful 
managers. His study showed that in multi-segment firms new CEOs promoted from within 
often shift resource allocation to the divisions with which they were not previously affiliated; 
this indicates that new CEOs “use the capital budget as a bridge-building tool to elicit 
cooperation from powerful divisional managers” (Xuan, 2009: 4919). 
Practices of Adjusting Performance to Expectations. New CEOs typically experience 
pressure to improve the firm’s performance, particularly when this has been declining 
(Barker and Mone, 1998; Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Krieger and Ang, 2013). Thus, it is 
crucial for new CEOs to meet the expectations of the board of directors in order to gain 
legitimacy and to secure their position (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Past studies have 
found that new CEOs—possibly because it often takes a long time to build a successful 
record—try to enhance the impression of their performance in the short term in order to gain 
acceptance and to secure their positions. They achieve this either through earnings 
management (Bens, 2002; Davidson et al., 2004; Krieger and Ang, 2013) or by cutting long-
term investments (Harrison and Fiet, 1999). Pourciau (1993) found that new CEOs often 
deflate earnings in the year of succession and inflate earnings in the following year, instead 
of trying to enhance the firm performance as soon as they become appointed. This allows the 
new CEO to attribute the firm’s bad performance to the former leadership and take the credit 
for improvements in performance. In sum, these studies suggest that CEOs have some 
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discretion in adjusting financial measures and sometimes use it to establish a record of 
success early on. An exception within this line of research is an early study by Lasalle et al. 
(1993), who did not find evidence that new CEOs manipulated earnings, although they did 
tend to adjust financial measures.  
Practices of Shaping Shared Expectations. Some scholars have argued that, in order 
to be able to work together, the new leader and other organizational members have to align 
their expectations and understandings of how things work in the organization (Denis et al., 
2000; Gabarro, 1979). Gabarro (1979) found that new CEOs spend a lot of time on working 
with key subordinates to develop joint expectations about each party’s role and the way in 
which they can work together effectively. The practices to achieve this purpose include 
discovering each party’s initial expectations, exploring each party’s expectations and 
concerns in detail, and testing whether the expectations each party has of the other converge. 
Gabarro’s findings (1979) highlight how important it is that both the new CEO and the 
subordinates become aware of and adjust to each other’s expectations in order to achieve 
some form of stability within the organization. In a related case study, Denis et al. (2000) 
found that while the new CEO perceived his own role as an innovator who would challenge 
the status quo, the organization expected him to promote the existing strategy. To eliminate 
the divergence, the new CEO adopted various practices of learning, persuasion, and power 
consolidation, which led to the convergence of the two parties’ expectations. More generally, 
Denis et al. (2000) identified two different modes in which new CEOs and organizational 
members develop their shared expectations: a cooperative mode, whereby the leader adapts to 
the expectations of organizational members, and an affirmative mode, whereby the leader 
modifies the expectations of organizational members.  
Practices of Projecting a Positive External Image. Creating a positive impression, 
also among external stakeholders, appears to be important to new CEOs. Analyzing the 
letters that new CEOs sent to shareholders and the interviews they gave to the media, Fanelli 
and Grasselli (2006) found that using categories and labels, as well as prototypical and 
emotional language, helps CEOs project charisma and thereby be positively perceived by 
investors. In a later study, Fanelli et al. (2009) showed that CEOs construct charisma by 
assessing the current situation of the organization as intolerable, articulating ideological 
goals, and emphasizing the role of collective efficacy in achieving these goals. These two 
studies by Fanelli et al. suggest that new CEOs use discourse to build a positive image that 
may help them gain acceptance from external stakeholders. 
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Temporal Sequencing of Integration Practices. In addition to identifying different 
integration practices researchers have also investigated their temporal sequencing. As Denis 
et al. (2000: 1064) remarked, “the respect and esteem of organization members,” which is a 
precondition for effective leadership, “is rarely acquired instantaneously, but evolves over 
time.” New CEOs, as Kelley (1980) found, establish their acceptance and informal authority 
in the course of a six-month “honeymoon,” and turn their attention to strategy afterwards. 
Two studies have examined how various sub-practices that are subsumed under integration 
practices and whose purpose is to shape shared expectations are adopted over time. In the 
first of these, Gabarro (1979) studied four new CEOs in order to identify patterns in the 
process through which they formed mutual expectations and built working relationships with 
subordinates over a three-year period. He found that a stable CEO–subordinate relationship 
tends to develop in four stages: (1) orientation: the CEO and the subordinate form an 
impression of each other, (2) exploration: they find out each other’s expectations in detail, (3) 
testing: they test each other against their own expectations about roles, trust, and influence, 
and (4) stabilization: if there is mutual acceptance, the relationship is likely to become stable.  
While Gabarro (1979) concentrated on the expectations that a CEO and an individual 
subordinate have of each other, Denis et al. (2000) focused on how a new CEO develops 
shared expectations with different divisions within the organization. Denis et al. (2000) 
suggested that CEO integration involves three sub-practices, which new CEOs may use 
sequentially or in parallel: (1) learning by observing and listening, or through trial-and-error, 
(2) persuasion, which describes the new CEO’s effort to influence the expectations of others 
by aligning his or her own interests with those of others or by selling his or her initial 
proposals and negotiating back, and (3) power consolidation, i.e., performing expected roles 
or changing the formal role structures. These two studies by Gabarro (1979) and Denis et al. 
(2000) provide important insights into the complicated dynamics of CEO integration over 
time. 
Critical Assessment of the Existing Studies. The studies reviewed above contribute to 
the overall understanding of how new CEOs create a fit between themselves and their 
organization by actively managing their relations to different social groups: top managers, the 
board of directors, different departments, and even external stakeholders. However, there are 
some obvious gaps in the literature, as our review makes clear: First, the relation between the 
identified integration practices has yet to be explored. Although our review shows the 
importance of different groups of stakeholders, it is not clear how new CEOs prioritize their 
integration activities with these groups over time. Obviously, CEOs cannot attend to all 
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groups with the same intensity and at the same time. Moreover, little is known about how the 
integration of the CEO with one social group influences his or her integration with other 
groups. Second, there are indications that there are integration practices that have not been 
studied yet. For example, considering that new CEOs use particular discursive practices to 
influence external stakeholders, they are likely to use comparable practices to influence also 
the internal stakeholders (Fanelli et al., 2009). 
2.3.2 Influences of Key Properties of New CEOs on Integration 
Various studies have examined how certain key properties, such as the “origin” of new CEOs 
(i.e., whether they are recruited internally or externally) and the sources of their power, 
influence the integration process and the creation of a fit between the new CEO and the 
organization.  
The Successor’s Origin and its Influence on Integration. Whether the new CEO is 
selected from a pool of external or internal candidates has been identified as an important 
factor that influences the process of integration (Friedman and Saul, 1991; Helmich and 
Brown, 1972). Internal successors typically possess organization-specific knowledge and 
have already established personal relationships with other members of the organization (Cao 
et al., 2006; Helmich and Brown, 1972). In contrast, external successors typically need to 
acquire this kind of knowledge and develop these relationships. Helmich and Brown (1972), 
for example, have shown that external successors are more likely to change the “executive 
role constellation” either by replacing certain TMT members or by expanding the number of 
TMT positions. Similarly, Friedman and Saul (1991) found that external successors are 
associated with a relatively high turnover of TMT members.  
The New CEO’s Power and Its Influence on Integration. Davidson et al. (2004) 
argued that having more power allows a new CEO to achieve credibility more effectively by 
controlling the earnings ratio. Their study compared how new CEOs who also chair the board 
manage earnings compared to their peers. Their findings show that powerful CEOs who also 
chair the board are more likely to use earnings management as a means of securing their 
positions. This study suggests that the power that new CEOs hold offers them more latitude 
in the process of achieving integration with their organization. 
Critical Assessment of the Existing Studies. Our review indicates that the origin and 
the power of new CEOs affect considerably their choice of integration practices. Both 
properties influence the knowledge that new CEOs acquire, the personal relationships they 
build, and the degree of latitude they have in managing their relationship to the organization. 
  
37 
 
However, most existing studies focus exclusively on CEOs and do not consider how the 
properties of other stakeholders affect the practices that mediate the new CEO’s integration. 
For example, it is unclear how differently new and existing TMT members may behave and 
how this difference might influence the integration of the new CEO. Moreover, existing 
studies do not distinguish between stable and dynamic properties of new CEOs. Some 
properties, such as power, could change as a consequence of previous integration practices. 
For example, the practices of building networks with top managers might increase the CEO’s 
power, which then influence their discretion of manipulating earnings to fulfill the board’s 
expectations on improving performance. The reciprocal influence between relative power and 
integration practices is a striking gap in the post-succession literature.  
2.3.3 The Influence of the Practical Context on Integration 
Extant studies have identified various contextual factors that influence the ways in which 
CEOs employ integration practices. These factors are associated either with the succession 
context or the context of the organization in general.  
The Context of Succession and Its Influence on Integration. One dominant factor in 
the context of succession is whether a new CEO is appointed unexpectedly or as a matter of 
routine. Farrell and Whidbee (2000) found that in cases of CEO dismissal, the new CEO was 
more likely to replace the outside directors than when the new appointment was made as a 
matter of course. One possible reason for this is that the new CEO considers the outside 
directors who dismissed the former CEO more likely to challenge his or her decision-making; 
by replacing these directors with people less likely to challenge their decisions, new CEOs 
may find it easier to work with the board (Farrell and Whidbee, 2000). With respect to how 
new CEOs use earnings management to meet expectations about performance, Pourciau 
(1993) found that in cases of non-routine succession, new CEOs are more likely to manage 
earnings in order to meet the expectation of improved performance than in cases of routine 
succession. The author argued that since non-routine succession is typically unplanned and 
followed by disruption in the organization’s operation, it provides new CEOs with 
considerable opportunities for earnings management (Pourciau, 1993). In a related study, 
Davidson et al. (2004) argued that when pre-succession performance is poor, the expectation 
that the new CEO will improve the firm’s performance is higher. Indeed, the authors found 
that in cases of poor pre-succession performance, new CEOs were more likely to employ 
earnings management as a means of enhancing short-term performance.  
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The Organizational Context and Its Influence on Integration. Several studies 
examined how the organizational context influences the integration practices that new CEOs 
choose to apply. Krieger and Ang (2013) found that when the expectations of improving 
organizational performance and the pressure to achieve that performance are high, new CEOs 
are more likely to engage in earnings management in order to meet these expectations. Denis 
et al. (2000) explored the integration of a CEO at a hospital, a complex organization that 
comprises two distinct social groups: administrative staff and clinical staff. The authors found 
that the new CEO adopted different integration practices in relation to each group: to 
integrate with clinical staff, the CEO used collaborative practices; while to integrate with 
administrative staff, he used affirmative practices (Denis et al., 2000). Independently of the 
particular hospital setting, this study suggests that the existence of distinct social groups in an 
organization has an impact on the integration process of a new CEO. 
Critical Assessment of the Existing Studies. The reviewed studies have shown that 
contextual factors related to the succession process as such and to general organizational 
aspects can both facilitate and constrain attempts at creating a fit between the new CEO and 
the organization. While we already know a lot about the role of the practical context, our 
systematic review also reveals some gaps in this research. First, different studies have 
identified opposing effects of the same contextual factors. For example, while Pourciau 
(1993) showed that non-routine succession, because of the uncertainty it involves, allowed 
new CEOs to manage earnings in order to meet performance expectations, Bens (2002) 
showed that it limits the scope for managing earnings, as the board is likely to monitor the 
new CEO more closely. This contradiction points to the fact that we lack a proper 
understanding of how different practical contexts come to bear on the post-succession 
process. Second, most works so far focused on the impact of the local context, neglecting the 
effects of the broader industry context and the cultural environment. Given that the practices 
involved in the process of integration are largely socially embedded, these broader contexts 
are very likely to have a strong impact on how new CEOs fulfill the expectations of various 
stakeholders. So far we have little understanding of the extent to which such wider contexts 
influence what particular integration practices are adopted by new CEOs and how they are 
enacted. 
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2.4 Realignment of Organization and Environment 
Our review reveals that the post-succession process involves not only the creation of a fit 
between the new CEO and the organization, but also the establishment or maintenance of a fit 
between the organization and its environment. New CEOs typically adopt a range of different 
practices aimed at realigning the organization with its environment. In the following, we 
discuss the practices of realignment identified in the literature and how the properties of new 
CEOs and of the practical context affect the adoption of these practices.  
2.4.1 Practices of Realignment 
When a new CEO takes over, the ensuing realignment of the organization may either spring 
from the new CEO’s initiative or follow a mandate issued by the board (Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001). Several studies have examined the “practices of realignment”, which 
refers to the recurrent patterns of activities that new CEOs undertake to realign the different 
aspects of the organization with the environment. We discuss below different types of 
realignment practices identified in the literature.  
Practices of Initiating Changes to Product Strategies and Market Strategies. Several 
studies have shown that in order to realign the organization to its environment, a new CEO is 
likely to initiate changes that relate to its products or to the markets in which it operates. 
These changes may involve entering new markets (Boeker, 1997; Wischnevsk, 20Y08), 
exiting business lines or markets (Barron et al., 2011; Denis and Denis, 1995), changing the 
business or product portfolio (Goodstein, 1991; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Wiersema, 
1992, 1995), and adjusting resource allocation among different departments (Datta et al., 
2003; Weng and Lin, 2012). For instance, within three months after taking office as CEO of 
Alcatel-Lucent in 2013, Michel Combes announced a plan to focus on networking products 
and high-speed broadbrand, which would transform the firm from a telecoms generalist to a 
specialist (Abboud, 2013). Other studies have also found that new CEOs tend to refocus the 
company strategy by divesting poorly performing assets and businesses that had been 
acquired by the former leadership (Berger and Ofek, 1999; Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; 
Weisbach, 1995). Some researchers note that the appointment of a new CEO often leads to 
strategic reorientation—namely, to simultaneous changes in all the major aspects of an 
organization (Gordon et al., 2000; Lant et al., 1992; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Virany 
et al., 1992), including changes to the product strategy and the market strategy, as well as to 
organizational structures and processes (see next section). All these studies suggest that, 
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because new CEOs are more open to external scanning and less committed to existing 
strategies than their predecessors, they often redefine various dimensions of the 
organization’s strategy.  
Practices of Adjusting Organizational Structures and Processes. There is evidence 
that new CEOs often also adjust internal structures and processes, occasionally combining 
these changes with those of product and market strategies (Gordon et al., 2000; Lant et al., 
1992; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Virany et al., 1992). The intention behind making 
changes to an organization’s internal structure and processes may be to improve immediately 
the firm’s efficiency (Gabarro, 1985) or to facilitate changes in product or market strategies 
later on. For example, when Benard Fontana took office in 2012 as the CEO of Holcim, a 
global leading supplier of cement and aggregates, he immediately announced a program 
called “Holcim Leadership Journey,” whose target was to optimize the internal operational 
structures and processes in order to improve profitability within the existing strategy 
(Holcim, 2012).  
In an early study, Carlson (1961: 226) found that new school principals (particularly 
if recruited externally) were likely to develop new rules and policies and to “prepare the 
organization for new ways of functioning by expanding administrative staff.” Miller (1993) 
found that new CEOs often changed the major dimensions of structure and process in their 
organization. His results suggest that new CEOs tend to decentralize power in the control 
system and diversify the sources of information they use in their decision-making. Both 
practices may help new CEOs gain new perspectives and encourage new initiatives that 
promote change in response to environmental demands (Miller, 1993). Similarly, Simons 
(1994) emphasized that adjusting formal control systems was crucial to a new CEO’s efforts 
to initiate and implement a new strategic agenda. He found that new CEOs use managerial 
control systems to “formalize beliefs, set boundaries on acceptable strategic behavior, define 
and measure critical performance variables, and motivate debate and discussion about 
strategic uncertainties” (Simons, 1994: 169).  
Practices of Reconfiguring the TMT in Line with Environmental Demands. Our 
review shows that another important realignment practice to reconfigure the TMT according 
to environmental demands (Helmich and Brown, 1972). Helmich and Brown (1972) argued 
that by replacing existing executives, new CEOs could introduce new perspectives and 
competences that are necessary to direct an organization. Keck (1993) found that new CEOs 
are likely to reconfigure the TMT in a way that creates heterogeneity, which helps 
organizations meet environmental demands. In addition, several studies have shown that new 
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CEOs are more likely than longer-serving CEOs to introduce changes in general in order to 
realign the organization with its environment (Barron et al., 2011; Kesner and Dalton, 1994; 
Lin and Liu, 2011; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). A good example of a new CEO who 
reconfigured the TMT to enable the company to meet environmental demands is Meg 
Whitman, CEO of Hewlett-Packard. Within two years after taking office, she replaced the 
executives who headed Printing and Personal Systems and Enterprise Group. As she said in a 
conference call, “my job is to get the right people in the right job, at the right time, with the 
right experience and domain expertise. [...] I have got to match the right executive to the 
challenge at the time” (cited in Burt, 2013: 1). However, as we noted earlier, replacing 
executives is also an important integration practice that can help the new CEO gain 
acceptance and political support. This indicates potential links between the integration and 
realignment practices.  
Practices of Reconstituting External Relationships. External relationships are an 
important means by which organizations gain support and acquire resources. Westphal et al. 
(2006) found that new CEOs tended to befriend the CEOs of key business partners and 
financial institutions in order to secure access to critical resources; this often involved 
reconstituting the personal ties of the outgoing CEO. In highly competitive environments new 
CEOs may establish friendly relationships with the CEOs of competitors, while in firms that 
depend strongly on external capital they may befriend the CEOs of financial institutions. 
Overall, the study by Westphal et al. (2006) suggests that new CEOs need to maintain or 
establish strategic external relationships in order to realign the organization with its 
environment.  
Temporal Sequencing of Realignment Practices. Although most studies focus on 
individual realignment practices, some have examined temporal sequencing of these practices 
(Gabarro, 1985; Greiner and Bhambri, 1989). In an early study, Gabarro (1985) described 
how successful leaders adjust organizational structures and processes at the beginning of their 
tenure. He presented a five-stage model of the post-succession process, which is 
characterized by three waves of change: (1) taking hold (orientational learning accompanied 
by corrective changes), (2) immersion (reflective and finer-grained learning accompanied by 
small changes), (3) reshaping (major changes), (4) consolidation (of earlier changes), and (5) 
refinement (incremental changes accompanied by some additional learning). In his model, 
learning and change alternate sequentially. Learning ranges from becoming informed about 
the organization’s current situation to diagnosing how to improve its performance, while the 
scope of change ranges from correcting certain aspects of the organization to profound 
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changes that reshape the organization. Gabarro (1985) showed that new CEOs make changes 
mainly in stages (1), (3), and (4).  
In another study, Greiner and Bhambri (1989) focused on sequential changes in 
strategy. The authors proposed a six-stage model delineating how a new CEO achieves a 
deliberate change of strategy, which they based on their study of a successful case of strategic 
change in the post-succession process. The model consisted in (1) taking over from the 
predecessor, (2) solving short-term problems, (3) building commitment to strategic change, 
(4) realigning the organization’s structure with strategy and key people, (5) empowering 
middle managers, (6) installing incentive systems. This model suggests that at each different 
stage, the new CEO needs to focus on specific issues. 
Critical Assessment of the Existing Studies. As our review shows, extant research has 
identified many practices that new CEOs tend to adopt in order to realign the organization 
with its environment. These practices concern various aspects of the relation between the 
organization and its environment. Although the practices of realignment have been studied 
extensively, there are certain gaps that impede our understanding of the realignment process. 
First, some of these practices have only been studied on a very general level, rather than in 
detail. Thus, currently little is known about the specific activities employed in enacting these 
practices. As to reconfiguring the TMT for example, it is not clear how new CEOs identify 
the environmental demands and how they evaluate the TMT’s existing members and how 
they select new members to meet these demands. Second, very little attention has been paid 
to the linkages between various realignment practices. For example, we know little about the 
extent to which particular practices might facilitate or hinder the adoption of other practices 
or how the changes that a new CEO makes to the product strategies and market strategies of 
the organization interrelate with the reconfiguration of the TMT and the reconstitution of 
external relationships. Third, the interrelation between realignment practices and integration 
practices has yet to be explored. Our review shows that the existing studies typically focus on 
either integration practices or realignment practices, but rarely on both. As we will elaborate 
in the last part of this paper, how these two types of practices interrelate is a particularly 
promising avenue for future research. 
2.4.2 Influences of Key Properties of New CEOs on the Realignment between 
Organization and Environment 
Various studies have shown that whether and how new CEOs adopt particular realignment 
practices depends on their socialization background and the power they hold (Fondas and 
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Wiersema, 1997; Bigley and Wiersema, 2002). Researchers have already sought to identify 
indicators that reflect the cognitive schemes that new CEOs use, the knowledge and skills 
they possess, and their commitment to the status quo, all of which influence significantly how 
they view the relationship between their organization and the environment and their 
capability of making necessary changes (Fondas and Wiersema, 1997; Hutzschenreuter et al., 
2012).  
The Origin of CEOs and Its Influence on Realignment. The origin of CEOs has been 
recognized as a key indicator of how new CEOs view the relationship between their 
organization and the environment. In contrast to internally promoted CEOs, new CEOs 
recruited from outside tend to bring in a cognitive perspective that is different from the 
dominant perspective within the organization and to have a low commitment to the status 
quo. Several studies have found that, compared to “insiders,” “outsiders” are more likely to 
adjust the organization to the demands that its environment poses. To that end, new CEOs 
employ various practices, such as redefining the product strategy and the market strategy 
(Shimizu and Hitt, 2005; Wiersema, 1992), reconfiguring the TMT (Helmich and Brown, 
1972; Kesner and Dalton, 1994), and adjusting the internal structure and processes of the 
organization (Gabarro, 1985; Miller, 1993; Simons, 1994).  
More recent studies tend to distinguish between different types of insiders and of 
outsiders. Bigley and Wiersema (2002), for example, argued that the distinction between an 
“heir apparent” and other insiders is important. The typical “heir apparent” will have been 
involved in formulating the current strategy together with the former CEO and is thus likely 
to be committed to the status quo. Moreover, as the authors found, in cases where the “heir 
apparent” was eventually appointed CEO, he or she was more likely than other types of 
candidates not to change the company’s products and markets. Similarly, Weng and Lin 
(2012) found that the experience that new CEOs have previously gained as members of the 
company’s TMT or board is negatively associated with changes in resource allocation. In two 
other studies, Shen and Cannella (2002), and subsequently Barron et al. (2011), categorized 
insiders into “contenders” and “followers”; the former are those who succeed a dismissed 
CEO, while the latter are those who succeed a retired CEO. Both studies demonstrated that 
the perspective of contenders differs from that of their predecessors. Supporting this 
argument, Barron et al. (2011) found that contenders are more likely than followers to lead 
the firm to exit a business line. 
Other studies distinguish between different categories of outsiders on the basis of the 
degree to which the new CEO is unfamiliar with the nature of the new organization. Karaevli 
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(2007) and Karaevli and Zajac (2013) argued that the degree to which a new CEO is 
considered an “outsider” depends on his or her experiences in other firms and industries: the 
greater the “distance” between the type of company to which the new CEO has been 
appointed and his or her previous company, the greater the probability that the new CEO will 
introduce new perspectives and skills. Similarly, Ndofor et al. (2009) found that when the 
cognitive community that new leaders represent is different from that of their predecessors, 
newcomers tend to introduce more drastic changes to the organizational structure than leaders 
who are part of their predecessors’ cognitive community. These results suggest that it is 
necessary to differentiate more precisely new CEOs according to their origin in order to gain 
insight into how a new CEO intends to adjust the relationship between the organization and 
its environment. Tellingly, Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010) found that the changes initiated by 
outsiders have a greater (positive or negative) impact on organizational performance than 
those initiated by insiders. Their study also indicates that insiders and outsiders tend to 
concentrate on different aspects of organizational realignment, a finding that needs to be 
investigated in greater depth by future research as we will argue below.  
How the New CEO’s Experience and Demographic Background Influence 
Realignment. There is evidence that new CEOs tend to draw on previous experience when 
they realign the organization with its environment (Boeker, 1997; Kraatz and Moore, 2002). 
In particular, Boeker (1997) found that CEOs recruited from outside tend to lead the 
company into the product markets in which their former organization also operated, while 
Kraatz and Moore (2002) found that they are likely to implement strategic programs similar 
to those they applied in their former organization. Moreover, Boeker (1997) found that new 
CEOs with experience of R&D and engineering are more likely to adjust the product 
strategies, indicating the impact of the CEO’s functional background. In another study, 
Ndofor et al. (2009) examined whether the new CEOs’ realignment practices are influenced 
by the extent to which they were successful in their previous jobs. Surprisingly, they found 
that the new leader’s prior experience of “top-job” success and the magnitude of the changes 
that he or she makes to the current organization’s structures are negatively related. On the 
basis of their findings, the authors suggested that experienced new leaders with a successful 
track record may employ fewer but more effective practices of organizational adjustment.  
Some scholars also use demographic variables to assess how a new CEO will realign 
the organization to its environment. Fondas and Wiersema (1997), for example, argued that 
demographic variables indicate the socialization background of new CEOs; to the extent that 
this background shapes the values and skills of new CEOs, it can influence the direction and 
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magnitude of the changes they pursue in the process of organizational realignment. Similarly, 
Datta et al. (2003) identified a set of demographic variables—tenure, education, and age—as 
indicators of a new CEO’s “openness to change.” They found that shorter tenure, higher 
education, and younger age were negatively associated with maintaining existing strategies.  
The Influence of CEO Power on Realignment. The extent of power that a new CEO 
has over other key stakeholders also appears to be important for their actions. Bigley and 
Wiersema (2002) found that the more power a new CEO holds, the more latitude he or she 
has in adjusting the company’s product lines. The presence of the new CEO’s predecessor on 
the board, who may constrain the newcomer’s plans to make necessary changes, indicates 
that the latter’s power may be limited. Nakauchi and Wiersema (2014) and Quigley and 
Hambrick (2012) found that retaining the previous CEO as chairman significantly reduces the 
likelihood that the new CEO will be able to make changes to the company’s product 
strategies and market strategies.  
Critical Assessment of the Existing Studies. The studies reviewed above show that 
differences in the origin, experience, and background of new CEOs, as well as their relative 
power over others, shape their views of the relationship between their organization and its 
environment and affect the extent to which they can and do engage in particular realignment 
practices. However, three gaps are noted. First, to date no study has examined how the 
specific realignment practices that new CEOs employ affect their properties reciprocally. For 
example, after having engaged in certain realignment practices (such as reconstituting 
external strategic relationships), the new CEO might change his or her initial perspective and 
develop new views on the organization-environment relationship, which is likely to affect 
their subsequent realignment activities. Second, we know little about how different types of 
board members and other top managers affect the realignment process and how they get 
involved in the realignment practices. Third, we know very little about the way in which new 
CEOs’ functional background affects their realignment practices. As indicated by Boeker 
(1997), different functional backgrounds are likely to direct a new CEO’s attention to 
different aspects of the organization affecting what realignment practices will be employed.  
2.4.3 The Influence of the Practical Context on Realignment Practices  
Extant research has identified several contextual factors that influence critically the choice of 
realignment practices. These factors are related to the succession context, the organizational 
context, and the environmental context.  
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The Succession Context and Its Influence on Realignment. Change of ownership and 
changes in the board at the time of CEO succession were found to enable the realignment of 
the organization with its environment (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991). This is because the old 
shareholders and board members may block the new CEO’s realignment initiatives. Some 
studies suggest that in organizations whose performance has been declining there is an 
urgency to realign strategy and organizational structure once a new CEO takes over (e.g., 
Barker and Mone, 1998). More specifically, in cases of poor pre-succession performance, 
new CEOs are more likely to replace the TMT members (Kenser and Dalton, 1994), 
centralize organizational control (Barker and Mone, 1998), downsize the company’s 
operation and assets (Denis and Denis, 1995), and reorientate the company strategy (Barker 
and Mone, 1998).  
However, two more recent studies have argued that poor pre-succession performance 
can actually constrain the new CEOs’ realignment initiative because of limited financial 
resources (Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013). More specifically, Karaevli (2007) and 
Karaevli and Zajac (2013) found that in companies that performed poorly before succession, 
it was harder for new CEOs to introduce successfully changes aimed at realigning the 
company than in companies that performed well. The inconsistent results suggest that poor 
pre-succession performance may have conflicting effects on the actions of new CEOs. This 
may be because poor performance generates high expectations and the urgency to adapt the 
organization to its environment (Barker and Mone, 1998; Denis and Denis, 1995; Kenser and 
Dalton, 1994), but at the same time limits the resources that are necessary for making 
changes (Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013).  
The Influence of the Organizational Context on Realignment. Drawing on “upper 
echelons” theory, some scholars have argued that certain properties of the TMT can influence 
the likelihood of new CEOs making changes to product strategies and market strategies 
(Fondas and Wiersema, 1997). In addition, Boeker (1997) found evidence that long TMT 
tenure and large TMT size limit the new CEO’s influence and thus reduce the likelihood of 
the company entering new product markets. Another factor, organizational slack, was found 
to influence the association between the presence of a new CEO and changes in the firm’s 
scale of operation in international markets: Lin and Liu (2012) suggested that when a firm 
has limited resources, the new CEO may find it hard to reorientate the firm’s strategy, given 
that the implementation of a new strategy often requires substantial financial resources. 
The Influence of the Environmental Context on Realignment. Several studies have 
highlighted the influence of various environmental factors on how new CEOs apply 
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realignment practices. Datta et al. (2003) found that in industries with high differentiation, 
high growth, and low capital intensity new CEOs find it easier to make changes to the 
product strategies and market strategies. The authors argued that these characteristics 
increase the managerial discretion of CEOs and offer them greater latitude in their strategic 
choices (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Similarly, Karaevli (2007) found that the 
turbulence and munificence of the environment allows the new CEO to have more impact on 
their organizational strategy and performance.  
The national context may also influence the post-succession process. Sakano and 
Lewin (1999), who analyzed a sample of Japanese firms, found that new CEOs make no 
changes to their company’s product strategies and market strategies or to the organizational 
structure within the first two years following their appointment—a finding that contrasts with 
those of studies based on US samples (e.g. Boeker, 1997; Simons, 1994). The authors argued 
that this difference might be due to the fact that Japanese CEOs face less pressure from stock 
markets and block-holding membership than their counterparts in the US. However, a recent 
study by Nakauchi and Wiersema (2014) showed that in Japanese firms, especially in cases 
of non-routine succession, new CEOs also tend to make changes to existing strategies.  
Critical Assessment of the Existing Studies. Extant studies have shown that different 
succession contexts, organizational contexts, and environmental contexts create different 
opportunities and constraints that have an impact on how new CEOs select which 
realignment practices to apply. However, there are also some obvious shortcomings in the 
literature. First, similarly to studies on the impact of the context on integration, there are also 
some conflicting findings regarding the impact of the context on realignment practices. In 
particular, some studies found that poor pre-succession performance provides new CEOs 
with opportunities for major changes (Barker and Mone, 1998; Denis and Denis, 1995; 
Kenser and Dalton, 1994), whereas other studies associated it with a lack of financial 
resources that actually limits the scope for major changes (Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli and 
Zajac, 2013). Again, we lack a detailed understanding of the particular mechanisms through 
which particular contexts affect the post-succession process, in order to be able to explain 
why the same practical context can have conflicting effects. In addition to that, the existing 
studies do not distinguish between different forms of poor performance that might have 
different effects. For example, financial distress (e.g., Barker and Mone, 1998) and low return 
on assets (e.g., Denis and Denis, 1995; Kenser and Dalton, 1994) might put different 
restrictions on new CEOs’ actions. Second, few studies have examined how the post-
succession process unfolds in different national and cultural contexts. Considering that 
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countries differ in their governance structures and cultural norms (Nakauchi and Wiersema, 
2014), it is very likely that new CEOs in different countries choose different realignment 
practices or apply differently the same realignment practices. 
2.5 An Agenda for Future Research 
Taken together, existing studies on the CEO post-succession process provide a host of 
insights on the core question of how the fit between the CEO, the organization and the 
environment is created in the process that follows the appointment of a new CEO. Our 
analysis suggests that this process is complex and involves various integration and 
realignment practices. We have outlined what is already known about the post-succession 
process but also indicated several gaps in the literature. In this section, we summarize the 
gaps and apply a practice perspective to develop promising avenues for future research.  
2.5.1 Research Opportunities Regarding Practices 
As we have shown above, most studies on the post-succession process concentrate on 
individual practices, rather than on how different practices interrelate. However, practice 
theorists have emphasized that practices are always embedded in a web of other practices that 
influence each other mutually (Nicolini, 2012). This suggests that each practice acts as a 
context for other practices, which in turn suggests that practices are likely to be co-
constructed and to co-evolve.  
The primary reason behind the lack of knowledge about how different practices 
interrelate is that few studies examine the new CEOs’ concrete activities in detail. Since most 
existing studies are deductive, they fail to capture the complexities of the post-succession 
process, which often involves situating a particular practice or combining different practices 
in a particular context. We identify three main linkages that can be further explored in order 
to shed light on the complexity of the post-succession process: linkages between integration 
practices and realignment practices, linkages between different integration practices, and 
linkages between different realignment practices. 
The Relation between Integration Practices and Realignment Practices. Taking a 
more comprehensive view of the post-succession process, future research should explore the 
co-evolutionary patterns of integration and realignment. In the existing literature three such 
patterns can be discerned. The first pattern indicates that new CEOs may apply integration 
practices first and realignment practices subsequently; that is, they may choose to integrate 
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themselves into the organization before initiating changes to realign the organization with its 
environment. As already mentioned, Kelly (1980) suggested that there is a six-month 
“honeymoon” during which new CEOs develop interpersonal networks and reconfigure the 
TMT, before dealing with crucial strategic issues, which supports the idea of sequentiality. 
By contrast, the second pattern suggests that the two types of practices may be applied 
simultaneously, rather than sequentially: because new CEOs are often under pressure to turn 
a situation around promptly, they may be forced to realign the organization in response to 
environmental demands immediately after taking office (Greiner and Bhambri, 1989). 
Obviously, in this case there can be no “honeymoon” period. The third pattern suggests that 
in some cases the new CEO may combine specific practices of both types. In these cases, the 
new CEO may use realignment practices to secure the acceptance of internal and external 
stakeholders—for example, by allocating more resources to the divisions of powerful 
managers in order to gain their support, as Xuan (2009) has shown—and at the same time 
build networks with top managers to facilitate organizational changes (Gabarro, 1985).  
The three patterns may reflect the dynamics underlying the relationship between these 
two types of practices. One could argue that in the stressful post-succession period, a new 
CEO may only be able to deal with a limited number of issues at the same time. Thus, during 
that period either integration or realignment may monopolize the CEO’s attention. This 
suggests that in order to understand why certain patterns emerge in the post-succession 
process it is critical to study how new CEOs divide their attention over time. Another 
dynamic that deserves further investigation is the possibility that the two types of practices 
may both facilitate and hinder each other. For example, building good relations with key 
subordinates can help the new CEO change strategic elements in the organization, precisely 
because these subordinates may show greater loyalty and support than the rest. However, 
good relations may also constrain the realignment process, because the new CEO may try to 
protect these relations by refraining from making changes that those key subordinates might 
oppose or resent.  
Practices of Integrating with Multiple Social Groups. As a social system, an 
organization is constituted by multiple social groups with often conflicting interests (Denis et 
al., 2007). As our review and critical assessment of the literature has shown, exiting studies 
suggest that new CEOs use various practices to integrate with different social groups 
internally and externally. However, little is known about how the CEO prioritizes these 
groups over time and how their efforts to integrate with one group might influence his or her 
integration with other groups.  
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Overall, our review reveals that there is a need to study systematically the integration 
of new CEOs into four distinct groups: the TMT, the board of directors, the group of middle 
managers, and the group of external stakeholders. Considering that the new CEO’s actions at 
different levels are likely to have a mutual impact, a multi-level approach seems necessary in 
order to capture the full complexity of the integration process. The study by Denis et al. 
(2000), which showed how new CEOs bypassed top managers to gain information and 
support directly from middle managers, is an interesting example of such an approach. The 
practice that the authors describe may indeed help a new CEO to limit the influence of 
uncooperative top managers and build personal authority, but it may also create resentment 
among the shunned top managers. To capture the dynamics of the new CEO’s integration 
with different social groups, future research needs to look at how different practices of 
integration may impede or facilitate each other.  
Patterns of Realigning Different Organizational Dimensions. Several studies have 
examined how new CEOs may realign different aspects of the organization with its 
environment, including the product strategy, the market strategy, the organization’s structure 
and control systems, the TMT configuration, and the organization’s external networks. Very 
few studies, however, have examined how different realignment practices interrelate. For 
example, a number of studies have shown that reconfiguring the TMT can enable new CEOs 
to introduce changes to the product strategies and market strategies (Barron et al., 2011; 
Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). This indicates that certain 
practices may trigger or facilitate the application of another practice.  
However, different practices of realignment may also conflict. For example, Barker 
and Moon (1998) found that in declining firms new CEOs tend to shift the organizational 
structure and control system towards mechanical structures and to reorientate strategy. 
However, such shifts in the organizational structure were shown to hinder the reorientation of 
strategy because mechanical structures impeded both the use of multiple information sources 
and scanning the environment sufficiently for developing new strategic directions (Barker 
and Moon, 1998). This suggests that future studies should examine how new CEOs adjust 
one aspect of the organization in conjunction with other aspects, which aspects they combine, 
and how contextual factors and process dynamics influence the process of adjustment. 
2.5.2 Research Opportunities Regarding Practitioners 
Our review shows that researchers have differentiated between several different types of 
incoming CEOs (Bigley and Wiersema, 2002; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Ndofor et al., 2009; 
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Shen and Cannella, 2002). Recent studies also tend to draw attention to the new CEOs’ 
personal characteristics, experience, and power to explain why they choose and apply 
different practices (Boeker, 1997; Datta et al., 2003; Kraatz and Moore, 2002; Weng and Lin, 
2012). Although previous studies have refined the distinct types of new CEOs, their view is 
mostly static in that they consider new CEOs to be embedded in their past experience and 
socialization. Furthermore, few studies examine the role of practitioners other than the CEO 
in the post-succession process.  
Towards a More Dynamic View of New CEOs. While existing studies treat the 
characteristics of new CEOs—such as the degree of their power—as static, practice theorists 
have shown that characteristics of practitioners often change as a result of their engagement 
in practices (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). For example, there is evidence that the identity of 
strategists tends to change when they engage in processes of strategic transformation (Beech 
and Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al., 2010). This suggests that when new CEOs become 
embedded in a new context, some of their characteristics may change as a result of the 
integration practices and realignment practices that they apply. Generally, the post-succession 
process is a period of intense learning for new CEOs, who strive to master the organization 
(Gabarro, 1985): they develop their own paradigms, acquire organization-specific 
knowledge, and accumulate legitimacy and power (Denis et al., 2000; Hambrick and 
Fukutomi, 1991).  
Studying new CEOs from a dynamic perspective opens up two pathways for future 
research: first, future research could examine how the post-succession process affects new 
CEOs—for example, how it shapes their identity, reputation, power, authority, and chances 
of remaining in their position. Second, prospective studies could examine the recursive 
relation between the personal development of the new CEO and the progress of the post-
succession process, exploring, for example, how a new CEO’s organization-specific 
knowledge, power, and legitimacy are developed through and influence the adoption of post-
succession practices (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). 
The Active Role of Stakeholders in Shaping the Post-succession Process. As argued 
above, research so far has primarily focused on the person of the new CEO (see also 
Hutzschenreuter et al., 2012), largely neglecting other relevant practitioners. This is 
surprising since the existing studies also point to the existence of multiple stakeholders 
involved in the post-succession process. Also from practice theory more generally, we know 
that practitioners mostly do not act in isolation but interact with others (Jarzabkowski et al., 
2007; Nicolini, 2012). Hence, future research should acknowledge the role of these other 
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practitioners in shaping the post-succession process. For example, a recent study by Graffin 
et al. (2013) investigated how members of the board of directors draw on contextual 
heuristics to evaluate the new CEOs’ performance. This study found that, because of the 
uncertainty associated with CEO succession, it is difficult for the board of directors to 
evaluate a new CEO on the basis of financial performance and its members often draw on 
various heuristics to judge the new CEO’s ability. Moreover, although some studies 
examined how external stakeholders, such as the media and financial analysts (Fanelli and 
Grasselli, 2006; Fanelli et al., 2009), react to new CEOs and their actions, little is known 
about how new CEOs respond to external reactions and how this affects the post-succession 
process. In addition, other important stakeholders and their impact on new CEOs’ actions 
have yet to be examined. For example, debtholders might have different concerns than the 
board of directors and financial analysts, and thus influence new CEOs in different ways. 
Acknowledging the active role of multiple stakeholders in the post-succession process, future 
studies should investigate the practices that various stakeholders use to actively cope with or 
influence the incoming CEO, how various stakeholders influence the integration of the new 
CEO and the process of realignment, and how different stakeholders influence each other in 
the post-succession process. 
2.5.3 Research Opportunities Regarding Practical Contexts 
Recent research has shown that a particular context can enable or constrain the new CEOs’ 
efforts to integrate themselves into or to realign the organization. A close examination of the 
literature reveals two areas that deserve more attention. 
Conflicting Effects of Practical Contexts. As highlighted in the critical assessment of 
the literature studies so far have not been able to explain why the same practical contexts can 
have opposing effects such as when poor pre-succession organizational performance in some 
cases facilitate and in other cases impedes change; or why non-routine succession in one case 
facilitates earnings management and in other ones impedes it. 
To understand better why the same contexts can have opposing effects future research 
might want to dig deeper into the micro mechanisms through which practical contexts come 
to affect the post-succession process. In particular, researchers so far have largely treated the 
practical context as objectively given and as directly impacting the succession process. Yet, 
one might argue that contexts and their effects are only enacted through the (combination of) 
practices employed. In addition to that future research should compare the different ways in 
which new CEOs use a particular practice. Simon’s study (1994) is a good example in that 
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respect; he compared how new CEOs adjust organizational control systems differently when 
the pre-succession performance is good and when it is poor. 
The Influence of National and Cultural Contexts. Our review shows that little 
attention has been paid to the ways in which different national contexts influence the 
dynamics of the post-succession process (Nakauchi and Wiersema, 2014). This is surprising 
as we know particularly from practice theory that social practices are shaped by larger 
societal institutions and cultural norms in which they are embedded (Suddaby et al., 2013). 
For example, as mentioned earlier, Sakano and Lewin (1999: 667) found that “strategic 
reorientation or organization restructurings […] are not observable in the first two years of 
the new CEO. This is in contrast to the United States where such changes are generally 
observed in the first year of a new CEO.” This finding suggests that researchers need to take 
national differences into account to fully understand the post-succession process. The 
GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) study in 62 societies 
shows that the effectiveness of leadership behavior is culturally contextualized to a high 
degree (House et al., 2004). Other studies also show that there are significant differences in 
how various general management practices are applied in different countries (Bloom and Van 
Reenen, 2010). This suggests that in different cultural contexts new CEOs may employ 
various integration practices and realignment practices in different ways. 
Given that the international mobility of CEOs is increasing, researchers should 
explore more extensively how different national and cultural contexts affect what new CEOs 
are expected to do, are able to do, and cannot do during the post-succession process. At least 
three aspects of the cultural and national context may influence the post-succession process. 
First, “time-orientation” (Hofstede, 1997) could help explain the timing of post-succession 
practices and the order in which they are employed in different cultures. For example, East 
Asian societies are characterized by “long-term orientation,” which implies that new CEOs 
may delay the realignment of the organization, whereas North America and Europe are 
characterized by “short-term orientation” (Hofstede, 1997). Second, “collectivism-
individualism” (Hofstede, 1997), i.e., the extent to which a society is characterized by 
collectivist or individualist principles, may also provide a good starting point for discussing 
how the national culture influences the new CEOs’ activities: in a collectivist culture, such as 
that of Japan, the new CEO may experience greater pressure to become integrated into the 
organization; by contrast, in an individualist culture, such as that of the US, the new CEO 
may feel pressured to instigate immediate bold changes within the organization in order to 
demonstrate personal competence. Third, in addition to cultural values, national institutions 
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that determine ownership structure, governance arrangements, and approaches to incentives 
may affect the new CEO’s scope of action (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010; Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2007) and be indicative of how new CEOs behave in different parts of the world. 
Identifying the main activities of new CEOs and the best practices for facilitating succession 
in each country or culture are essential tasks for future research.  
2.5.4 Methodological Opportunities for Studying the Post-succession Process 
Our review of the literature reveals that, to date, researchers have used a host of different 
methodologies in order to examine the post-succession process. These include correlation 
studies (e.g., Davidson et al., 2004; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994), longitudinal in-depth 
case studies (e.g., Denis et al., 2000; Simons, 1994), and simulation approaches (Grusky, 
1969). While all methodological approaches have certain strengths, there is a need for more 
longitudinal in-depth case studies, especially studies based on organizational ethnographies 
(e.g., Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). This approach seems particularly suitable for addressing 
the research gaps listed here, because it can identify the activities of new CEOs and capture 
how these interrelate over time and at multiple levels of analysis. Moreover, due to 
explorative nature, this approach could identify other important post-succession practices in 
addition to what we have found in the current literature.   
Obtaining detailed data from field studies would allow scholars to identify more 
easily the patterns of integration and realignment, as well as how the practices associated 
with these two processes interact. Furthermore, such studies could help researchers refine key 
variables (e.g., successor origin) and devise useful constructs for examining the post-
succession process (Pitcher et al., 2000). In addition, field studies could bring to light other 
important but so far unidentified post-succession practices.  
2.5.5 Conceptual Resources for Theorizing the Post-succession Process 
As already suggested above, practice theory provides a particularly fruitful lens for studying 
the post-succession process because it is able to take into account the micro-level activities of 
new CEOs. This is also stressed by Orlikowski when she writes: “A practice perspective, 
because it entails a theoretically grounded understanding of recursive interaction among 
people, activities, artifacts, and contexts, is particularly well positioned to address 
organizational phenomena that are posited to be relational, dynamic and emergent” 
(Orlikowski, 2010: 26–27). In this review we have already introduced three basic concepts 
from practice theory: practices, practitioner, and practical context. Future research could 
build on this basic conceptual framework, drawing on the host of theoretical concepts that the 
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many variants of practice theory (Schatzki et al., 2001) hold in stock. This is likely to result 
in a more sophisticated theorization of the post-succession process that is able to account for 
its complex and dynamic nature. While a comprehensive review of practice theory is 
unfeasible at this point and given the scope of our study (for an overview see Nicolini, 2012), 
we want to introduce three theoretical concepts taken from practice theory extending the 
three basic concepts employed in this review so far, in order to illustrate their potential for 
future theorizing.  
First, the concept of sociomaterial practices takes our basic concept of “practices” a 
step further by highlighting the “constitutive entanglement of the social and the material” 
(Orlikowski, 2007: 1435) in the performance of all practices. Adopting this concept will 
sensitize researchers to the subtle ways in which materiality—ranging from the physical 
setup of offices to communication technologies and management tools—shapes the activities 
of new CEOs. As our review shows, the material aspect of post-succession practices has not 
been taken into account in existing research and is thus open to exploration.  
Second, the concept of habitus, first developed by Bourdieu (1977), can add a new 
dimension to the way in which researchers conceptualize the new CEO’s traits, their 
development, and the role they play in his or her activities. The concept of habitus refers to 
the dispositions that practitioners acquire through earlier activities and experiences. These 
can influence the practices practitioners adopt, which in turn shape their future dispositions. 
Thus, the concept of habitus can sensitize researchers to the recursive relationship between 
practitioner and practical context. This might prove particularly fruitful for theorizing both 
stability and change in the traits of CEOs during the post-succession process, which we 
highlighted earlier as a potential topic for further research. 
Finally, the concept of social field provides a more sophisticated conceptualization of 
the practical context in which the post-succession process takes place. This concept describes 
the practical context as a dynamic constellation of social positions characterized by struggles 
for domination and regulated by specific sets of rules, beliefs, and values (Bourdieu, 1977). 
Because the concept of the social field integrates the different aspects of the practical context, 
it can alert researchers to the importance of examining the relative social position of new 
CEOs with respect to power. Examining the CEOs’ relative social position should enable 
future studies to take into account all stakeholder groups, as well as determine what practices 
are available to each group and how particular practices affect each group’s relative position. 
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2.6 Contributions and Conclusion 
With this review of research on the CEO post-succession process we have contributed to the 
literature in two ways: first, mobilizing conceptual categories of the practice perspective we 
have provided a comprehensive overview of the fragmented literature in terms of what we 
know about the ways in which the match between CEO, organization and environment is 
created in the post-succession process. We thereby also revealed manifest and latent linkages 
between previously unconnected lines of inquiry. This will make it easier for researchers to 
build on the existing works and thus create a cumulative body of knowledge. Second, we 
have developed a research agenda on the CEO post-succession process, providing some 
guidelines for future studies in terms of topics, methodologies, and theories. We believe that 
these will help in generating a richer, broader, and deeper understanding of this complex and 
dynamic process. 
 
  
57 
 
References 
Abboud, L. 2013. New CEO begins Alcatel makeover. Reuters.com. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/us-alcatel-reorganisation-
idUSBRE95I06O20130619, June 19. 
Barker, V.L. and Mone, M.A. 1998. The mechanistic structure shift and strategic 
reorientation in declining firms attempting turnarounds. Human Relations, 51, pp. 
1227–1258. 
Barnes, B. 2001. Practice as collective action. In Schatzki, T.R., Cetina, K.K., and von 
Savigny, E. (eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (pp. 17–28). London: 
Routledge. 
Barron, J.M., Chulkov, D.V. and Waddell, G.R. 2011. Top management team turnover, CEO 
succession type, and strategic change. Journal of Business Research, 64, pp. 904–910. 
Beech, N. and Johnson, P. 2005. Discourses of disrupted identities in the practice of strategic 
change: The mayor, the street-fighter and the insider-out. Journal of Organzational 
Change Management, 18, pp. 31–47. 
Bens, D.A. 2002. The determinants of the amount of information disclosed about corporate 
restructurings. Journal of Accounting Research, 40, pp. 1–20. 
Berger, P.G. and Ofek, E. 1999. Causes and effects of corporate refocusing programs. Review 
of Financial Studies, 12, pp. 311–345. 
Bigley, G.A. and Wiersema, M. 2002. New CEOs and corporate strategic refocusing: How 
experience as heir apparent influences the use of power. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 47, pp. 707–727. 
Bloom, N. and Van Reenen, J. 2010. Why do management practices differ across firms and 
countries? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24, pp. 203–224. 
Boeker, W. 1997. Executive migration and strategic change: The effect of top manager 
movement on product-market entry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, pp. 213–
236. 
Bourdieu P. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brown, J.S. and Duguid, P. 2000. The social life of information. Boston, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Burt, J. 2013. HP CEO Whitman Putting Her Own Executive Team in Place. Eweek.com. 
http://www.eweek.com/pc-hardware/hp-ceo-whitman-putting-her-own-executive-
team-in-place/, August 22. 
Cabrera-Suarez, K. 2005. Leadership transfer and the successor's development in the family 
firm. Leadership Quarterly, 16, pp. 71–96. 
Cao, Q., Maruping, L.M. and Takeuchi, R. 2006. Disentangling the effects of CEO turnover 
and succession on organizational capabilities: A social network perspective. 
Organization Science, 17, pp. 563–576. 
Carlson, R.O. 1961. Succession and performance among school superintendents. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 6, pp. 210–227. 
CBC. 2014. BlackBerry hires sales chief from Sybase. Cbc.ca. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/blackberry-hires-sales-chief-from-sybase-
1.2494900, January 13. 
  
58 
 
Crossland, C. and Hambrick, D.C. 2007. How national systems differ in their constraints on 
corporate executives: A study of CEO effects in three countries. Strategic 
Management Journal, 28, pp. 767–789. 
Datta, D.K., Rajagopalan, N. and Zhang, Y. 2003. New CEO openness to change and 
strategic persistence: The moderating role of industry characteristics. British Journal 
of Management, 14, pp. 101–114. 
Davidson, W.N., Jiraporn, P. Kim, Y.S. and Nemec, C. 2004. Earnings management 
following duality-creating successions: Ethnostatistics, impression management, and 
agency theory. Academy of Management Journal, 47, pp. 267–275. 
Denis, D.J. and Denis, D.K. 1995. Performance changes following top management 
dismissals. Journal of Finance, 50, pp. 1029–1057. 
Denis, J.L., Langley, A. and Pineault, M. 2000. Becoming a leader in a complex 
organization. Journal of Management Studies, 37, pp. 1063–1099. 
Denis, J.L., Langley, A. and Rouleau, L. 2007. Strategizing in pluralistic contexts: 
Rethinking theoretical frames. Human Relations, 60, pp. 179–215. 
Fanelli, A. and Grasselli, N.I. 2006. Defeating the Minotaur: The construction of CEO 
charisma on the US stock market. Organization Studies, 27, pp. 811–832. 
Fanelli, A., Misangyi, V.F. and Tosi, H.L. 2009. In charisma we trust: The effects of CEO 
charismatic visions on securities analysts. Organization Science, 20, pp. 1011–1033. 
Farrell, K.A. and Whidbee, D.A. 2000. The consequences of forced CEO succession for 
outside directors. Journal of Business, 73, pp. 597–627. 
Feldman, M.S. and Orlikowski, W.J. 2011. Theorizing practice and practicing theory. 
Organization Science, 22, 1240–1253. 
Fondas, N. and Wiersema, M. 1997. Changing of the guard: The influence of CEO 
socialization on strategic change. Journal of Management Studies, 34, pp. 561–584. 
Fredrickson, J.W., Hambrick, D.C. and Baumrin, S. 1988. A model of CEO dismissal. 
Academy of Management Review, 13, pp. 255–270. 
Friedman, S.D. and Saul, K. 1991. A leader's wake: Organization member reactions to CEO 
succession. Journal of Management, 17, pp. 619–642. 
Gabarro, J. 1979. Socialization at the top – How CEOs and subordinates evolve interpersonal 
contracts. Organizational Dynamics, 7, pp. 3–23. 
Gabarro, J. 1985. When a new manager takes charge. Harvard Business Review, 63, pp. 110–
123. 
Giambatista, R.C., Rowe, W.G. and Riaz, S. 2005. Nothing succeeds like succession: A 
critical review of leader succession literature since 1994. Leadership Quarterly, 16, 
pp. 963–991. 
Gilmore, T.N. 1988. Making a Leadership Change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Gioia, D.A. and Chittipeddi, K. 1991. Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change 
initiation. Strategic Management Journal, 12, pp. 433–448. 
Goodstein, J. and Boeker, W. 1991. Turbulence at the top: A new perspective on governance 
structure changes and strategic change. Academy of Management Journal, 34, pp. 
306–330. 
Gordon, S.S., Stewart, W.H., Sweo, R. and Luker, W.A. 2000. Convergence versus strategic 
reorientation: The antecedents of fast-paced organizational change. Journal of 
Management, 26, pp. 911–945. 
  
59 
 
Graffin, S.D., Boivie, S. and Carpenter, M.A. 2013. Examining CEO succession and the role 
of heuristics in early-stage CEO evaluation. Strategic Management Journal, 34, pp. 
383–403. 
Greiner, L.E. and Bhambri, A. 1989. New CEO intervention and dynamics of deliberate 
strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 10, pp. 67–86. 
Grusky, O. 1960. Administrative succession in formal organizations. Social Forces, 39, pp. 
105–115. 
Grusky, O. 1969. Succession with an Ally. Administrative Science Quarterly, 14, pp. 155–
170. 
Haleblian, J. and Rajagopalan, N. 2006. A cognitive model of CEO dismissal: Understanding 
the influence of board perceptions, attributions and efficacy beliefs. Journal of 
Management Studies, 43, pp. 1009–1026. 
Hambrick, D.C. and Finkelstein, S. 1987. Managerial discretion: A bridge between polar 
views of organizational outcomes. Research in Organizational Behavior, 9, pp. 369–
406. 
Hambrick, D.C. and Fukutomi, G.D.S. 1991. The seasons of a CEO's tenure. Academy of 
Management Review, 16, pp. 719–742. 
Harrison, J.S. and Fiet, J.O. 1999. New CEOs pursue their own self-interests by sacrificing 
stakeholder value. Journal of Business Ethics, 19, pp. 301–308. 
Harvard Business Review 2009. Harvard business review on CEO succession. Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business Press. 
Hayes, R.M., Oyer, P. and Schaefer, S. 2006. Coworker complementarity and the stability of 
top-management teams. Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 22, pp. 184–212. 
Helmich, D.L. and Brown, W.B. 1972. Successor type and organizational change in corporate 
enterprise. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, pp. 371–381. 
Holcim. 2012. Holcim Leadership Journey 2012 – 2014. Holcim.com. 
http://www.holcim.com/uploads/CORP/leadership_journey_e__final.pdf, May 14. 
Hofstede, G.H. 1997. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.  
House, R.J., Hanges, P.J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P.W. and Gupta, V. (eds.) 2004. Culture, 
leadership, and organizations: the GLOBE study of 62 societies. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage. 
Hutzschenreuter, T., Kleindienst, I. and Greger, C. 2012. How new leaders affect strategic 
change following a succession event: A critical review of the literature. Leadership 
Quarterly, 23, pp. 729–755. 
Jarzabkowski, P., Balogun, J. and Seidl, D. 2007. Strategizing: The challenges of a practice 
perspective. Human Relations, 60, pp. 5–27. 
Johnson, P., Balogun, J., and Beech, N. 2010. Researching strategists and their identity in 
practice: Building ‘close-with’ relationships. In Golsorkhi, D., Rouleau, L., Seidl, D. 
and Vaara, E. (eds.), Cambridge handbook of strategy as practice (pp. 243–257). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Karaevli, A. 2007. Performance consequences of new CEO ‘outsiderness’: Moderating 
effects of pre- and post-succession contexts. Strategic Management Journal, 28, pp. 
681–706. 
  
60 
 
Karaevli, A. and Zajac, E.J. 2013. When do outsider CEOs generate strategic change? The 
enabling role of corporate stability. Journal of Management Studies, 50, pp. 1267–
1294. 
Keck, S.L. and Tushman, M.L. 1993. Environmental and organizational context and 
executive team structure. Academy of Management Journal, 36, pp. 1314–1344. 
Kelly, J.N. 1980. Management transitions for newly appointed CEOs. Sloan Management 
Review, 22, pp. 37–45. 
Kesner, I.F. and Dalton, D.R. 1994. Top management turnover and CEO succession: An 
investigation of the effects of turnover on performance. Journal of Management 
Studies, 31, pp. 701–713. 
Kesner, I.F. and Sebora, T.C. 1994. Executive succession: Past, present and future. Journal of 
Management, 20, pp. 327–372. 
Kraatz, M.S. and Moore, J.H. 2002. Executive migration and institutional change. Academy 
of Management Journal, 45, pp. 120–143. 
Krieger, K. and Ang, J.S. 2013. The unintended consequences of high expectations and 
pressure on new CEOs. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 40, pp. 501–526. 
Lant, T.K., Milliken, F.J. and Batra, B. 1992. The role of managerial learning and 
interpretation in strategic persistence and reorientation: An empirical exploration. 
Strategic Management Journal, 13, pp. 585–608. 
Le Breton-Miller, I., Miller, D. and Steier, L.P. 2004. Toward an integrative model of 
effective FOB succession. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28, pp. 305–328. 
Lasalle, R.E., Jones, S.K. and Jain, R. 1993. The association between executive succession 
and discretionary accounting changes: Earnings management or different 
perspectives? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 20, pp. 653–671. 
Lin, W.T. and Liu, Y. 2012. Successor characteristics, organisational slack, and change in the 
degree of firm internationalisation. International Business Review, 21, pp. 89–101. 
Lin, W.T. and Liu, Y.S. 2011. The impact of CEO succession on top management teams and 
the degree of firm internationalisation. European Journal of International 
Management, 5, pp. 253–270. 
Miller, D. 1993. Some organizational consequences of CEO succession. Academy of 
Management Journal, 36, pp. 644–659. 
Nakauchi, M. and Wiersema, M.F. 2014. Executive succession and strategic change in Japan. 
Strategic Management Jounral. Advance online publication, May 4, 2014. 
Ndofor, H.A., Priem, R.L., Rathburn, J.A. and Dhir, A.K. 2009. What does the new boss 
think? How new leaders' cognitive communities and recent "top-job" success affect 
organizational change and performance. Leadership Quarterly, 20, pp. 799–813. 
Nicolini, D. 2012. Practice theory, work, and organization: An introduction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ocasio, W. 1994. Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in U.S. 
industrial corporations, 1960–1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, pp. 285–
312. 
Orlikowski, W.J. 2007. Sociomaterial practices: Exploring technology at work, Organization 
Studies, 28, pp. 1435–1448. 
Orlikowski, W.J. 2010. Practice in research: Phenomenon, perspective and philosophy. In 
Golsorkhi, D., Rouleau, L., Seidl, D. and Vaara, E. (eds.), Cambridge handbook of 
strategy as practice (pp. 23–33). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
  
61 
 
Pitcher, P., Chreim, S. and Kisfalvi, V. 2000. CEO succession research: Methodological 
bridges over troubled waters. Strategic Management Journal, 21, pp. 625–648. 
Porter, M.E., Lorsch, J.W. and Nohria, N. 2004. Seven surprises for new CEOs. Harvard 
Business Review, 82, pp. 62–72. 
Pourciau, S. 1993. Earnings management and nonroutine executive changes. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics, 16, pp. 317–336. 
Quigley, T.J. and Hambrick, D.C. 2012. When the former CEO stays on as board chair: 
Effects on successor discretion, strategic change, and performance. Strategic 
Management Journal, 33, pp. 834–859. 
Reckwitz, A. 2002. Toward a theory of social practices: A development in culturalist 
theorizing. European Journal of Social Theory, 5, pp. 243–263. 
Romanelli, E. and Tushman, M.L. 1994. Organizational transformation as punctuated 
equilibrium: An empirical test. Academy of Management Journal, 37, pp. 1141–1166. 
Sakano, T. and Lewin, A.Y. 1999. Impact of CEO succession in Japanese companies: A 
coevolutionary perspective. Organization Science, 10, pp. 654–671. 
Schatzki, T.R., Knorr-Cetina, K. and Savigny, E.V. (eds.) 2001. The practice turn in 
contemporary theory. London: Routledge. 
Shen, W. and Cannella, A.A. 2002. Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO 
succession: The impacts of successor type, postsuccession senior executive turnover, 
and departing CEO tenure. Academy of Management Journal, 45, pp. 717–733. 
Shen, W. and Cho, T.S. 2005. Exploring involuntary executive turnover through a managerial 
discretion framework. Academy of Management Review, 30, pp. 843–854. 
Shimizu, K. and Hitt, M.A. 2005. What constrains or facilitates divestitures of formerly 
acquired firms? The effects of organizational inertia. Journal of Management, 31, pp. 
50–72. 
Simons, R. 1994. How new top managers use control-systems as levers of strategic renewal. 
Strategic Management Journal, 15, pp. 169–189. 
Suddaby, R., Seidl, D. and Le, J.K. 2013. Strategy-as-practice meets neo-institutional theory. 
Strategic Organization, 11, pp. 329–344. 
Tushman, M.L. and Rosenkopf, L. 1996. Executive succession, strategic reorientation and 
performance growth: A longitudinal study in the US cement industry. Management 
Science, 42, pp. 939–953. 
Virany, B., Tushman, M.L. and Romanelli, E. 1992. Executive succession and organization 
outcomes in turbulent environments: An organization learning approach. 
Organization Science, 3, pp. 72–91. 
Weisbach, M.S. 1995. CEO turnover and the firm's investment decisions. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 37, pp. 159–188. 
Weng, D.H. and Lin, Z.J. 2012. Beyond CEO tenure: The effect of CEO newness on strategic 
changes. Journal of Management. Advance online publication, June 28, 2012. 
Westphal, J.D., Boivie, S. and Chng, D.H.M. 2006. The strategic impetus for social network 
ties: Reconstituting broken CEO friendship ties. Strategic Management Journal, 27, 
pp. 425–445. 
Westphal, J.D. and Fredrickson, J.W. 2001. Who directs strategic change? Director 
experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy. Strategic 
Management Journal, 22, pp. 1113–1137. 
  
62 
 
Whittington, R. 2006. Completing the practice turn in strategy research. Organization 
Studies, 27, 613–634. 
Wiersema, M.F. 1992. Strategic consequences of executive succession within diversified 
firms. Journal of Management Studies, 29, pp. 73–94. 
Wiersema, M.F. 1995. Executive succession as an antecedent to corporate restructuring. 
Human Resource Management, 34, pp. 185–202. 
Wischnevsky, J.D. and Damanpour, F. 2008. Radical strategic and structural change: 
occurrence, antecedents and consequences. International Journal of Technology 
Management, 44, pp. 53–80. 
Xuan, Y.H. 2009. Empire-building or bridge-building? Evidence from new CEOs' internal 
capital allocation decisions. Review of Financial Studies, 22, pp. 4919–4948. 
Zajac, E.J. and Westphal, J.D. 1996. Who shall succeed? How CEO board preferences and 
power affect the choice of new CEOs. Academy of Management Journal, 39, pp. 64–
90. 
Zhang, Y. and Rajagopalan, N. 2003. Explaining new CEO origin: Firm versus industry 
antecedents. Academy of Management Journal, 46, pp. 327–338. 
Zhang, Y. and Rajagopalan, N. 2004. When the known devil is better than an unknown god: 
An empirical study of the antecedents and consequences of relay CEO successions. 
Academy of Management Journal, 47, pp. 483–500. 
Zhang, Y. and Rajagopalan, N. 2010. Once an outsider, always an outsider? CEO origin, 
strategic change, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 31, pp. 334–
346. 
 
 
 
 
  63 
3 New CEOs and Their Immediate Collaborators: 
Divergence and Convergence Between the Strategic 
Apparatus and the Top Management Team2 
Shenghui Ma and David Seidl  
 
 
Abstract 
An important challenge of new CEOs is to establish an effective group of collaborators, 
which we call the “strategic apparatus”. Drawing on a comparative case study we show that 
the composition of the strategic apparatus initially tends to differ from that of the top 
management team (TMT) because of constraints on the CEO to change the TMT. In some 
cases, the strategic apparatus consists of a subgroup of the TMT, in others of members of the 
TMT and individuals not on the TMT. We show that these discrepancies between the 
strategic apparatus and the TMT can lead to tensions that trigger a process of convergence 
between the two, particularly as constraints on changing the TMT are alleviated and as the 
functions of the apparatus change.  
 
Keywords 
Strategic apparatus; Top management team; New CEO; CEO succession; Behavioral 
integration 
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3.1 Introduction 
As a result of its significant impact on organizational life, CEO succession has been the focus 
of substantial attention in the fields of strategy, organization, and corporate finance 
(Giambatista, Rowe, and Riaz, 2005; Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, and Greger, 2012; Kesner 
and Sebora, 1994). Whereas early studies have extensively examined the antecedents and 
outcomes of CEO succession, recent research has turned its attention to what occurs to the 
organization after a new CEO arrives (Ma, Seidl, and Guérard, forthcoming). This research 
shows that new CEOs are frequently under pressure to make sense of unfamiliar situations, to 
make necessary changes, to develop new strategies, to manage turnarounds, and/or to 
improve financial performance (Denis, Langley, and Pineault, 2000; Greiner and Bhambri, 
1989; Harvard Business Review, 2009; Simons, 1994). In addition, new CEOs must establish 
a group of key collaborators to support them in directing their organizations (Hayes, Oyer, 
and Schaefer, 2006; Helmich and Brown, 1972; Kelly, 1980; Porter and Nohria, 2010). We 
refer to this group as the CEO’s strategic apparatus to acknowledge their important role in 
shaping the strategic direction of the firm. In this paper, we focus on this process of 
establishing the strategic apparatus, which has thus far received only scant attention in 
management research.  
  From the perspective of upper echelons theory, the CEO influences strategic and 
organizational outcomes by collaborating with other members of the top management team 
(TMT) (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). In this vein, previous studies 
emphasize the importance of establishing an effective TMT. Studies suggest that by changing 
the TMT, new CEOs can build a team to gain support (Grusky, 1969; Hayes et al., 2006; 
Kelly, 1980) and to bring in new perspectives and competences (Friedman and Saul, 1991; 
Keck and Tushman, 1993; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). However, some studies suggest 
that replacing top managers is not always possible, particularly when these managers are 
powerful and have valuable firm-specific knowledge (Denis et al., 2000; Gabarro, 1979; 
Xuan, 2009).   
 Whereas prior research has yielded many important insights in this field, several 
important gaps remain. First, most studies investigate change in TMT either as an outcome of 
CEO succession or as a mediator or moderator of other post-succession outcomes (e.g., 
strategic change). Little attention has been paid to the change process itself: How and when 
do new CEOs change their TMT? What are the constraints on changing the TMT and how do 
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new CEOs address these constraints? As a result, we know little about the temporal and 
interpersonal dynamics underlying these changes. Second, previous studies have ignored the 
challenge of directing an organization with a TMT in transition. Hambrick (1995) notes that 
new CEOs frequently face a fragmented TMT because of membership changes and 
interpersonal relationships. In such a case, how can new CEOs direct their organization with 
a team in transition?   
This paper aims to fill these gaps by systematically investigating the drivers, 
constraints, and dynamics of establishing CEO’s strategic apparatus. As forming a team is 
essentially about defining and adjusting role relationships, we employ role theory to inform 
this research (Biddle, 1986; Katz and Kahn, 1978). We draw on data from a longitudinal 
qualitative study of eight firms, each of which had just appointed a new CEO. For each case, 
we tracked the CEO’s activities over his first two years via regular interviews (every 4-8 
weeks). We complemented these data with interviews with other organizational members, 
including top managers and staff members, to capture different perspectives on the post-
succession process and to gain a more comprehensive understanding of each case. This 
process generated a dataset of 130 interviews in total. 
Our analysis of the empirical data yielded the following results. First, we identified 
the requirements for strategic orientation and for personal integration as drivers for the 
development of the strategic apparatus. Second, we show that due to the structural, relational 
and personal constraints of TMT change, these requirements frequently cannot be fully met 
by adjusting the TMT, defined as the formal executive team (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and 
Sanders, 2004; Nielsen, 2010). Thus, CEOs are often forced to include individuals outside of 
the TMT in their strategic apparatus. As a consequence, discrepancies tend to arise between 
the strategic apparatus and the TMT, particularly in the initial stages. Third, we find that 
these discrepancies frequently result in increasing interpersonal tension that over time leads 
to a gradual convergence between the strategic apparatus and the TMT.  
With these findings, we contribute to the CEO succession literature by showing how, 
when, and why new CEOs change their TMT, the constraints they face in so doing, and how 
they address these constraints in directing the organization. Thereby, our research helps open 
up the black box between the CEO succession event and its organizational outcomes (Miller, 
1993; Pitcher, Chreim, and Kisfalvi, 2000). Furthermore, we contribute to the upper echelons 
literature by identifying the mechanisms underlying development of the TMT and responds 
to recent calls for studies of how TMTs are formed and evolve (Hambrick, 2007: 338). 
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3.2 Theoretical Background 
3.2.1 Research on CEO Succession 
TMT change following CEO succession is common. Some scholars find that the first action 
of many new CEOs is to replace certain top managers in order to establish a TMT that they 
can rely on (Kelly, 1980). Kelly (1980) found that new CEOs tend to build a team with an 
equal number of new and old executives. Changing the TMT enables the new CEO to create 
complementarity among TMT members in terms of personality, interpersonal relations, and 
skill sets. Hayes et al. (2006) found that new CEOs tend to replace those TMT members, in 
particular, who have a close relationship with the former CEO. Such changes allow new 
CEOs to bring in their own allies who can help them gain support in the company and to 
adapt more easily (Grusky, 1969).  
In addition to gaining support and creating complementarity in the TMT, replacing 
executives has been shown to help new CEOs introduce new perspectives and competences 
that are necessary to lead the organization. Keck and Tushman (1993) found that new CEOs 
are likely to reconfigure the TMT to create heterogeneity, which helps organizations meet 
environmental demands. In particular, as external successors frequently have a new 
perspective on the organization-environment relation, they are more likely to realign the 
TMT to environmental demands than internal successors. According to Helmich and Brown 
(1972), external successors are more likely to change the “executive role constellation” either 
by replacing certain TMT members or by expanding the number of TMT positions. Similarly, 
Friedman and Saul (1991) found that external CEO successors are associated with a relatively 
high turnover of TMT members.  
Although replacing top managers can be an effective way of creating a team that a 
new CEO wants, it may not always be feasible, particularly when these managers are 
powerful and/or are the repositories of valuable firm-specific knowledge. In such cases, new 
CEOs may have to collaborate with these individuals. As Xuan (2009) has argued, new CEOs 
use capital allocation as a means of building relationships with powerful managers. Xuan 
(2009) shows that in multi-segment firms, new CEOs promoted from within frequently shift 
resource allocations to the divisions with which they have not been previously affiliated, 
indicating that new CEOs “use the capital budget as a bridge-building tool to elicit 
cooperation from powerful divisional managers” (Xuan, 2009: 4919). Furthermore, Gabarro 
(1979) points to the importance of new CEOs establishing collaborative relationships with 
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their subordinates and finds that stable CEO-subordinate relationships tend to develop over 
four stages: orientation, exploration, testing, and stabilization. 
Taken together, previous studies suggest that new CEOs change the TMT for three 
main reasons: to gain support, to create complementarity, and to introduce new competences. 
However, these studies fail to capture the temporal and contextual dynamics of TMT change. 
As a result, we do not know how and when new CEOs change the TMT. These studies 
suggest that new CEOs may face constraints regarding changing some TMT members and 
therefore collaborating with these managers is important. However, we do not know what 
type of constraints new CEOs face and how they address them. It is unclear how they decide 
whether to replace or collaborate with a member. These gaps exist largely because most 
studies use quantitative methods that are ill-equipped for exploring temporal and contextual 
dynamics.  
3.2.2 Upper Echelons Research    
Upper echelons theory is mainly concerned with the way in which the TMT collaborates as a 
whole and how it affects strategic and organizational outcomes. Conceiving of the 
organization as a reflection of its top managers, upper echelons theory argues that the 
experiences, values, and personalities of TMT members will influence how they enact the 
environment and make strategic choices (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Two 
concepts from upper echelons theory seem particularly relevant to our study: TMT 
composition and TMT behavioral integration.    
A central question of upper echelons research is how the composition of the TMT 
influences various organizational outcomes. TMT composition is typically investigated in 
terms of demographics, such as age, tenure or functional background. Demographic 
characteristics are used as proxies for TMT members’ psychosocial attributes as it is difficult 
to observe these attributes directly. Studies have linked TMT demographic composition to 
various outcomes, such as strategic choice or change, innovation, and even financial 
performance (Carpenter et al., 2004; Nielsen, 2010). This research implies that new CEOs 
should form an assemblage of competences and skills in the TMT that can meet competitive 
environment demands (Kor and Mesko, 2013). However, little attention has been paid to the 
temporal dynamics of the TMT composition: How does a CEO establish or change the TMT 
according to particular temporal requirements? On a related note, there have long been calls 
for studying the factors that influence TMT composition and its evolution: “Why do top 
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management teams look the way they do? What are the factors that cause the profiles of 
TMTs to change?” (Hambrick, 2007: 338)  
Introduced by Hambrick (1994) as a refinement of upper echelons theory, the concept 
of TMT behavioral integration refers to the level of mutual communication and interaction 
among TMT members; it consists of important team processes including information 
exchange, collaborative behavior, and joint decision-making. TMTs characterized by higher 
behavioral integration are more likely to collectively influence their organization. By 
contrast, a TMT with low integration is fragmented and has little “teamness” to it. In this 
regard, studies have shown that TMT behavioral integration plays an important role in 
moderating the impact of TMT composition (Carmeli and Halevi, 2009; Carmeli and 
Schaubroeck, 2006; Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, and Veiga, 2006). Without sharing information, 
resources and decisions, it is unlikely that TMT members will influence the organization as a 
whole. The idea of behavioral integration is thus highly relevant to the current study. As 
Hambrick (1995) notes, CEO succession is an important trigger of fragmentation in TMT 
because of changes in personnel and interpersonal relationships. This is also supported by a 
recent study showing that shorter tenured CEOs are characterized by lower levels of 
behavioral integration in the TMT (Simsek, Veiga, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2005). This notion 
raises two important empirical questions: If new CEOs face a fragmented team, how will they 
direct the organization? How will they adjust the team to achieve higher behavioral 
integration?  
In summary, this brief review of the literature has shown that we know little about the 
internal dynamics of TMT change despite a number of CEO succession studies that focus on 
how new CEOs use such TMT change to affect strategic and organizational outcomes. 
Similarly, although upper echelons researchers emphasize the importance of investigating 
how the TMT is formed and how temporal dynamics influence TMT processes, little research 
has been performed in this regard. In summary, what is missing from all these studies is a 
systematic and in-depth examination of how, when, and why new CEOs form their TMT. To 
fill this gap, we must investigate within the CEO’s network of immediate collaborators: who 
are these individuals, and why and when are particular individuals included or excluded. Our 
objectives lead us to focus this study on the following two research questions: (1) How do 
new CEOs establish their TMT? (2) How do new CEOs work with a TMT in transition?  
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3.2.3 A Role Theory Perspective on New CEOs and TMT Formation  
Although this study is explorative in nature and aims to build theory inductively, adopting a 
theoretical perspective can be helpful in offering a conceptual vocabulary for analyzing and 
theorizing the phenomenon under investigation (Blaikie, 2000; Bowen, 2006; Charmaz, 
2003). Thus, we employ role theory for this purpose as a theoretical perspective to inform our 
study (Biddle, 1986; Katz and Kahn, 1978). Role theory appears particularly suitable for at 
least two reasons. First, forming a team is essentially about (re)defining roles within the team 
and the interactive relationships between them. Role theory can sensitize us by directing our 
attention to how and why new CEOs modify existing or create new TMT positions and how 
they relate to one another. Second, role theory has previously been used in studies on new 
CEOs (Denis et al., 2000; Fondas and Wiersema, 1997). Although these studies have not 
directly focused on TMT formation, they note socialization as a significant aspect of new 
CEOs’ taking charge process. Whereas there are different streams in the role theory literature 
(Biddle, 1986; Sluss, van Dick, and Thompson, 2011), this is not the place for a 
comprehensive review; instead, we merely want to introduce some basic concepts of role 
theory that seem particularly fruitful for discussing how new CEOs form their team.  
From a role theory perspective, an organization is a system of interdependent roles 
(Katz and Kahn, 1978). A role can be defined as “a set of behavioral expectations attached to 
a position in an organized set of social relationships” (Stryker, 2007: 1083). The role of a 
CEO is often understood as directing the organization as a whole, an essential part of which 
is to provide a strategic orientation (Chen and Hambrick, 2012; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and 
Cannella, 2009; Kor and Mesko, 2013). Moreover, when adopting a new role, an individual 
typically faces a high level of uncertainty because of an initial lack of understanding of the 
new role and limited resources in performing it (Ashford and Black, 1996; Ellis et al., 2015; 
Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, and Rosenthal, 1964). Research on organizational entry 
emphasizes the importance of newcomers to “learn the ropes” in their new position, a process 
called organizational socialization. During this process, an individual may be proactive and 
seek information and feedback, while negotiating changes in the job (Ashford and Black, 
1996). Therefore, new CEOs are expected to direct the organization but also must learn the 
organizational ropes. The demands of taking charge may not only involve orienting the 
organization but also connecting to and relating to the organization.  
The literature typically suggests that a new job occupant assimilates values, attitudes, 
and expectations through socialization and tries to perform the role as defined previously 
(i.e., role taking) (Katz and Kahn, 1978). Some scholars extend the idea of role taking to role 
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enactment in the context of managerial jobs (Fondas and Stewart, 1994). Fondas and Stewart 
(1994) argue that a manager may not only passively take a role as expected by others but also 
deliberately and actively try to shape the role expectations. This idea resonates with exiting 
studies of CEOs succession that have shown that new CEOs frequently don’t just passively 
accept the role as expected by others, but modify their role depending on their agenda, 
preferences, and power (Denis et al., 2000; Fondas and Stewart, 1994). For that purpose, for 
example, they may deliberately change their surrounding environment by modifying the 
positions and members around them.  
Another concept that is particularly relevant in this regard is role constellation, which 
can be defined as a group of people “performing certain roles that are interrelated” with one 
another in certain ways for achieving a particular function (Hodgson, Levinson, and Zaleznik, 
1965: 485). Role constellation is used by Hodgson et al. (1965) and Denis et al. (2000) to 
describe the collective leadership in a hospital in which power and authority are shared. In a 
leadership role constellation, “each member plays distinct but harmoniously integrated roles 
that enable all issues to be covered” (Denis et al., 2000: 1067). The concept of role 
constellation seems particularly suited to describing the role relationships within TMTs, since 
a single role has no meaning without considering its relationship to the roles surrounding it. 
This notion is consistent with upper echelons theory that addresses the TMT as an 
assemblage of skills and competences necessary for directing the organization. The notion of 
role constellation also captures the informal role relationships in the TMT, such as the 
informal responsibilities or expectations attached to different positions. When new CEOs 
form a team, they must define their own role in relation to others, considering the different 
functions in the team to achieve their agenda. Thus, new CEOs may not only enact their own 
role but also enact the role constellation around them (Denis et al., 2000).  
Two more concepts are particular relevant for a TMT in transition in which roles must 
be redefined and renegotiated: role ambiguity and role conflict. Whereas role ambiguity 
refers to the situation in which expected behaviors are unclear to an individual, role conflict 
occurs when incompatible expectations are placed upon an individual (Humborstad and 
Kuvaas, 2013; Jackson and Schuler, 1985; Kahn et al., 1964; Rizzo, House, and Lirtzman, 
1970; Tubre and Collins, 2000; Vansell, Brief, and Schuler, 1981). When new CEOs induce 
changes in the positions and in the members around them, role ambiguity and role conflict is 
likely to result. A clearly defined role is more likely the result of social interaction than 
official assignment. New positions or members may experience role ambiguity, as 
responsibilities may not be clearly defined from the beginning. For example, new CEOs 
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sometimes appoint interim executives but what the interim position entails is frequently 
unclear (cf. Ballinger and Marcel, 2010). Similarly, role conflict can be common as different 
members may have different expectations regarding a particular position or member. As the 
literature suggests, both role ambiguity and role conflict can lead role holders to experience 
stress and dissatisfaction (Kahn et al., 1964; Rizzo et al., 1970; Tubre and Collins, 2000). 
Once such situations occur in the TMT, tensions and stress will rise, which can trigger further 
modifications of role relationships among TMT members (Bedeian and Armenakis, 1981; 
van de Vliert, 1981). Therefore, role ambiguity and role conflict must be considered in 
seeking to understand the dynamics of interaction within a TMT in transition.  
3.3 Methods 
This research is explorative in nature and is intended for theory building as opposed to theory 
testing (Eisenhardt, 1989). A longitudinal multiple-case study is adopted for three reasons. 
First, in-depth case studies are useful for exploring the key concepts and dynamics of how 
new CEOs establish their TMT as these notions are not yet well documented in the literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 2002; Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Yin, 1994). Second, to understand 
how the TMT is established or modified over time, a longitudinal approach is required to 
capture the temporal patterns and to account for the precedence of events (Langley, 1999; 
Van de ven, 1992). Third, multiple cases yield a replication logic that can generate a rich 
theoretical framework and simultaneously improve the generalizability of findings 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994). Finally, this methodological choice responds to 
the growing calls for longitudinal and qualitative approaches to CEO succession research 
(Kesner and Sebora, 1994; Ma et al., forthcoming; Pitcher et al., 2000). 
 Because this research aims to build theory, eight firms were selected by theoretical 
sampling (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994). As shown in Table 4, our sampling 
follows two levels of replication. First, we selected firms with both internal and external 
successors, with four cases in each category. This design was chosen because studies suggest 
that successor origin influences how new CEOs change their TMT, given that internal and 
external successors typically have different perspectives regarding strategic directions and 
different interpersonal relationships in the organization (Friedman and Saul, 1991; Helmich 
and Brown, 1972). For example, some studies have shown that external successors are more 
likely than internal successors to change the TMT (Helmich and Brown, 1972). Therefore, 
this design lets us compare how insiders and outsiders form their TMT. Second, we selected 
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four firms with a divisional structure and four with a functional structure. This design is 
intended to capture the potential influence of TMT structural interdependence on how new 
CEOs change their TMT (Hambrick, Humphrey, and Gupta, 2015). Different TMT structures 
imply different types of collaborative dynamics among TMT members: within a divisional 
structure, top managers are more likely to be independent of one another, whereas within a 
functional structural they tend more to depend on one another (Hambrick et al., 2015). 
Having cases in both categories can help us understand how structural differences affect the 
ways in which new CEOs change and work with and within their TMTs. In summary, 
comparing CEOs within different categories is likely to generate deep insights into the 
different possibilities of establishing a TMT and therefore to enrich our theorization 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Furthermore, replicating cases in each category will 
improve the robustness and generalizability of our findings (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; 
Yin, 1994). Appendix 1 provides additional characteristics of the eight firms, showing their 
variations in industry, status as the whole corporate or subsidiary, scope of operation, age, 
and size. These variations are expected to improve the generalizability of our findings.  
 
Table 4: Attributes of cases 
 Internal successor External successor 
Divisional 
structure  
ComCo  
ServiCo  
ManuCo  
TraviCo  
 
Functional 
structure  
TechCo  
MechCo  
SalesCo  
CleanCo  
  
3.3.1 Data Collection 
We approached our eight case companies shortly after their new CEOs took charge, and data 
collection began mostly within their first six months and all within their first 10 months. In 
each firm, the most intense period of data collection covers the new CEO’s first 24 months, 
which is followed by collecting public data and informal interviews to track certain further 
developments. As summarized in table 5, our data include the following sources: 1) 
interviews with the CEO and other informants, 2) internal and external documents, and 3) 
informal interviews and office tours. Triangulating sources can enhance the accuracy of the 
information collected and therefore of the theory developed (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
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Table 5: Summary of data sources 
   Firm 
Data Source ComCo ServiCo TechCo MechCo ManuCo TraviCo SalesCo CleanCo 
 Interviews         
  CEOa 9 7 8 6 5 10 8 10 
  Top managers 2 6 3 5 2 5 3 5 
  Staff/ othersb 9 1 2 3 10 1 6 4 
  In total (130) 20 14 13 14 17 16 17 19 
           
 Documents         
  Internal  36 3 10 2 11 8 14 2 
  External 26 12 5 2 76 4 19 3 
           
 Other sources         
  Informal interviews 11 15 7 5 10 3 9 5 
  Office tours 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
a The total number of interviews with the same CEO over the data collection period.  
b Staff refer to those who occupy supporting functions, such as project office, strategic office, organizational 
development, communication, etc. Other interviewees include lower level managers, the former CEO, and 
members of the board of directors. 
 
 
Interviews with the CEO and other organizational members constitute our main 
source of data. Interviews are particularly useful in terms of identifying how, when, and why 
a new CEO changes particular members or positions in the TMT. Similarly, interviews can 
help us discover with whom the CEO works on which issues and how and why they work 
together on such issues. In the initial interviews, we tried to retrospectively capture the 
background of the succession and what the new CEO had undertaken thus far (e.g., Denis et 
al., 2000). Following that, our interviews with the CEO generally took place every 4-8 weeks 
to ensure that we were closely following the CEO’s activities (Van de ven, 1992). Eight 
interviews were conducted with each CEO on average during the data collection period.  
In addition to interviewing the CEO, we also interviewed other organizational 
members to gain a comprehensive picture of the development in each case and to mitigate 
any bias that might arise by interviewing the CEO as a single informant (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994). For this purpose, we selected the other informants by three 
criteria. First, we tried to include both existing top managers and those who were appointed 
by the new CEO. Together, they could provide information regarding the top management 
team dynamics before and after the new CEO had taken office. Second, we interviewed those 
members who were close and important to the CEO. Some of them were interviewed several 
times during the study. These persons were identified from interviews with the CEO. As we 
shall show later, these individuals were sometimes staff members or lower level managers 
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who may not have been part of the TMT. Interviews with these individuals were intended to 
reveal how and why the CEO worked closely with them. Third, whenever possible and to 
capture alternative perspectives, we interviewed members who held views critical of the CEO 
regarding important issues or developments.  
 Given the explorative nature of this research, semi-structured but open-ended 
interviews were conducted with a set of main themes about the background of CEO 
succession, key personnel changes, important decisions, organizational and strategic changes, 
and development of key events over time (e.g., Denis et al., 2000). Whereas early interviews 
were broad in scope, latter interviews became increasingly focused on the topic of this study. 
We paid particular attention to any and each personnel or positional change in the TMT or of 
other direct reports to the CEO, how the CEO worked with different members, the inclusion 
and exclusion of certain members during important decisions, and developments of TMT 
dynamics. Several techniques were used to mitigate informant bias in interviews. First, our 
interviews followed real-time organizational development and thus minimized recall bias 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990). Second, as we interviewed the CEOs several times and also 
interviewed many different members of each firm, we had the opportunity to crosscheck 
uncertainties. Third, to limit information bias we began each interview by identifying the 
timeline of actions, issues, and events, which allowed us subsequently to ask questions by 
following the timeline with the facts identified (Eisenhardt, 1989; Huber, 1985; Miller, 
Cardinal, and Glick, 1997). 
Interviews lasted approximately 60-90 minutes each and were audiotaped, except for 
one interview with a staff member who only allowed us to take notes. Most interviews were 
conducted by two interviewers to compare impressions and to avoid blind spots, thus serving 
as a form of investigator triangulation (Patton, 2002). Within 24 hours following each 
interview, the interviewers reflected on interesting points and noted what questions should be 
asked next time. The taped interview was sent to a professional firm for transcription and 
then was analyzed to guide the follow-up interviews. In total, we conducted 130 interviews3, 
which resulted in a transcript of more than 2,100 single-spaced pages.  
 The second data source includes archival data collected internally from the firm and 
also externally from public sources. Internal documents included the corporate agenda of 
main meetings and projects, executive meeting agenda and minutes, the CEO’s personal 
agenda, the CEO’s slides of presentations in important meetings, and internal communication 
                                                
3 All interviews were conducted in English except for 16 interviews that were conducted in German. For 
purpose of analysis, a third-party professional translated all the German interviews into English.  
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related to the CEO. These documents were particularly helpful in establishing an accurate 
timeline of key changes, decisions, events, and facts after the new CEO took charge. They 
were also used to triangulate the information obtained in interviews, such as the participants 
and agenda points in key meetings. External archives include annual reports, industry analyst 
reports, firm news releases, CEOs’ interviews given to the media, and any media news 
related to the CEO or to the firm during our data collection period. The external documents 
provided us with additional information and perspectives about particular changes and 
developments in the organization, which were helpful for prompting questions in the 
interviews.  
 In addition to interviews and documents, we also conducted many informal interviews 
during and after the intense period of data collection. The informal interviews were often 
short, varying from five to 30 minutes, taking place in corridors, in cars, at social events, or 
via telephone calls. They were useful to verify the information from formal interviews or to 
gain more information regarding certain issues. After an intense period of data collection in 
the new CEO’s first two years, we followed most cases by informal interviews to track 
particular developments. In addition, during data collection, we also took office tours in each 
firm to understand the atmosphere of the working place, such as the setup of the office rooms 
and departments.  
3.3.2 Data Analysis 
We adopted an inductive approach to analyzing the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). We first 
composed a rich description of each case by synthesizing the information of the firm from 
multiple sources (Eisenhardt, 1989). These case descriptions were 25-30 single-spaced pages 
in length each. Each began with the context of CEO succession and followed a chronological 
order describing key events, actions, decisions, and developments. It also identified the 
names of individuals, departments, and other facts that seemed necessary for further analysis. 
Guided by our research questions, when composing the case description we paid particular 
attention to 1) each change in the CEO’s direct reports both in terms of position or person, 2) 
the context, rationales, and effects of the change, 3) the manner of collaboration between the 
CEO and others, such as executive meeting routines, and 4) what persons were involved with 
respect to each major decision or project initiated by the CEO. Thus, we created an accurate 
timeline of key personnel change and with whom the CEO worked on which major issues.   
Once the case descriptions were created, we began looking for general patterns by 
means of within- and cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). Diagrams were drawn to 
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describe the evolution of the CEO’s group of collaborators and to compare them across cases. 
Several general patterns emerged. First, all the CEOs stressed establishing a team of 
collaborators as a top priority and most TMTs4, i.e., most formal executive teams (Carpenter 
et al., 2004; Nielsen, 2010), underwent significant changes during the first three years. 
However, we also found in several firms that the CEO emphasized the importance of 
changing or collaborating with particular positions or members outside the TMT, such as the 
project office manager. Second, all the new CEOs had a group of immediate collaborators 
who were 1) constantly involved in strategic issues and 2) were important to the CEOs as 
described by themselves. More importantly, these immediate collaborators, which we call the 
strategic apparatus, often included members outside the TMT, which sometimes created 
tensions between TMT members who were excluded from important decisions and those 
persons that were included. Third, we found that the group of immediate collaborators and 
the TMT converged over time, particularly over the second and third years. These discerned 
patterns led us to engage in open coding during the next data analysis stage.  
Instead of relying exclusively on the case descriptions, we coded the original 
interviews to be able to explain the patterns we observed. NVivo for Mac was employed to 
code for 1) the reasons for changing a direct report in terms of its position or occupant, 2) the 
reasons for collaborating with a particular member of the organization, 3) and the reasons for 
the convergence between the group of immediate collaborators and the TMT. On the basis of 
the coding, we created an excel sheet of all the coded entries to search for similarities 
between codes within and across cases. The codes were then grouped into interpretive 
clusters according to their similarities and differences: where similar, codes were clustered 
together under a common interpretive umbrella, which formed the first-order categories 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). By identifying the links among these categories, we generated 
second-order themes in which the former could be understood as the dimensions of the latter 
(Gioia, Price, Hamilton, and Thomas, 2010). For example, one of themes generated from this 
process included the constraints on TMT change, which includes three categories: relational, 
structural, and personal. In this process, we followed a replication logic to check all the cases 
for the occurrence of each theme and category (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Moreover, 
                                                
4 The TMT has been defined and operationalized in many different ways by different authors depending on their 
respective research purpose and access to data (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick, 2007; Nielsen, 2010). In line 
with a large number of other studies, we define the TMT as including all individuals that are formally part of the 
executive team (e.g., Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary, 2003; Kor, 2003). This definition allows us to compare 
those who are formally expected to collaborate with the CEO to those who actually do.  
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generating the theoretical categories and themes was also informed by the pervious literature 
on new CEOs and TMTs and by a role theory perspective.  
During the final stage of the analysis, we developed a process model by linking 
different theoretical themes to explain the patterns we observed, which involved a process of 
iteration between data and theory to ensure the process model could explain the pattern in 
each case. We now turn to presenting our findings. We begin by describing our empirically 
generated process model that will serve as a structure for elaborating our findings.  
3.4 Findings: Formation and Evolution of the Strategic Apparatus  
As discussed in the data analysis, we found that all the CEOs formed a group of immediate 
collaborators that were involved in multiple strategic issues and decisions in contrast to their 
peers who were either involved in only a particular strategic issue or in charge of only 
operational responsibilities. Sometimes this group was referred to as the “inner circle” by the 
organizational members. For example, the CEO of ComCo said that he had an inner circle to 
discuss all the important issues: “Maybe the inner circle of four to five people […] is usually 
involved in almost all the thoughts I have.” Moreover, it was important for him to bring his 
own inner circle to the corporate level when he was promoted to the position of CEO:  
Now this is a very tough decision [to replace some existing executive and staff 
members] because these people up there, they are just not part of your family, or 
they’re just not part of your inner circle or whatever, so it sounds a bit unfair. But 
on the other hand, you need to have a kind of a belt around you, where you are 
convinced that they perform, they have the right character, integrity, trust. All these 
issues become very important. 
 
We propose the term “strategic apparatus” to denote this group of immediate 
collaborators. This term is appropriate for at least three reasons. First, the term captures the 
strategic nature of the group that was formed by the CEO to direct the organization. The 
members of the group shape key decisions and the strategic direction. Second, “apparatus” is 
appropriate for denoting the complex interrelations between the roles of different group 
members. By “strategic apparatus”, we want to emphasize the role relationships among 
members as a constellation and not as an aggregate (Hodgson et al., 1965). Third, 
“apparatus” is useful to indicate its fundamental association with power, as used by some 
philosophers (Agamben, 2009). Since the members of this group are close to the CEO and 
constantly involved in important decisions, they are powerful individuals – although some of 
them may not have an important position on an official organizational chart. Finally, as we 
  78 
discuss in detail below, the constitution of the group is different from the TMT, and it is 
therefore important to use a term that is not associated with the TMT.  
 
a strategic apparatus 
Figure 1: A process model of establishing and changing the strategic apparatus 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the theoretical themes and categories generated from our data 
analysis are linked into a coherent model explaining how new CEOs establish their strategic 
apparatus as well as how the apparatus evolves over time. We found that two main drivers 
lead to establishing a strategic apparatus: strategic orientation requirements and personal 
integration requirements. Although the former involve aligning the team with the CEO’s 
strategic agenda (Helmich and Brown, 1972; Keck and Tushman, 1993), the latter involve the 
personal integration of the new CEO into the organization (Denis et al., 2000). Whereas new 
CEOs frequently try to meet these requirements by changing their TMT, they face three types 
of constraints: relational, structural, and personal. These constraints limit the CEO’s ability to 
establish the TMT as their strategic apparatus. Hence, to meet their requirements, CEOs tend 
to include members outside the TMT in their strategic apparatus. For this purpose, they often 
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create staff positions and/or appoint new members into established positions. As an 
intermediary outcome, establishing a strategic apparatus can lead to two types of discrepancy 
between it and the TMT. The first type is the overlapping strategic apparatus, in which the 
strategic apparatus includes non-TMT members while excluding some members of the TMT. 
The second type is the subgroup strategic apparatus in which the strategic apparatus only 
includes a subset of TMT members. 
However, we found that discrepancies between the strategic apparatus and the TMT 
tends to result in gradually increasing tensions between members included in and excluded 
from the strategic apparatus. In addition, some of the strategic orientation and integration 
requirements tend to become less important as new CEOs accumulate both knowledge and 
authority over time. Consequently, we tend to observe a gradual convergence between the 
strategic apparatus and the TMT, which manifests in different ways: non-TMT apparatus 
members moving into the TMT or being moved out from the apparatus or non-apparatus 
TMT members moving into the apparatus or moving out of the TMT.   
The main themes and the linkages between them can be identified in all the cases, 
although different cases may vary in the subcategories of a particular theme. In the following, 
we present our detailed findings following the logic of the process model shown in Figure 1.  
3.4.1 Formation of the Strategic Apparatus 
Strategic orientation requirements  
In this study, we found that all the CEOs took deliberate efforts to establish a group of 
collaborators, which often led to significant changes in their direct reports within and outside 
of the TMT. One type of requirement that drove these changes was related to the strategic 
orientation of the organization. Most new CEOs brought with them a different strategic 
agenda from their predecessor that varied from critical operational issues, to structural 
changes, to strategic changes. For example, the CEO of ServiCo told us:  
[I]t was a new strategy for the firm, […] the way we were going to be operating our 
firm, one sense of purpose, was very different to how it had been. […] [I created] 
eleven initiatives. Okay, we will embed a high performance culture. We will create a 
differentiated brand. […]. We will do a step change in our capability, de, de, de, de, 
de. 
 
Such changes in the strategic agenda were typical both for successors promoted from outside 
and from within the company. The only exception was the CEO of MechCo who chose to 
retain the predecessor’s strategic agenda without any changes whatsoever. Although the new 
agenda was sometimes also mandated by the board of directors, it was typically the CEO’s 
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responsibility to execute it. However, this was frequently not particularly easy as the existing 
executive members were either not committed to – or lacked the competences for – pushing 
the agenda. To meet the requirements of strategic orientation, new CEOs built into their 
strategic apparatus necessary competences, commitments, and special task forces.  
Competences refer to the experience, knowledge, skills, and access to resources to be 
able to effectively pursue a particular strategic agenda. We found that creating or acquiring 
the necessary competences often involved adjusting positions and replacing members in the 
TMT to align with the new strategy or structure. When appointing new top managers, new 
CEOs looked in particular for those who have had experience in leading similar projects, 
networks accessing particular resources, market-specific knowledge, and/or skills associated 
with the agenda. For example, the CEO of ServiCo was pursing a growth strategy and for that 
he emphasized the importance of creating a position entitled “strategic clients” and 
appointing a person, who we refer to as T85, with particular competences. As he explained: 
I created some new roles and I created what we call “head of strategic clients”. 
[…] I felt that the best person for that was a person called [T8]. T8 is just a brilliant 
client person and he's a great strategist, so who is better to drive our strategy than 
someone like here. 
 
Another strategic orientation requirement is to ensure commitment that refers to the 
motivation and willingness to purse the new agenda. We found that new CEOs often had to 
dismiss managers who were too attached to the past or the preceding CEO because they 
impeded – or were perceived to impede – the new course of action. Concurrently, new CEOs 
appointed those with the willingness to move forward in the new direction. For example, 
when joining CleanCo from outside, the new CEO deliberately tested existing team 
members’ willingness to go with his direction. As a result, he terminated a marketing 
manager who was not enthusiastic about pursuing the new direction. The CEO explained:  
I made very clear at the beginning that we have to move on, that we have to move 
into new direction.[...] And then normally you wait and look what is the reaction. 
And for sure, people react differently. And especially with this marketing person, I 
found out there was almost no reaction. And so that’s what I explained before. 
Being on the move means the key people, they have to be able and the willingness 
has to be there to – to move on together. 
 
In addition, there was also a requirement for a special task force for strategic 
orientation. When taking charge, the new CEOs often had many new ideas to be developed 
                                                
5 To preserve the anonymity of our informants, we refer to members of the TMT as T1, T2,...Tn, to staff 
members or lower-level managers as S1, S2,…Sn, and to members of the board as B1, B2,…Bn. 
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further and implemented. New strategic projects had to be coordinated. Moreover, as some 
top managers were in transition, their strategic work had to be undertaken by others. As a 
result, we found that new CEOs frequently saw a requirement to create positions particularly 
for developing and carrying out their emergent strategic ideas, coordinating and leading 
strategic projects, and supporting other departments in terms of strategic work whenever 
necessary. The nature of this type of work was more dynamic, emergent, and interim, and its 
responsibility could not be clearly defined. For example, the new CEO of ComCo created a 
COO position whose responsibility was not clearly specified. The CEO explained why he 
created such a position: “I nominated him [T2] as a COO in the role of really being very 
close to me and often bringing things that I start really into the goal, bringing them really to 
the end.” In contrast to this particular case, most of these positions were created outside the 
TMT, perhaps because defining a clear role within the TMT for these positions was difficult. 
Typical positions serving these functions were “project management office,” “strategic 
projects,” and “organizational development.” The unclearly defined scope of responsibility of 
such positions allowed them to address various topics that the CEO was concerned about. In 
SaleCo, for example, two new staff members, S3 and S4, were developing strategic concepts 
for the CEO and addressing emergent issues in other departments. Another staff member 
explained their roles: 
He (the CEO) needs two or three people at a level for the concepts he needs. For 
example, [one department head], I think he's not so much into the strategic way and 
the concept way that he wants, and that's where S3 and S4 are going in and doing 
the whole presentations and big pictures and everything. This work is done here and 
that's why he needs them. […] They are like a little police of him or a firemen 
department. In one department, if something is wrong and they cannot perform and 
keep up with the pace of [the CEO], these two have to support.  
 
 Whereas in most cases, strategic orientation requirements were significant as 
perceived by the new CEO, this perception was less obvious in the two insider cases, TechCo 
and MechCo. In the former, the CEO stressed maintaining continuity; in the latter, the new 
CEO had a new perspective from which to direct the firm, but this new perspective did not 
involve no dramatic changes of strategy or structure. Therefore, in both cases, there were 
fewer requirements arising from strategic orientation than in others. Appendix 2 summarizes 
the representative quotes and evidence of the strategic orientation requirements across the 
eight cases. 
 
Personal integration requirements 
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The second driver of establishing the strategic apparatus involved the personal integration 
requirements associated with (the necessity of) the CEO connecting with and relating to the 
organization (Denis et al., 2000). We identified three integration requirements in our data 
related to the composition of the strategic apparatus: access to critical information, idea 
testing, and interpersonal fit.  
Gaining access to critical information is a critical challenge for new CEOs. We found 
that formal information channels did not provide new CEOs with the information they needed 
in terms of the organizational atmosphere, the perceptions and expectations of key 
individuals, information regarding historical issues, firm-specific knowledge, and even 
critical operational information. Such information might help the CEO better understand the 
organization. For purposes of accessing critical information, new CEOs deliberately selected 
particular individuals for close collaboration. These individuals typically had two features. 
First, they had been working for a long time for the same organization and had a good 
working knowledge of the overall situation. For example, in the case of ManuCo, staff 
member S3 who was appointed for a major transformation project had been working in a 
global capacity for a long time, and the CEO believed him to“know the group pretty well in 
the context of processes, the businesses, the people, the cultures.” He said that the CEO 
appointed him to understand the firm better through his knowledge. As he explained, 
Because he (the CEO) is also new to the group and, probably if you do 
transformation, it might help to understand a little bit the cultures and how you can 
get best along with it.  
 
The second feature of these individuals is that they often had solid connections and knew 
what was happening in the organization. They were ordinary staff members, such as the 
communication officer and project management officer, who interacted with organizational 
members from lower levels and were thus able to provide the CEO with information 
regarding how the CEO was perceived by employees, the organizational atmosphere, and the 
feelings of important individuals. For instance, the CEO of SalesCo explained the importance 
of having such individuals close for critical information:  
You also have to people who are well networked within the enterprise so that you 
have an early warning system in place. [...] If you don’t have a few people through 
the ranks with whom you share a strong bond of trust you as a CEO won’t know 
what’s going on. [...] S3 does [have this function.] For me it’s definitely S4, who is a 
great people person, and also S1, she knows what’s going on within the company. 
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Although in some cases, these individuals were members of the TMT, in most cases, they 
were members in staff positions close to the CEO – perhaps because they had fewer conflicts 
of interest in revealing such critical information to the CEO.   
Another personal integration requirement is idea testing. As observed in this study, 
most new CEOs felt that it was necessary to have “sounding boards” or “sparring partners” 
for testing ideas. They sought to have some close collaborators with whom to discuss their 
ideas, looking particularly for individuals who would provide counterpoints or novel 
perspectives. Idea testing was particularly crucial for new CEOs because of the uncertainty 
and complexity associated with taking charge, on the one hand, and because of their 
unfamiliarity with the people and operations, on the other. These individuals often had “an 
eagle’s view” of the organization, had profound knowledge of the business or the 
organization, and could challenge the CEO on sensitive and critical issues. These might be 
members of the board, top managers or even staff members. For example, in the case of 
TechCo, the CEO actively searched within the TMT for individuals who could serve such a 
role. He explained,  
 Another topic which I started quite quickly to analyze [...] was my inner circle of 
the management team where I would like to discuss some topics. So to have one or 
two guys [...] where I could discuss, for example the CFO topic, what he believes I 
should do. [...] But to challenging such situation, how should I react, how should I 
present myself or TechCo in certain areas, in a meeting, in a conference, or 
whatever it will be. 
 
These individuals typically had strong views on the business or the market and were 
able to challenge the new CEO by providing alternative views. For example, in ServiCo the 
CEO worked closely with senior member T6 due to his strong views on the markets. One top 
manager explained why the CEO appointed T6 to the TMT: 
T6 has got an important role, to a certain extent. I mean he's counter pole to some of 
[the CEO]'s thinking, also of the others. He's got very specific views about the 
market. Not necessarily shared by everyone, […] but he's got strong views.  
 
The final personal integration requirement is interpersonal fit, which refers to the 
match between the CEO and other members in terms of personality, behavioral style, and 
trust, which are all necessary for effective collaboration (Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, and 
Johnson, 2005; van Vianen, Shen, and Chuang, 2011). We found that all the new CEOs had 
substantially different personalities and working styles from their predecessors. Therefore, 
when a CEO appointed or chose an individual for close collaboration, he or she was 
frequently concerned with the “chemistry” between them. For example, the CEO of ComCo 
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wanted to have “hands-on” managers, which was very different from his predecessor’s style. 
As he explained, “I wanted to completely change. I wanted to have people who were hands 
on.” Similarly, the CEO of ServiCo wanted people with positive energy: “I just don’t want 
people who are always going to be negative. And we had some of those on the previous 
management committee.” Achieving interpersonal fit was a major reason why new CEOs 
often brought their former colleagues with them, either from their previous department in the 
insider cases or from their previous company in outsider cases. For example, the CEO of 
SalesCo explained the advantages of bringing in his former colleague, S5, from the outside:  
“S5 and I were already colleagues at [another firm] and the constellation was the 
same. I knew him and I was the one who encouraged him to come on board at 
SalesCo. So if you’ve already worked together for many years, probably 10 years, it 
is relatively easy to let things take their course later.” 
 
We found that both internal and external successors were concerned with personal 
integration requirements in general, which suggests that internal successors were concerned 
with creating the necessary context for mastering their new assignment, even when promoted 
from the inside. However, it seems that internal successors had less requirement for access to 
critical information, as observed in ServiCo, TechCo, and MechCo. Appendix 3 offers some 
representative quotes and evidence of personal integration requirements across the eight 
cases. 
 
Constraints of TMT change 
In contrast to the assumption in the literature that CEOs can always configure their TMT to 
meet strategic and organizational demands (Kor and Mesko, 2013), we found that new CEOs 
faced various constraints in so doing, which was a major reason why they did not collaborate 
closely with some TMT members while collaborating closely with others outside of the 
TMT. Three types of constraints were identified: relational, structural, and personal.  
Relational constraints refer to the situations in which the CEO cannot change the 
status of a TMT member because of his or her relationship to particular organizational 
members. In some cases, an individual could not be replaced in the TMT because he or she 
was “protected” by his or her good relationship with the board of directors or to other TMT 
members. For example, at TechCo, top manager T7 had a good relationship with the board of 
directors. Although the new CEO found him problematic, it was not possible to replace him 
with respect to leading his department. The CEO explained this situation as follows:   
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 [With T7], I already planned end last year, beginning this year, to make some 
changes and I learned, I gave almost up that this is not possible because […] the 
boss said oh no, no, everything is okay and also T7 and other people, oh no they are 
working well and great.  
 
In some cases, the relationship that constrained TMT change was also negative in 
nature, such as when the TMT or the board of directors would not accept the person the CEO 
wanted to appoint. For example, the new CEO of SalesCo wanted to appoint his former 
colleague S5 to the TMT but he felt that this person would not be accepted by the board and 
by the other TMT members. As a result, the CEO recruited him as a lower-level manager but 
promoted him to the TMT within the year. S5 explained this situation:   
I think it was a bit political. [...] And it could well be that he [the CEO] thought 
that, also in the discussion with [the board of directors], it's easier to have me in 
this interim function and then to settle the task a bit later. [...]I see it was an 
extremely intelligent way to get me introduced into the company, not only because 
we came from [the same firm] but also in the contact with [the board]. So, placing 
the wanted person, politically correct, and then seeing what is [the solution]. 
 
Some new CEOs also faced structural constraints, such as when a CEO would like to 
create or change positions in the TMT but was not allowed to do so by the board of directors. 
Because of the institutional requirements associated with the composition of the TMT, one 
might assume that CEOs always face structural constraints implicitly. In this study, the 
structural constraints were clear in MechCo and TechCo. For example, in MechCo, the CEO 
was required to combine his previous functional role as head of the sales department with his 
new role as CEO. As a result, he could not create a separate position of head of sales in the 
TMT. As he explained, “it is forbidden by the Group. I have to accumulate two functions, 
CEO and sales, this is to reduce personnel costs.” In the end, he had to appoint S2 as a 
coordinator outside of the TMT who actually took over most of his previous responsibilities.     
The third type of constraints consist of personal constraints, which refer to the 
situations in which the CEO could not appoint an individual to the TMT – or even retain one 
in the TMT – because of that individual’s personal reasons. These reasons might be that the 
individual did not want to remain in or be appointed to the TMT. For example, in ManuCo, 
the CEO could not retain a former TMT member S2 because he wanted to retire earlier, but 
the CEO kept him as an advisor outside the TMT for the CEO’s first year. In some cases, the 
collaborator did not want to be in the TMT because they did not have certain qualities or the 
ambition of being in a leadership position. For example, in ComCo, the top manager T2 
explained such a situation with the financial controller S3:  
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S3 would have, let's say, had the chance to get also the CFO job if he liked to do it, 
but he was always a very clear person saying I like my job, I'm a controlling person, 
I don't want to take more responsibility.  
  
Personal constraints also included those situations in which the CEO lacked good candidates 
or it took some time for the recruited members to join the firm. For example, in TraviCo, the 
CEO hired two top managers but it took six months for them to join; as a result, he faced a 
shortage of managers in the TMT. As he explained,  
I don’t have enough managerial staff at the moment. So I have a good amount of 
people reporting directly to me which keeps me quite busy which is day-to-day 
things. […] There are not so many people here to talk to. I mean certain topics like 
reducing staff is not a topic you want to discuss with everybody in a corridor. […] 
It’s very stupid to be in a company which is not in the best state, to be still quite new 
and not to be able to rely on a few people within the company. 
 
We found that new CEOs in the cases of functional structure face relational and 
structural constraints more frequently than those in the cases of divisional structures. The 
reason might be that in contrast to personal constraints, both relational and structural 
constraints are directly related to the role relationships in the TMT. Since the 
interdependence between TMT members is higher in functional than in divisional structures 
(Hambrick et al., 2015), new CEOs tend to face more constraints of modifying the role 
relationships among them. However, we did not find systematic evidence for this 
explanation, which could be further explored. Appendix 4 provides some representative 
quotes and evidence for the constraints of TMT change across the eight cases.   
 
Establishing the strategic apparatus 
From a role theory perspective, establishing the strategic apparatus is a process through 
which new CEOs actively create their work environment by reconfiguring surrounding role 
relationships rather than passively adapting to existing role relationships. Three types of 
actions constitute this process: changing TMT positions and members, changing staff 
positions and members, and selecting immediate collaborators. Whereas the first two involve 
creating possibilities for close collaboration by adjusting formal role structures, the last 
involves including and excluding particular members for close collaboration in real working 
relationships. As discussed above, establishing the strategic apparatus is driven by the 
requirements of taking charge and is influenced by the constraints that new CEOs face. 
Appendix 5 provides an overview of how the different members of the strategic apparatuses 
of the eight companies relate to the different types of requirements and constraints. 
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The first type of action in establishing the strategic apparatus that we observed involves 
changing positions and members in the TMT, as driven by the requirements of strategic 
orientation and personal integration. Since TMT members are the natural collaborators for 
new CEOs, we found that CEOs took deliberate efforts to configure the TMT. Six out of the 
eight new CEOs changed their TMT substantially within the first six months both in terms of 
members and positions. Two firms, TechCo and MechCo, experienced fewer TMT changes, 
with only one member change in the former and no change in the latter. This resulted mainly 
for two reasons. First, these CEOs did not initiate strategic or structural changes at the 
beginning of their tenure and had fewer strategic orientation requirements, as a result. 
Second, both CEOs were promoted from within and had fewer integration requirements than 
the other CEOs. Therefore, regarding TMT change when new CEOs take charge, our findings 
suggest the following proposition: 
Proposition 1. The greater the CEO’s perceived requirements for strategic 
orientation and personal integration, the more likely he or she will change positions 
and/or members in the TMT. 
 
As discussed above, new CEOs faced various constraints when configuring their 
TMT. For this reason, they sometimes were not able to replace particular TMT members or to 
appoint particular individuals to the TMT. In such situations, we found that new CEOs often 
changed staff positions and members close to them to be able to collaborate with certain 
individuals. When they could not remove particular TMT members, they often did not 
include them in their network of immediate collaborators. In other words, the constraints of 
TMT change forced new CEOs to collaborate with individuals outside the TMT. These 
findings suggest the following proposition:  
Proposition 2.The greater the constraints on TMT change, the more likely a new CEO 
will choose immediate collaborators outside the TMT.  
3.4.2 Discrepancy Between the Strategic Apparatus and the TMT 
In contrast to most literature that assumes that CEOs collaborate with their TMT members to 
lead their organization, we found that this is not the case – at least not for new CEOs. After 
the initial efforts of establishing a group of immediate collaborators within their first six 
months, all the new CEOs created a strategic apparatus that differed from their TMT. Two 
types of discrepancies between the strategic apparatus and the TMT were identified: 
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overlapping strategic apparatus and subgroup strategic apparatus. Overlapping strategic 
apparatuses refer to situations in which the members of the strategic apparatus and the TMT 
only partly overlap, which we found in six cases. In the other two cases, ServiCo and 
TechCo, the strategic apparatus consisted only of a subgroup of the TMT members. Figure 2 
provides an overview of these two types of discrepancies and their manifestations in all eight 
cases.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Two types of discrepancy between the strategic apparatus and the TMT 
Note:  
1) Dotted line indicates the CEO’s strategic apparatus;  
2) A square with frame indicates a change of the position; a circle with frame indicates a change of the 
person; # indicates that the current occupant is about to leave; 
3) […] indicates other members in this category; and 
4)  (M) indicates the number of months since the new CEO taking charge; 
 
 
In the overlapping type, the CEO’s immediate collaborators included members 
outside the TMT, such as members of the board of directors, staff members, and even lower 
level managers. For instance, in SalesCo, the CEO worked closely with B2 – the 
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representative of the main shareholder on the board of directors – in testing ideas during the 
process of strategic development. The CEO was in close collaboration with staff members 
S1, S2, S3, and S4. The communication manager, S1, explained the situation:  
He had a close, close circle (i.e., S1,S2, S3, S4) when he started and he said, "You 
are the team. You are my team. You are really close to me. I need you. You are 
important for the company," at the beginning.  
 
Among these members, the new CEO even created new positions to have S3 and S4 
to help him with important strategic topics. He explained, “with [S4] and [S3], I have people 
who can really think integrally, which is something most of the members of the executive 
board can’t do to the same extent.” The personal assistant to the former CEO and the current 
CEO also noted that the new CEO created new staff positions and relied more on staff 
members than his predecessor did. She explained that “there is basically a second group that 
is relatively close [to the CEO]. The former CEO did, primarily, rely on the management 
board members. Exclusively.” In addition to the staff members, the CEO also worked closely 
with a lower-level manager, S5, who was a former colleague of and brought in by the CEO. 
As discussed above, the CEO was concerned about his acceptance if he appointed him 
directly to the TMT. As a result, S5 was recruited as a non-TMT member, but the CEO began 
working with him on strategic issues right away. In this case, the CEO did not involve T3 and 
T4 in strategic topics because both were interim heads and it was taking some time to search 
for new members. The CEO wanted to replace T1 but he was protected by his relationship 
with the board of directors. In summary, the discrepancy in SalesCo between the strategic 
apparatus and the TMT resulted because certain personal integration and strategic orientation 
requirements could not be met within the TMT as a result of the perceived constraints on 
TMT change. For similar reasons, such discrepancy also appeared in the other five cases of 
the overlap type. Based on these findings, proposition 2 can be extended as following: 
Proposition 2*. The greater the perceived requirements of strategic orientation and 
personal integration that cannot be met by changing the TMT, the larger the 
discrepancy will be between the strategic apparatus and the TMT.  
 
The other type of discrepancy we found is the subgroup type in which the immediate 
collaborators include some but not all TMT members; this type was identified in ServiCo and 
TechCo. Both firms had a management team of 7-9 members in addition to the CEO, which 
was significantly larger than those of the other firms. We found that both new CEOs closely 
collaborated with only 2-3 people on the TMT, whereas other executive members were 
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marginalized and not consistently included in the core decision-making circle. This finding is 
similar to findings made by Roberto (2003) that in many top management teams only a subset 
of core members are consistently involved in making strategic decisions, whereas the 
remainder are only involved in particular type of decisions.   
In contrast to the cases involving overlap, both the strategic orientation requirements 
and personal integration requirements could be met within the TMT in the two subgroup 
cases. Both CEOs maintained a large management team for historical reasons within their 
particular organizations. However, in large TMTs, as observed in these two cases, it is almost 
impossible that all of the TMT can be included to participate in making each strategic 
decision. It is also unlikely that CEOs would have the time and energy to work with too many 
members closely. Therefore, our findings suggest the following proposition:   
Proposition 3. In very large TMTs that meet both the strategic orientation and 
personal integration requirements of the new CEOs, such CEOs are likely to create 
their strategic apparatus from a subgroup of the TMT without including individuals 
outside of the TMT. 
3.4.3 Convergence of the Strategic Apparatus and the TMT  
By tracking the evolution of the strategic apparatus over time, we can identify a gradual 
process of convergence between the strategic apparatus and the TMT: in other words, the 
membership of the strategic apparatus and of the TMT became increasingly identical over 
time. This convergence process often began within the first year and continued into the 
second and sometimes even third year. This convergence was typically triggered by two 
circumstances: increasing tensions between the strategic apparatus and the TMT and 
decreasing requirements met outside of the TMT.    
Increasing tensions between the strategic apparatus and the TMT 
We found that tensions grew over time between the strategic apparatus and the TMT. As 
informed by the role theory perspective, two particular factors leading to the tensions were 
identified: role conflict and role ambiguity. First, the tensions were a result of role conflicts, 
i.e., by the incompatibility of different role expectations regarding an individual. As a result 
of the discrepancy between the strategic apparatus and the TMT, some TMT members 
outside the strategic apparatus realized that they were being left out of making strategic 
decisions despite their formal strategic roles, whereas certain non-TMT members in the 
strategic apparatus might be powerful in reality although they did not occupy formal strategic 
roles. This conflict between formal and informal roles often led to high levels of tension and 
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personal conflicts. In TraviCo for example, top manager T1 was left out of important 
decisions. He explained,  
“And unfortunately, there are now camps, obviously, because I am not in [the 
CEO]'s camp. I'm not in a camp at all because there is no camp left. […] The 
resistance [to me] is a bit more subtle. […] We don't have confrontations. But I feel, 
more and more, what I say, I could also say to that all the way and I'm not being 
taken serious.”  
 
Staff members who had an informal strategic role that was not part of their job description 
also experienced role conflict. For example, project manager S2 in ComCo explained that he 
played an important role in the background but not in a formal executive role, which resulted 
in strong tensions between him and other top managers. He explained:   
To be honest, I'm in a really tricky situation [...]. On the one hand, I really like to 
work with the CEO because I think, in his heart, he's a good guy. He's polite. He has 
the same values as I do. The topics are really interesting, really dynamic. On the 
other hand, I'm always in the background. [...] I'm not a member of the Group 
Executive Board. I don't have a salary [as they do]. 
I really feel it's difficult because there is this stupid thing about who spends more 
time with the CEO, who knows more. [...] I have quite a high frustration rate, but at 
the end, I always have to ask myself, is the whole package good or not? I don't 
know. It depends. I can't say.  
 
Second, some staff members in the strategic apparatus had responsibilities that were 
ambiguous and not clearly defined (i.e., role ambiguity). As discussed above, new CEOs 
often created staff positions to have the possibility to collaborate with particular individuals 
but the official responsibility for these positions were often not specified. These positions 
included “project office,” “strategy and projects,” “organizational development,” “office 
coordinator”, etc. However, due to the role ambiguity of the individuals occupying these 
positions, others often questioned them about their roles and their situations became 
personally stressful. In SalesCo, for example, the roles of staff members S3 and S4 were not 
clearly specified to others. As T7 explained, “This is like a cloud, nobody really knows their 
role.” Because of the ambiguity of their roles, some members were actively struggling with 
their jobs. For example, the sales department coordinator in MechCo was stressed because his 
role was between a department head and a lower-level manager. As he explained,  
 Of course the situation of me […] sometimes brings some – I wouldn’t say that 
these are problems [...]. So maybe in some months or some years I will be forced to 
say to the CEO, you have to make a decision or to take a decision because my 
situation, it's not easy like this, I'm in the middle and I'm in the no man's land. 
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Appendix 6 offers an overview of some representative quotes and other evidence for 
the tensions experienced in the eight cases. We found that tensions were particularly strong in 
the overlap type cases, i.e., where the CEO closely collaborated with staff members or other 
lower-level managers outside of the TMT. In contrast, in the subgroup type cases, i.e., in 
which new CEOs selectively collaborated with only certain TMT members and excluded 
others from their strategic apparatus, tensions were less intense because both role ambiguity 
and role conflict are both relatively higher in the overlap type cases than in the subgroup type 
cases. This finding suggests the following proposition:  
Proposition 4. The more immediate collaborators that the CEO has outside of the 
TMT, the higher the tensions are between the TMT and the strategic apparatus, 
resulting in a greater probability of convergence between the two. 
 
Decreasing requirements and constraints 
As noted above, the main reason for the discrepancy between the strategic apparatus and the 
TMT was that certain requirements of personal integration or strategic orientation could not 
be met within the TMT (i.e., in the cases of overlap). Over time, however, some requirements 
became less important as new CEOs accumulated knowledge and authority and certain 
constraints involved with TMT change disappeared. In particular, three requirements of 
strategic orientation and personal integration were found to have become less important over 
time: the special task force, access to critical information, and idea testing. First, many of the 
new CEOs utilized special task forces to address emergent strategic work. We found that the 
requirement for such task forces decreased as strategic projects became more structured and 
well-implemented. The organization stabilized over time and new CEOs had fewer 
unstructured tasks or ideas to be developed and implemented. Moreover, initially there were 
personal constraints involved with replacing some top managers, as it took time to find 
candidates and for them to take office. As new top managers eventually joined the TMT, they 
were able to perform the strategic work that was previously performed by the special task 
force. For example, the CEO of SalesCo explained that as one permanent department head 
finally replaced the interim one, he could now re-assign the strategic tasks that were 
previously undertaken by certain staff members. As the CEO explained,  
And that’s where we have certainly had the biggest gap for a year – in sales. [...] 
that’s where you did of course have to build a parallel organization to bridge the 
gap you have there. [...] In fact, the true difficulty is that you do have to assign 
certain responsibilities, competencies to people who are working on the staff level, 
the project level and now [T7] is coming on board and […] he now has to take the 
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lead, in those issues, those are his responsibilities. [...] it means that they have to 
take a hierarchical step back when it comes to these issues. 
 
Second, we found that gaining access to critical information was particularly 
important at the early stage of taking charge but became less so over time. Some 
collaborators installed for that purpose thus became less important. New CEOs accumulated 
their own knowledge of their organization over time. For example, in CleanCo, the CEO was 
working closely with a staff member who had detailed knowledge of the organization and 
clients. However, after about a year, the CEO stopped working closely with him. As the CEO 
explained, “S4 helped me a lot at the beginning [by providing information]. [...] But I 
recognized I can only work with him until it comes to a certain stage or level.” 
Third, the requirement for testing ideas also became less important. In many cases, 
the CEO used certain board directors or organizational members who had long histories with 
the company as sounding boards or sparring partners for testing ideas due to the CEO’s lack 
of familiarity with the new situation and the attendant high uncertainties associated with 
taking charge. However, this requirement become less important as new CEOs accumulated 
knowledge and learning over time and better understood the protocols for assessing ideas. 
For example, in ManuCo the CEO engaged closely with three directors as sounding boards 
for initiating changes in the structure and the TMT, but he stopped doing so after six months. 
As the CEO explained,   
I was updating them on what I was doing, and they were giving me their feedback. 
And then in November they told me, we believe there's no longer any need, and by 
the way I had the feedback I needed and it was okay also. 
 
In summary, some initial requirements of strategic orientation and personal 
integration that were initially served by collaborators outside the TMT became less important 
over time as the new CEOs accumulated learning, knowledge, and authority in the 
organization and as certain other constraints involving changing the TMT disappeared at 
some point. Appendix 7 provides an overview of some representative quotes and evidence 
from the eight cases. As a result of these decreasing requirements, some non-TMT members 
who were initially included in the strategic apparatus for meeting those requirements also 
became less important to the CEO. As we observed in this study, new CEOs then shifted their 
immediate collaboration away from these members outside of the TMT, which leads to the 
following proposition:  
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Proposition 5. As the strategic orientation and personal integration requirements that 
are served by non-TMT members become less important, the CEO is likely to exclude 
those members from his or her strategic apparatus.  
 
Convergence of the strategic apparatus and the TMT 
Triggered by increasing tensions and decreasing requirements, the strategic apparatus tends 
to converge gradually with the TMT over time. Figure 3 provides an overview of how these 
convergences manifested in the eight cases. The convergences typically involved two types 
of individuals: strategic apparatus members outside the TMT and TMT members outside the 
strategic apparatus. With respect to the former, Figure 3 shows that the external members of 
the strategic apparatus either entered into the TMT or exited the strategic apparatus. For 
example, project office manager S3 of ManuCo was promoted to the TMT in the third year, 
whereas in the case of SalesCo, the CEO initially collaborated closely with a group of staff 
members but eventually shifted away from them. Staff member S1 described this shift:  
Before, it was really the circle. It was me, S3, S4 and, well, maybe S2. […] He had a 
close, close circle when he started and he said, "You are the team. You are my team. 
You are really close to me. I need you. You are important for the company," at the 
beginning, and now you see that he has the [executive] team together and this is the 
second row now. […] Unbelievable. We would have done everything for him at the 
beginning, and this got lost. […] The more power he got and the more focused he is 
on his sports team, […] and now the circle is clearly, defined. 
 
In some cases, external apparatus members even left the firm altogether as a result of the 
convergence. For example, staff member S2 left ComCo as a result of the tensions.  
For those TMT members outside of the strategic apparatus, there was a tendency that 
they either entered the strategic apparatus or exited the TMT, as shown in Figure 3. As 
working relationships developed, some of those TMT members became close collaborators 
with the CEO. Otherwise, they tended to leave the firm and be replaced by new top 
managers. For example, in ComCo, both T3 and T4 were not close collaborators of the CEO 
at the beginning; while T3 managed to build a close working relationship with the CEO, T4 
could not resolve his conflict with other strategic apparatus members and finally left the firm.    
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Figure 3: An overview of the convergence between the strategic apparatus and the TMT 
Note:  
1) Dotted line indicates the CEO’s strategic apparatus;  
2) A square with frame indicates a change of the position; a circle with frame indicates a change of the 
person; # indicates that the current occupant is about to leave; 
3) […] indicates other members in this category; 
4)  (M) indicates the number of months after the new CEO taking charge; and 
5) * In CleanCo at the second stage, there was an expansion of staff members included in the strategic 
apparatus because of the acquisition of another organization.  
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As shown above, the strategic apparatus is dynamic in nature and evolves over time in the 
early tenure of new CEOs. On one hand, the CEO tends to shift collaboration away from 
members outside the TMT when triggered by the increasing tensions between the strategic 
apparatus and the TMT and the decreasing requirements served by individuals outside the 
TMT (i.e., proposition 4 and 5). On the other hand, new CEOs develop close working 
relationships within the TMT and thus collaborate with more TMT members as a result of 
increasing interactions over time. Therefore, the strategic apparatus and the TMT tend to 
generally converge over time – although they may never become completely identical – 
suggesting the following proposition:  
Proposition 6. The strategic apparatus and the TMT tend to converge over time: the 
longer the CEO’s tenure, the more the members of the strategic apparatus will be 
identical to the members of the TMT.   
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
3.5.1 Divergence and Convergence Between the Strategic Apparatus and the TMT 
In this paper, we set out to examine how new CEOs establish a TMT and how they direct the 
organization with a TMT in transition. We find that new CEOs make deliberate efforts to 
configure their TMT in terms of members and positions, as driven by the requirements of 
strategic orientation and personal integration. However, they face various constraints to do so 
and they often have requirements that cannot be met within the TMT. As a result, it is 
difficult for new CEOs to rely on a TMT in transition to direct their organization. Instead of 
relying exclusively on TMT members, new CEOs often establish and work with a strategic 
apparatus whose composition differs from that of the TMT. The theoretical framework 
presented in the findings elaborates upon the reasons for the discrepancy between the 
strategic apparatus and the TMT and the mechanisms that lead to their convergence over 
time.  
 From a role theory perspective, both the TMT and the strategic apparatus can be 
understood as a role constellation within which multiple members occupy differentiated but 
complementary roles to achieve certain functions (Denis et al., 2000; Hodgson et al., 1965). 
While the TMT is formal, the strategic apparatus is informal. When a new CEO takes charge, 
the existing TMT constellation often does not fit his or her requirements in leading the 
organization, not only in terms of strategic orientation requirements but also in terms of 
personal integration requirements (Fondas and Stewart, 1994). When facing constraints 
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associated with enacting the formal TMT constellation, the new CEO tends to create a 
strategic apparatus that diverges from the TMT as the actual leadership constellation, whose 
members fulfill various functions according to the requirements of the CEO when taking 
charge. However, the two tend to converge later. As the two role constellations interact 
around the same functions of making strategic decisions and leading the organization, 
tensions can arise due to role ambiguity and role conflict (Jackson and Schuler, 1985; Kahn 
et al., 1964; Tubre and Collins, 2000). Moreover, some requirements of the CEO that might 
not be met by the TMT constellation become less important as the CEO accumulates 
knowledge and authority over time and is able to change the TMT constellation due to the 
disappearance of the constraints. Therefore, the strategic apparatus and the TMT experience a 
tendency toward convergence, although they may never become completely identical.  
3.5.2 Advantages of a Strategic Apparatus Perspective  
This study contributes to upper echelons research by providing a strategic apparatus 
perspective. Whereas upper echelons research typically assumes that TMT members work 
together as a team to shape the strategic direction (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984), our findings suggest that this is not always the case. We find that the strategic 
apparatus, i.e., the grouping of the CEO’s immediate collaborators, is often not identical with 
the TMT. Although the two tend to converge over time, the process of convergence can take 
a long time, and they may never become identical. In most of the cases investigated in this 
study, the strategic apparatus remained significantly different from the TMT in the second 
and even in the third year. As the result of a rapidly changing environment, CEOs may need 
to constantly reconfigure their TMT and new relational, structural, or personal constraints can 
arise. Therefore, the strategic apparatus is likely to differ from the TMT, in general. Three 
previous studies that are not only focused on new CEOs support this notion. Hambrick (1995) 
finds that many CEOs have various problems with their TMT, such as having problematic 
executives or fragmentation in the team. In such cases, it is unlikely that the strategic 
apparatus will be identical to the TMT. Pitcher and Smith (2001) find that the titles of 
members of formal TMTs are sometimes not consistent with their actual roles in strategic 
decision making. Similarly, Roberto (2003) finds that there is often “a stable core” of 
members of TMTs who are involved in all strategic issues, whereas the remaining members 
are mainly occupied with operational responsibilities and only involved in particular strategic 
issues. The stable core is similar to the strategic apparatus identified here, but the difference 
is that we find that the strategic apparatus can also include members outside of the TMT (i.e., 
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the overlap type) and is not limited to being a subgroup of it. In summary, if the strategic 
apparatus differs from the TMT in general, we must be cautious about using the TMT as an 
indicator of strategic outcomes.  
 A strategic apparatus perspective also contributes to our understanding of strategic 
leadership. First, a strategic apparatus perspective directs attention to the basic question of 
strategic leadership: How are strategic decisions made and who is involved? It emphasizes 
the actual interaction dynamics between the CEO and his or her collaborators, which has 
largely been neglected in upper echelons research (Hambrick, 2007) and points to the 
importance of understanding role structures between the CEO and other collaborators. A 
strategic apparatus perspective allows us to discuss who is included and who is excluded in 
actual strategic decision making, notwithstanding formal roles. Although recent research has 
used TMT behavioral integration to capture the actual decision-making dynamics in the TMT 
and emphasized its importance for shaping strategic outcomes, there is only limited 
understanding of how TMTs actually become fragmented and how CEOs handle fragmented 
teams with low behavior integration (Carmeli and Schaubroeck, 2006; Hambrick, 1994; 
Hambrick, 1995; Simsek et al., 2005). A strategic apparatus perspective suggests that CEO 
succession is often associated with TMT fragmentation and to direct the organization they 
may collaborate with members outside the TMT or only utilize a subgroup within the TMT 
for strategic issues (Hambrick, 1995; Pitcher and Smith, 2001; Roberto, 2003). Thus, it 
allows us to discuss how CEOs actually manage fragmented TMTs or those with low 
behavioral integration. 
Second, whereas upper echelons research typically focuses on the TMT, the strategic 
apparatus perspective allows for a broader view of the CEO’s immediate collaborators as it 
can include the members of the board of directors, staff members, or even lower-level 
managers – all depending on the CEO’s requirements. This directs attention to the strategic 
roles of those individuals who have not been well understood, as they cannot be clearly 
defined as top managers or middle managers that are typically studied in the literature 
(Dutton, Ashford, O'Neill, and Lawrence, 2001; Dutton and Ashford, 1993; Floyd and 
Wooldridge, 1997; Rouleau and Balogun, 2011; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990; Wooldridge, 
Schmid, and Floyd, 2008).  
Third, whereas sharing with upper echelons research the assumption that CEOs need 
immediate collaborators to be able to direct their organizations, a strategic apparatus 
perspective highlights the important role of CEOs in configuring the constellation of their 
collaborators. By contrast, the upper echelons research typically neglects the distinct role of 
  99 
the CEO from other TMT members (Hambrick, 1994). A strategic apparatus perspective 
directs attention to how, when, and why the CEO configures his/her group of collaborators to 
direct the organization (Kor and Mesko, 2013).  
3.5.3 TMT Formation and Evolution 
Our findings further contribute to the literature by identifying the dynamics of TMT 
formation and evolution. The CEO succession literature has shown the importance of TMT 
change for new CEOs to effect strategic and organizational changes (Barron, Chulkov, and 
Waddell, 2011; Friedman and Saul, 1991; Karaevli, 2007; Keck and Tushman, 1993; Kelly, 
1980; Shen and Cannella, 2002; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996), but there remains limited 
understanding regarding how new CEOs actually form their TMT. Upper echelons 
researchers also call for studying the mechanisms that lead to TMT composition and 
evolution (Hambrick, 2007: 338). Our findings show that when establishing their TMT, new 
CEOs were concerned with two types of requirements: strategic orientation and personal 
integration. Whereas the literature typically focuses on the former and assumes that CEOs 
form an assemblage of competences and skills in TMT that can meet environmental demands 
(Kor and Mesko, 2013), we show that the personal integration requirements of relating to and 
connecting with the organization is also important (Denis et al., 2000). Therefore, our 
findings enrich our understanding of the social and interpersonal dynamics underlying TMT 
formation.  
 Moreover, we find that CEOs often face various constraints on changing their TMT: 
relational, structural, and personal. These constraints prevent CEOs from changing particular 
positions or members in the TMT. Thus, instead of relying on the TMT, the CEO works 
closely with a subset of TMT members and/or other members outside the TMT in leading the 
organization. The constraints of TMT change have important effects on the formation of the 
TMT that have not been explicitly examined in the literature. Our study is the first step 
toward exploring these constraints and how CEOs address them.  
In addition, our findings also show the mechanisms underlying the evolution of TMT 
composition. We find that forming the TMT is an ongoing process. Because certain 
constraints on TMT change can disappear and CEOs’ requirements with regard to directing 
the organization can change over time, CEOs tend to make further changes in their TMT. 
These changes are also influenced by the tensions among various collaborators of the CEO. 
We find that the TMT evolves over time, not only in terms of its composition but also in 
terms of the working relationships among its members. In the long run, CEOs tend to 
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collaborate more with TMT members and shift away from collaborations with members 
outside of the TMT.  
3.5.4 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
Like all research, ours has limitations, which also provide opportunities for future research. 
First, the firms investigated in this research are all based in Europe, although some of them 
are multinationals. As a result, we do not know the cultural influences on the patterns we find 
here. Some research suggests that new CEOs from different cultures might exhibit somewhat 
different behavioral patterns (Nakauchi and Wiersema, 2015; Sakano and Lewin, 1999). For 
example, Sakano and Lewin (Sakano and Lewin, 1999) find that strategic or structural 
changes in Japan are not observable in the first two years, which contrasts with the US, where 
they are often observed in the first year of a new CEO’s tenure, suggesting that the patterns 
of divergence and convergence between the strategic apparatus and the TMT may differ by 
culture. Therefore, future research might explore how different cultural contexts affect how 
new CEOs establish their TMT and the constraints they may face when taking charge.  
 Second, this research focused on the reasons why new CEOs establish their TMT and 
strategic apparatus in particular ways and the patterns of their discrepancies and 
convergences but did not examine their effect on outcomes in any detail. Future research 
might examine how the types of discrepancy (i.e., overlap and subgroup types) and 
convergence influence organizational outcomes, such as the likelihood of strategic change or 
its impact on financial performance. Another important outcome to examine might be the 
new CEO’s legitimacy within the organization (Denis et al., 2000).  
  101 
References 
Agamben G. 2009. What is an Apparatus? and Other Essays (Kishik D, Pedatella S, Trans.). 
Stanford University Press: Stanford. 
Ashford SJ, Black JS. 1996. Proactivity during organizational entry: The role of desire for 
control. Journal of Applied Psychology 81(2): 199-214. 
Ballinger GA, Marcel JJ. 2010. The use of an interim CEO during succession episodes and 
firm performance. Strategic Management Journal 31(3): 262-283. 
Barron JM, Chulkov DV, Waddell GR. 2011. Top management team turnover, CEO 
succession type, and strategic change. Journal of Business Research 64(8): 904-910. 
Bedeian AG, Armenakis AA. 1981. A path-analytic study of the consequences of role 
conflict and ambiguity. Academy of Management Journal 24(2): 417-424. 
Biddle BJ. 1986. Recent developments in role theory. Annual Review of Sociology 12: 67-92. 
Blaikie N. 2000. Designing social research: The logic of anticipation. Polity: Cambridge, 
UK. 
Bowen G. 2006. Grounded theory and sensitizing concepts. International Journal of 
Qualitative Methods 5(3): 12-23. 
Carmeli A, Halevi MY. 2009. How top management team behavioral integration and 
behavioral complexity enable organizational ambidexterity: The moderating role of 
contextual ambidexterity. Leadership Quarterly 20(2): 207-218. 
Carmeli A, Schaubroeck J. 2006. Top management team behavioral integration, decision 
quality, and organizational decline. Leadership Quarterly 17(5): 441-453. 
Carpenter MA, Geletkanycz MA, Sanders WG. 2004. Upper echelons research revisited: 
Antecedents, elements, and consequences of top management team composition. 
Journal of Management 30(6): 749-778. 
Carpenter M, Pollock TG, Leary MM. 2003. Testing a model of reasoned risk-taking: 
governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global strategy in 
hightechnology IPO firms. Strategic Management Journal 24(9): 803–820. 
Charmaz K. 2003. Grounded theory: Objectivist and constructivist methods. In Strategies for 
qualitative inquiry. Denzin NK, Lincoln YS (eds.) 2nd ed., Sage: Thousand Oaks, 
CA. 
Chen G, Hambrick DC. 2012. CEO replacement in turnaround situations: Executive (mis)fit 
and its performance Implications. Organization Science 23(1): 225-243. 
Denis JL, Langley A, Pineault M. 2000. Becoming a leader in a complex organization. 
Journal of Management Studies 37(8): 1063-1099. 
Dutton J, Ashford S, O'Neill R, Lawrence K. 2001. Moves that matter: Issue selling and 
organizational change. Academy of Management Journal 44(4): 716-736. 
Dutton JE, Ashford SJ. 1993. Selling issues to top management. Academy of Management 
Review 18(3): 397-428. 
Eisenhardt KM. 1989. Building theories from case-study research. Academy of Management 
Review 14(4): 532-550. 
Eisenhardt KM, Graebner ME. 2007. Theory building from cases: Opportunities and 
challenges. Academy of Management Journal 50(1): 25-32. 
  102 
Ellis AM, Bauer TN, Mansfield LR, Erdogan B, Truxillo DM, Simon LS. 2015. Navigating 
Uncharted Waters: Newcomer Socialization Through the Lens of Stress Theory. 
Journal of Management 41(1): 203-235. 
Finkelstein S, Hambrick DC, Cannella AA. 2009. Strategic leadership: theory and research 
on executives, top management teams, and boards. Oxford University Press: New 
York. 
Floyd SW, Wooldridge B. 1997. Middle management's strategic influence and organizational 
performance. Journal of Management Studies 34(3): 465-485. 
Fondas N, Stewart R. 1994. Enactment in managerial jobs: A role analysis. Journal of 
Management Studies 31(1): 83-103. 
Fondas N, Wiersema M. 1997. Changing of the guard: The influence of CEO socialization on 
strategic change. Journal of Management Studies 34(4): 561-584. 
Friedman SD, Saul K. 1991. A leader's wake: Organization member reactions to CEO 
succession. Journal of Management 17(3): 619-642. 
Gabarro J. 1979. Socialization at the top - How CEOs and subordinates evolve interpersonal 
contracts. Organizational Dynamics 7(3): 3-23. 
Giambatista RC, Rowe WG, Riaz S. 2005. Nothing succeeds like succession: A critical 
review of leader succession literature since 1994. Leadership Quarterly 16(6): 963-
991. 
Gioia DA, Price KN, Hamilton AL, Thomas JB. 2010. Forging an Identity: An Insider-
outsider Study of Processes Involved in the Formation of Organizational Identity. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 55(1): 1-46. 
Greiner LE, Bhambri A. 1989. New CEO intervention and dynamics of deliberate strategic 
change. Strategic Management Journal 10: 67-86. 
Grusky O. 1969. Succession with an Ally. Administrative Science Quarterly 14(2): 155-170. 
Hambrick DC. 1994. Top management groups: A conceptual integration and reconsideration 
of the" team" label. Research in Organizational Behavior 16: 171-171. 
Hambrick DC. 1995. Fragmentation and the other problems CEOs have with their top 
management teams. California Management Review 37(3): 110-127. 
Hambrick DC. 2007. Upper echelons theory: An update. Academy of Management Review 
32(2): 334-343. 
Hambrick DC, Humphrey SE, Gupta A. 2015. Structural interdependence within top 
management teams: A key moderator of upper echelons predictions. Strategic 
Management Journal 36(3): 449-461. 
Hambrick DC, Mason PA. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top 
managers. Academy of Management Review 9(2): 193-206. 
Harvard Business Review. 2009. Harvard business review on CEO succession. Harvard 
Business Press: Boston, MA. 
Hayes RM, Oyer P, Schaefer S. 2006. Coworker complementarity and the stability of top-
management teams. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 22(1): 184-212. 
Helmich DL, Brown WB. 1972. Successor type and organizational change in corporate 
enterprise. Administrative Science Quarterly 17(3): 371-381. 
Hodgson RC, Levinson DJ, Zaleznik A. 1965. The executive role constellation. Harvard 
Business School Press: Boston. 
Huber GP. 1985. Temporal stability and response-order biases in participant descriptions of 
organizational decisions. Academy of Management Journal 28(4): 943-950. 
  103 
Humborstad SIW, Kuvaas B. 2013. Mutuality in leader-subordinate empowerment 
expectation: Its impact on role ambiguity and intrinsic motivation. Leadership 
Quarterly 24(2): 363-377. 
Hutzschenreuter T, Kleindienst I, Greger C. 2012. How new leaders affect strategic change 
following a succession event: A critical review of the literature. Leadership Quarterly 
23(5): 729-755. 
Jackson SE, Schuler RS. 1985. A meta-analysis and conceptual critique of research on role 
ambiguity and role Conflict in work settings. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 36(1): 16-78. 
Kahn RL, Wolfe DM, Quinn RP, Snoek JD, Rosenthal RA. 1964. Organizational stress: 
Studies in role conflict and ambiguity. Wiley: New York. 
Karaevli A. 2007. Performance consequences of new CEO 'outsiderness': Moderating effects 
of pre- and post-succession contexts. Strategic Management Journal 28(7): 681-706. 
Katz D, Kahn RL. 1978. The social psychology of organizations (2 ed.). John Wiley & Sons.: 
New York. 
Keck SL, Tushman ML. 1993. Environmental and organizational context and executive team 
structure. Academy of Management Journal 36(6): 1314-1344. 
Kelly JN. 1980. Management transitions for newly appointed CEOs. Sloan Management 
Review 22(1): 37-45. 
Kesner IF, Sebora TC. 1994. Executive succession: Past, present and future. Journal of 
Management 20(2): 327-372. 
Kor, YT. 2003. Experience-based top management team competence and sustained growth. 
Organization Science 14(6): 707–719. 
Kor YY, Mesko A. 2013. Dynamic managerial capabilities: Configuration and orchestration 
of top executives' capabilities and the firm's dominant logic. Strategic Management 
Journal 34(2): 233-244. 
Kristof-Brown AL, Zimmerman RD, Johnson EC. 2005. Consequences of individuals' fit at 
work: A meta-analysis of person-job, person-organization, person-group, and person-
supervisor fit. Personnel Psychology 58(2): 281-342. 
Langley A. 1999. Strategies for theorizing from process data. Academy of Management 
Review 24(4): 691-710. 
Leonard-Barton D. 1990. A dual methodology for case studies: Synergistic use of a 
longitudinal single site with replicated multiple sites. Organization Science 1(3): 248-
266. 
Lubatkin MH, Simsek Z, Ling Y, Veiga JF. 2006. Ambidexterity and performance in small- 
to medium-sized firms: The pivotal role of top management team behavioral 
integration. Journal of Management 32(5): 646-672. 
Ma S, Seidl D, Guérard S. forthcoming. The New CEO and the Post-succession Process: An 
Integration of Past Research and Future Directions. International Journal of 
Management Reviews: n/a-n/a. 
Miles MB, Huberman AM. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis - An Expanded Sourcebook (3rd 
ed.). SAGE: Thousand Oaks CA. 
Miller CC, Cardinal LB, Glick WH. 1997. Retrospective reports in organizational research: A 
reexamination of recent evidence. Academy of Management Journal 40(1): 189-204. 
Miller D. 1993. Some organizational consequences of CEO succession. Academy of 
Management Journal 36(3): 644-659. 
  104 
Nakauchi M, Wiersema MF. 2015. Executive succession and strategic change in Japan. 
Strategic Management Journal 36(2): 298-306. 
Nielsen S. 2010. Top management team diversity: A review of theories and methodologies. 
International Journal of Management Reviews 12(3): 301-316. 
Patton MQ. 2002. Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (3rd ed.). Sage: Thousands 
Oaks. 
Pitcher P, Chreim S, Kisfalvi V. 2000. CEO succession research: Methodological bridges 
over troubled waters. Strategic Management Journal 21(6): 625-648. 
Pitcher P, Smith AD. 2001. Top management team heterogeneity: Personality, power, and 
proxies. Organization Science 12(1): 1-18. 
Porter ME, Nohria N. 2010. What is leadership? The CEO's role in large, complex 
organizations. In Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice. Nohria N, Khurana R 
(eds.), Harvard Business Press: Boston. 
Rizzo JR, House RJ, Lirtzman SI. 1970. Role conflict and ambiguity in complex 
organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly 15(2): 150-163. 
Roberto MA. 2003. The stable core and dynamic periphery in top management teams. 
Management Decision 41(2): 120-131. 
Rouleau L, Balogun J. 2011. Middle Managers, strategic sensemaking, and discursive 
competence. Journal of Management Studies 48(5): 953-983. 
Sakano T, Lewin AY. 1999. Impact of CEO succession in Japanese companies: A 
coevolutionary perspective. Organization Science 10(5): 654-671. 
Shen W, Cannella AA. 2002. Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO succession: 
The impacts of successor type, postsuccession senior executive turnover, and 
departing CEO tenure. Academy of Management Journal 45(4): 717-733. 
Simons R. 1994. How new top managers use control-systems as levers of strategic renewal. 
Strategic Management Journal 15(3): 169-189. 
Simsek Z, Veiga JF, Lubatkin MH, Dino RN. 2005. Modeling the multilevel determinants of 
top management team behavioral integration. Academy of Management Journal 
48(1): 69-84. 
Sluss DM, van Dick R, Thompson BS. 2011. Role theory in organizations: A relational 
perspective. In APA handbook of industrial and organizational psychology. Zedeck S 
(ed.), American Psychological Association: Washington, DC. 
Strauss A, Corbin J. 1998. Basics of qualitative research (2nd ed.). Sage: Thousand Oaks. 
Stryker S. 2007. Identity theory and personality theory: Mutual relevance. Journal of 
personality 75(6): 1083-1102. 
Tubre TC, Collins JM. 2000. Jackson and Schuler (1985) revisited: A meta-analysis of the 
relationships between role ambiguity, role conflict, and job performance. Journal of 
Management 26(1): 155-169. 
Tushman ML, Rosenkopf L. 1996. Executive succession, strategic reorientation and 
performance growth: A longitudinal study in the US cement industry. Management 
Science 42(7): 939-953. 
Van de ven AH. 1992. Suggestions for studying strategy process: A research note. Strategic 
Management Journal 13: 169-188. 
van de Vliert E. 1981. A three-step theory of role conflict resolution. The Journal of Social 
Psychology 113(1): 77-83. 
  105 
van Vianen AEM, Shen C-T, Chuang A. 2011. Person–organization and person–supervisor 
fits: Employee commitments in a Chinese context. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior 32(6): 906-926. 
Vansell M, Brief AP, Schuler RS. 1981. Role conflict and role ambiguity: Integration of the 
literature and directions for future research. Human Relations 34(1): 43-71. 
Wooldridge B, Floyd SW. 1990. The strategy process, middle management involvement, and 
organizational performance. Strategic Management Journal 11(3): 231-241. 
Wooldridge B, Schmid T, Floyd SW. 2008. The middle management perspective on strategy 
process: Contributions, synthesis, and future research. Journal of Management 34(6): 
1190-1221. 
Xuan YH. 2009. Empire-building or bridge-building? Evidence from new CEOs' internal 
capital allocation decisions. Review of Financial Studies 22(12): 4919-4948. 
Yin RK. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd ed.). SAGE: Thousand Oaks 
CA.  
  106 
Appendix 1: Characteristics of Eight Cases 
 Industry  Status of  
the firm 
Scope of  
operation 
Age  
(years) 
Number of 
employees 
ManuCo Manufacturing Corporate Multinational 50-100 >5,000 
TechCo Manufacturing Subsidiary  National 50-100 500-5,000 
MechCo Manufacturing Subsidiary (own 
identity) 
Multinational >100 500-5,000 
CleanCo Manufacturing Corporate Multinational 10-50 <500 
ComCo Service Corporate Multinational >100 >5,000 
SalesCo Service Subsidiary (own 
identity) 
National >100 500-5,000 
ServiCo Service Subsidiary  National 50-100 500-5,000 
TraviCo Service Corporate National 10-50 <500 
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fo
rc
e 
th
at
 
w
as
 n
ot
 m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
 
Te
ch
C
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
 re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 c
om
pe
te
nc
es
 th
at
 w
as
 
no
t m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
 
“T
4 
w
as
 q
ui
te
 c
lo
se
 to
 [t
he
 fo
rm
er
 C
EO
] a
nd
 e
ve
ry
bo
dy
 
sa
w
 T
4 
th
e 
de
pu
ty
 o
f h
im
 a
ls
o 
w
he
n 
he
 le
ft.
 S
o 
th
e 
go
od
 p
oi
nt
 w
as
 a
ls
o 
to
 sa
y 
ok
ay
, l
et
 u
s s
ta
rt 
in
 a
 n
ew
 
vi
ew
, w
ith
 a
 n
ew
 c
ul
tu
re
, w
hi
ch
 is
 th
en
 a
ls
o 
ea
si
er
 
w
ith
ou
t T
4,
 w
he
re
 e
ve
ry
bo
dy
 se
es
 st
ill
 [t
he
 fo
rm
er
 
C
EO
] i
s h
er
e.
” 
(C
EO
Te
ch
C
o)
 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
 re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 sp
ec
ia
l t
as
k 
fo
rc
e 
th
at
 
w
as
 n
ot
 m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
 
M
ec
hC
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
 re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 c
om
pe
te
nc
es
 th
at
 w
as
 
no
t m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
  
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
 re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 c
om
m
itm
en
t t
ha
t w
as
 
no
t m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
 
“T
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t b
oa
rd
 is
 th
e 
sa
m
e,
 b
ut
 o
f c
ou
rs
e 
in
 th
e 
sa
le
s d
ep
ar
tm
en
t I
 h
ad
 to
 lo
ok
 fo
r a
 p
er
so
n 
w
ho
 w
ou
ld
 
ta
ke
 o
ve
r t
he
 fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 sa
le
s c
oo
rd
in
at
or
s, 
co
or
di
na
to
rs
 o
f t
he
 b
ac
k 
of
fic
e,
 c
oo
rd
in
at
or
 o
f t
he
 
te
ch
ni
ca
l s
up
po
rt.
 […
] I
 p
ro
po
se
d 
S2
 th
is
 fu
nc
tio
n 
so
 
he
's 
no
w
 m
y 
rig
ht
 h
an
d 
in
 th
e 
sa
le
s d
ep
ar
tm
en
t. 
B
ut
 h
e 
ha
s a
ls
o 
a 
lo
t o
f f
un
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
an
d 
so
 o
n,
 
is
 c
oo
rd
in
at
in
g.
 S
o 
I h
ad
 to
 h
av
e 
su
ch
 a
 m
an
.”
 
(C
EO
M
ec
hC
o)
  
M
an
uC
o 
“I
'v
e 
pu
t w
ith
in
 th
e 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
of
 c
ur
re
nt
 C
FO
 w
ha
t i
s 
m
or
e 
sh
ar
ed
 se
rv
ic
e,
 IT
 a
nd
 p
ro
cu
re
m
en
t. 
W
hy
? 
B
ec
au
se
 h
e 
is
 th
e 
be
st
 in
 th
e 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 to
 
m
ak
e 
it 
ha
pp
en
. H
e 
al
re
ad
y 
de
liv
er
ed
 th
at
 w
he
n 
he
 w
as
 
C
FO
 in
 S
ou
th
 A
si
a.
 […
] B
as
ic
al
ly
 th
is
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
[o
f 
ne
w
 T
M
T]
 w
as
 to
 g
et
 a
 b
et
te
r l
in
e 
on
 th
e 
w
ho
le
 st
ra
te
gy
 
tri
p 
pr
og
ra
m
.”
 (C
EO
M
an
uC
o)
 
“I
n 
fa
ct
 T
4 
vo
lu
nt
ee
re
d 
fo
r t
he
 jo
b 
in
 A
m
er
ic
as
. I
 w
as
 n
ot
 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
ce
nt
ra
l b
ec
au
se
 h
e 
w
as
 m
or
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
gu
y.
 
A
nd
 h
e 
w
as
 su
rp
ris
ed
 th
at
 I 
ga
ve
 it
 to
 h
im
 […
] b
ec
au
se
 
I t
ho
ug
ht
 w
e'd
 b
et
te
r t
ak
e 
a 
re
al
ly
 m
ot
iv
at
ed
 [p
er
so
n]
.”
 
(C
EO
M
an
uC
o)
 
 
“I
 th
in
k,
 w
e 
ne
ed
 so
m
eb
od
y 
on
 th
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
le
ve
l, 
yo
u 
kn
ow
, t
o 
m
an
ag
e 
th
at
 [p
ro
gr
am
]. 
It'
s n
ot
 g
oo
d 
en
ou
gh
 
ju
st
 to
 a
nn
ou
nc
e 
it,
 b
ut
 w
e 
ne
ed
 so
m
eb
od
y 
to
 ta
ke
 it
 u
p 
an
d 
sh
ap
e 
it 
an
d 
be
 th
er
e 
an
d 
be
 th
e 
fa
ce
 a
nd
 w
ha
te
ve
r. 
A
nd
 th
is
 is
 w
he
re
 I 
ca
m
e 
in
to
 th
e 
ga
m
e.
” 
(S
3 M
an
uC
o)
 
 
Tr
av
iC
o 
As
 a
 re
su
lt 
of
 se
tti
ng
 u
p 
tw
o 
ne
w
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts
 fo
cu
si
ng
 o
n 
B2
B 
an
d 
B2
C
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y,
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t h
ea
ds
 w
ith
 th
e 
di
st
in
ct
iv
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
an
d 
sk
ill
s i
n 
th
e 
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
ar
ea
s 
w
er
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
, w
hi
ch
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
m
em
be
rs
 la
ck
ed
. 
 
“A
nd
 th
e 
fo
rm
er
 fi
na
nc
e 
pe
rs
on
 a
nd
 th
e 
fo
rm
er
 
de
pa
rtm
en
t h
ea
d 
T3
, t
he
y 
w
er
e 
a 
pa
rt 
of
 it
 (i
.e
., 
th
e 
hi
st
or
y 
of
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n)
. T
he
y 
di
dn
't 
ca
us
e 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 m
es
s o
r t
he
 w
ho
le
 th
in
g,
 b
ut
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
a 
pa
rt 
of
 
it 
an
d 
[..
.] 
th
ey
 c
ou
ld
n'
t r
ea
lly
 m
ov
e 
on
 b
ec
au
se
 th
ey
 
w
er
e 
st
ill
 in
 th
is
 w
ho
le
 th
in
g.
 A
nd
 b
y 
ha
vi
ng
 n
ew
 
pe
op
le
 in
 p
la
ce
 n
ow
 d
oi
ng
 th
es
e 
jo
bs
, n
ot
 k
no
w
in
g 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
 re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 sp
ec
ia
l t
as
k 
fo
rc
e 
th
at
 
w
as
 n
ot
 m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
 
  
10
8 
m
uc
h 
ab
ou
t t
he
 p
as
t a
nd
 th
ey
 d
on
't 
ac
tu
al
ly
 c
ar
e 
m
uc
h 
ab
ou
t t
he
 p
as
t, 
th
ey
 ju
st
 lo
ok
 a
t t
hi
ng
s t
he
 w
ay
 th
ey
 a
re
 
an
d 
th
ey
 ju
st
 tr
y 
to
 fi
x 
th
em
, w
hi
ch
 g
iv
es
 a
 c
om
pl
et
el
y 
ne
w
 c
ul
tu
re
 so
m
eh
ow
.”
 (C
EO
Tr
av
iC
o)
 
Sa
le
sC
o 
“I
 th
in
k 
S5
 is
 a
 g
oo
d 
ch
oi
ce
. H
e 
ha
s s
ol
id
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
is
 a
ls
o 
a 
pe
rf
ec
t f
it 
w
ho
 m
ee
ts
 o
ur
 fu
tu
re
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
. 
[…
] E
sp
ec
ia
lly
 in
 th
e 
en
tir
e 
ar
ea
 o
f b
us
in
es
s 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 […
], 
he
 c
an
 m
ov
e 
us
 a
he
ad
 e
ff
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
Th
at
’s
 a
n 
ar
ea
 w
he
re
 w
e 
w
ill
 h
av
e 
to
 ta
ke
 a
 q
ua
nt
um
 
le
ap
.”
 (C
EO
Sa
le
sC
o)
 
“I
 p
ai
d 
ex
tre
m
e 
at
te
nt
io
n 
[..
.] 
th
at
 w
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
rin
g 
on
 
bo
ar
d 
ne
w
 c
ol
le
ag
ue
s w
ho
 w
ou
ld
 re
al
ly
 b
e 
su
pp
or
tiv
e 
of
 th
is
 sc
ho
ol
 o
f t
ho
ug
ht
.”
 (C
EO
Sa
le
sC
o)
 
“B
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 h
ug
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
, h
e 
de
ci
de
d 
to
 st
ar
t a
 p
ro
gr
am
 o
ff
ic
e,
 li
ke
 a
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
of
fic
e.
 S
o 
he
 
as
ke
d 
m
ys
el
f t
o 
le
ad
 th
is
 o
ff
ic
e 
be
ca
us
e 
I'v
e 
do
ne
 th
es
e 
th
in
gs
 b
ef
or
e.
” 
(S
4 S
al
es
C
o)
 
C
le
an
C
o 
“B
ut
 th
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
m
an
ag
er
 [S
2]
, I
 th
in
k 
he
 is
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
. I
 h
av
e 
to
 g
et
 h
im
 in
to
 th
at
 p
os
iti
on
 th
at
 h
e 
is
 
ab
le
 to
 m
ov
e 
on
 in
 th
at
 p
ro
ce
ss
. [
...
] ‘
C
os
 in
 th
at
 
po
si
tio
n 
I n
ee
d 
a 
pe
rs
on
 w
ho
 c
an
 1
00
%
 b
ac
k 
up
 m
e.
 It
’s
 
to
o 
cr
iti
ca
l.”
 (C
EO
C
le
an
C
o)
 
 
“A
nd
 I 
m
ad
e 
ve
ry
 c
le
ar
 a
t t
he
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 th
at
 w
e 
ha
ve
 to
 
m
ov
e 
on
, t
ha
t w
e 
ha
ve
 to
 m
ov
e 
in
to
 n
ew
 d
ire
ct
io
n.
 [.
..]
 
A
nd
 th
en
 n
or
m
al
ly
 y
ou
 w
ai
t a
nd
 lo
ok
 w
ha
t i
s t
he
 
re
ac
tio
n.
 A
nd
 fo
r s
ur
e,
 p
eo
pl
e 
re
ac
t d
iff
er
en
tly
. A
nd
 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 w
ith
 th
is
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
pe
rs
on
, I
 fo
un
d 
ou
t t
he
re
 
w
as
 a
lm
os
t n
o 
re
ac
tio
n.
 A
nd
 so
 th
at
’s
 w
ha
t I
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 
be
fo
re
. B
ei
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
m
ov
e 
m
ea
ns
 th
e 
ke
y 
pe
op
le
, t
he
y 
ha
ve
 to
 b
e 
ab
le
 a
nd
 th
e 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s h
as
 to
 b
e 
th
er
e 
to
 –
 
to
 m
ov
e 
on
 to
ge
th
er
.”
 (C
EO
C
le
an
C
o)
 
“S
3,
 m
y 
as
si
st
an
t, 
ha
s n
ow
 g
ot
 a
 lo
t o
f p
ro
je
ct
s, 
pr
ic
es
 
an
d 
th
is
 a
nd
 th
at
, b
ut
 n
ow
 h
e 
w
ill
 g
o 
in
to
 th
e 
da
y-
to
-d
ay
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
nd
 ta
ke
 o
ve
r f
ro
m
 T
1.
 [.
..]
 h
e 
w
ill
 d
o 
al
l t
he
se
 
th
in
gs
 I 
ju
st
 m
en
tio
ne
d 
[…
]. 
I w
ill
 e
du
ca
te
 h
im
 o
n 
ho
w
 
im
po
rta
nt
 it
 is
 a
nd
 I 
th
in
k 
w
e 
ha
ve
 a
 c
om
m
on
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
ab
ou
t t
ha
t a
lre
ad
y 
no
w
.”
 (C
EO
C
le
an
C
o)
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9 
A
pp
en
di
x 
3:
 R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
Q
uo
te
s a
nd
 E
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
r 
Pe
rs
on
al
 In
te
gr
at
io
n 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
cr
iti
ca
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
Id
ea
 te
st
in
g 
In
te
rp
er
so
na
l f
it 
C
om
C
o 
 “
[S
3]
 is
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
m
as
te
r b
ra
in
 o
f n
um
be
rs
 in
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. S
o 
he
 k
no
w
s s
in
ce
 2
5 
ye
ar
s e
ve
ry
 si
ng
le
 
nu
m
be
r o
f D
iv
is
io
n 
A
. [
...
] [
Th
e 
C
EO
] i
s u
si
ng
 h
im
 a
s a
 
so
ur
ce
 o
f i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ve
ry
 m
uc
h 
be
ca
us
e 
he
 k
no
w
s s
o 
m
uc
h 
ab
ou
t a
ll 
th
e 
hi
st
or
y,
 b
ec
au
se
 h
e's
 so
 lo
ng
 in
si
de
 
of
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.”
 (T
2 C
om
C
o)
 
“A
nd
 I 
fe
el
 th
at
 th
e 
ci
rc
le
 o
f S
3,
 S
2 
an
d 
m
e,
 w
e 
ar
e 
pe
op
le
 w
ho
 c
an
 d
o 
th
is
 [i
.e
., 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
vi
ew
s]
, w
he
re
 h
e's
 sa
yi
ng
 I 
lik
e 
to
 h
av
e 
it 
ev
en
: ‘
"I
 n
ee
d 
th
at
 so
m
eb
od
y 
is
 te
lli
ng
 m
e 
if 
I'm
 g
oi
ng
 o
n 
th
e 
w
ro
ng
 
si
de
."
” 
(T
2 C
om
C
o)
 
“B
ut
 fo
r m
e,
 it
’s
 a
lw
ay
s v
er
y 
im
po
rta
nt
 th
at
 I 
ha
ve
 a
 g
oo
d 
fe
el
in
g 
at
 th
e 
en
d 
fo
r t
he
 p
eo
pl
e 
[…
]. 
[…
], 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 lo
t 
of
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 h
av
e 
gr
ea
t k
no
w
le
dg
e 
ou
t t
he
re
, b
ut
 
m
ay
be
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 li
ttl
e 
bi
t l
es
s p
eo
pl
e 
ou
t t
he
re
 w
ho
 h
av
e 
a 
go
od
 p
er
so
na
lit
y,
 w
ho
 y
ou
 c
an
 b
ui
ld
 tr
us
t, 
w
he
re
 y
ou
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 y
ou
rs
el
f w
el
l, 
w
he
re
 it
 m
ak
es
 fu
n 
to
 w
or
k 
w
ith
 th
em
.”
 (C
EO
C
om
C
o)
 
Se
rv
iC
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
 re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 w
as
 n
ot
 m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
 
 “
So
 h
e 
(th
e 
C
EO
) k
no
w
s t
ha
t i
f I
 te
ll 
hi
m
 so
m
et
hi
ng
, i
t i
s 
m
or
e 
or
 le
ss
 th
e 
tru
th
 o
r a
t l
ea
st
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
tru
th
. 
A
nd
 th
at
's 
w
ha
t w
e 
ar
e 
ba
si
ng
 o
n.
 T
he
 tw
o 
of
 u
s h
av
e 
a 
ve
ry
, v
er
y 
go
od
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 W
e 
ca
n 
be
 v
er
y 
cr
iti
ca
l 
w
ith
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r, 
of
 c
ou
rs
e.
” 
(T
6 S
er
vi
C
o)
 
 “
I w
an
t p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 a
re
 g
oi
ng
 to
 b
e 
ho
ne
st
 w
ith
 m
e 
an
d 
ar
e 
go
in
g 
to
 c
ha
lle
ng
e 
m
e,
 a
nd
 fe
el
 th
ey
 c
an
 e
xp
re
ss
 
th
em
se
lv
es
. I
 ju
st
 d
on
’t 
w
an
t p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 a
re
 a
lw
ay
s 
go
in
g 
to
 b
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e.
 A
nd
 w
e 
ha
d 
so
m
e 
of
 th
os
e 
on
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 m
an
ag
em
en
t c
om
m
itt
ee
.”
 (C
EO
Se
rv
iC
o)
 
Te
ch
C
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
 re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 w
as
 n
ot
 m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
 
“A
no
th
er
 to
pi
c 
w
hi
ch
 I 
st
ar
te
d 
qu
ite
 q
ui
ck
ly
 to
 a
na
ly
ze
 
[..
.] 
w
as
 m
y 
in
ne
r c
irc
le
 o
f t
he
 m
an
ag
em
en
t t
ea
m
 w
he
re
 
I w
ou
ld
 li
ke
 to
 d
is
cu
ss
 so
m
e 
to
pi
cs
. S
o 
to
 h
av
e 
on
e 
or
 
tw
o 
gu
ys
 [.
..]
 w
he
re
 I 
co
ul
d 
di
sc
us
s, 
fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e 
th
e 
C
FO
 to
pi
c,
 w
ha
t h
e 
be
lie
ve
s I
 sh
ou
ld
 d
o.
 [.
..]
 B
ut
 to
 
ch
al
le
ng
in
g 
su
ch
 si
tu
at
io
n,
 h
ow
 sh
ou
ld
 I 
re
ac
t, 
ho
w
 
sh
ou
ld
 I 
pr
es
en
t m
ys
el
f o
r T
ec
hC
o 
in
 c
er
ta
in
 a
re
as
, i
n 
a 
m
ee
tin
g,
 in
 a
 c
on
fe
re
nc
e,
 o
r w
ha
te
ve
r i
t w
ill
 b
e.
” 
(C
EO
Te
ch
C
o)
 
“[
W
ith
 T
4]
, w
ha
t I
 d
id
n’
t r
ea
lly
 li
ke
d 
on
 h
is
 si
de
 w
as
 h
e 
w
as
 n
ot
 re
al
ly
 c
ar
e 
ab
ou
t t
he
 p
eo
pl
e.
 H
e 
w
as
 m
or
e 
lo
ok
in
g,
 o
h,
 I 
w
ill
 m
an
ag
e 
th
at
 b
ut
 I 
w
ill
 n
ot
 li
ke
 to
 
ha
ve
 to
o 
m
uc
h 
co
nt
ac
t w
ith
 th
e 
pe
op
le
. A
nd
 h
is
 
be
ha
vi
or
 I 
di
dn
’t 
re
al
ly
 li
ke
 to
 b
e 
ho
ne
st
. A
nd
 th
is
 w
as
 
re
al
ly
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 th
at
 T
10
, h
e 
ha
s r
ea
lly
 a
 g
oo
d 
lin
k 
to
 
th
e 
pe
op
le
 w
hi
ch
 I 
re
al
ly
 a
pp
re
ci
at
e,
 a
nd
 th
at
 w
as
 th
e 
re
as
on
 th
at
 w
e 
m
ad
e 
th
is
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 A
pr
il 
th
at
 h
e 
ta
ke
s 
ov
er
 n
ow
 th
is
 H
R
 p
os
iti
on
.”
 (C
EO
Te
ch
C
o)
  
M
ec
hC
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
 re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
at
 w
as
 n
ot
 m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
 re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 id
ea
 te
st
in
g 
th
at
 w
as
 
no
t m
et
 b
y 
th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
TM
T 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n.
  
“W
e 
ha
ve
 a
 g
oo
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
fo
re
, a
nd
 w
e 
co
nt
in
ue
 to
 
ha
ve
 a
 g
oo
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
af
te
r, 
a 
ve
ry
 o
pe
n 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
  
H
e 
(th
e 
C
EO
) g
iv
es
 m
e 
m
an
y 
th
in
gs
 to
 d
o 
bu
t a
ls
o 
m
an
y 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s. 
 [.
..]
 O
f c
ou
rs
e 
yo
u 
ca
n 
al
so
 sa
y 
I 
w
as
 th
e 
lu
ck
y 
on
e 
to
o.
  B
ec
au
se
 I 
th
in
k 
it 
do
es
n’
t 
ha
pp
en
 so
 o
fte
n 
th
at
 y
ou
 g
et
 th
e 
ch
an
ce
 li
ke
 th
at
, t
ha
t 
yo
ur
 b
os
s j
us
t g
et
s C
EO
 a
nd
 y
ou
 c
an
 ju
st
 g
o 
up
 w
ith
 
hi
m
.”
 (S
2 M
ec
hC
o)
 
M
an
uC
o 
S3
 e
xp
la
in
s w
hy
 th
e 
C
EO
 w
or
ks
 c
lo
se
ly
 w
ith
 h
im
: “
W
ith
 
th
is
 g
lo
ba
l t
as
k,
 y
ou
 k
no
w
, o
bv
io
us
ly
 I 
kn
ow
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
pr
et
ty
 w
el
l i
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ex
t o
f p
ro
ce
ss
es
, t
he
 b
us
in
es
se
s, 
th
e 
pe
op
le
, t
he
 c
ul
tu
re
s, 
an
d 
al
l t
ha
t g
oe
s w
ith
 it
. [
…
] 
B
ec
au
se
 h
e 
[th
e 
C
EO
] i
s a
ls
o 
ne
w
 to
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
an
d,
 
pr
ob
ab
ly
 if
 y
ou
 d
o 
tra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 it
 m
ig
ht
 h
el
p 
to
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 a
 li
ttl
e 
bi
t t
he
 c
ul
tu
re
s a
nd
 h
ow
 y
ou
 c
an
 g
et
 
be
st
 a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 it
.”
 (S
3  
M
an
uC
o)
 
“A
nd
 th
er
e 
(i.
e.
, w
ith
 B
2,
 B
3,
 a
nd
 B
4)
 w
as
 k
in
d 
of
 
so
un
di
ng
 b
oa
rd
. S
o 
I s
ta
rte
d 
lik
e 
th
at
 w
ith
 th
em
. [
...
] 
A
nd
 so
 fo
r t
es
tin
g 
th
e 
id
ea
s.”
 (C
EO
M
an
uC
o)
 
“T
X
 w
as
 th
e 
cl
os
es
t t
o 
[th
e 
fo
rm
er
 C
EO
] a
nd
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
a 
lo
ng
 h
is
to
ry
 to
ge
th
er
 in
 M
an
uC
o.
 T
Y
 w
as
 c
lo
se
 to
 
M
ik
e,
 so
 th
at
 w
as
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
th
er
e.
 […
] B
ec
au
se
 
yo
u 
ne
ed
 to
 se
e 
w
he
re
 y
ou
're
 g
oi
ng
 w
ith
 a
 n
ew
 C
EO
: 
ei
th
er
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
a 
pe
rs
on
al
ity
 m
at
ch
 […
] o
r t
he
re
 is
 n
o 
m
at
ch
 a
nd
 th
en
 y
ou
 sa
y,
 "
W
el
l, 
m
ay
be
 it
's 
be
tte
r t
o 
se
pa
ra
te
."
” 
(S
5 M
an
uC
o)
 
  
11
0 
Tr
av
iC
o 
 “
If
 it
's 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 se
ns
iti
ve
, h
e 
[th
e 
C
EO
] a
sk
s m
e 
an
d 
if 
he
 k
no
w
s t
ha
t I
 k
no
w
 th
is
 p
er
so
n 
go
od
 o
r i
f i
t's
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 fo
r s
en
si
tiv
e 
fo
r t
he
 st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
, h
e 
as
ks
 
m
e.
” 
(S
3 T
ra
vi
C
o)
 
“[
Th
e 
C
EO
] w
as
 re
al
ly
 lo
ok
in
g 
fo
rw
ar
d 
fo
r h
im
 to
 g
et
 
su
pp
or
t, 
no
t o
nl
y 
in
 re
ga
rd
s t
o 
th
e 
w
or
kl
oa
d,
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
ha
vi
ng
 so
m
e 
sp
ar
rin
g 
pa
rtn
er
s w
ith
 m
e 
an
d 
T4
, y
ou
 
kn
ow
. A
nd
 S
3 
at
 th
at
 ti
m
e 
w
as
 a
lre
ad
y 
a 
sp
ar
rin
g 
pa
rtn
er
, b
ut
 h
e 
w
as
n'
t p
ar
t o
f t
he
 b
oa
rd
 a
nd
 h
e 
w
as
n'
t o
n 
th
at
 le
ve
l y
et
.”
 (T
5 T
ra
vi
C
o)
 
T4
 re
co
un
ts
 h
is
 jo
b 
in
te
rv
ie
w
 w
ith
 th
e 
C
EO
 a
nd
 th
e 
H
R
 
pe
rs
on
: “
Th
e 
H
R
 p
er
so
n 
as
ke
d 
[..
.] 
w
ha
t w
as
 im
po
rta
nt
 
fo
r m
e,
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
ac
tio
n,
 a
s I
 re
m
em
be
r, 
fr
om
 th
e 
C
EO
 
w
as
 in
 th
at
 se
ns
e 
th
at
 w
as
 a
ls
o 
hi
s w
ay
 o
f w
or
ki
ng
.”
 
(T
4 T
ra
vi
C
o)
 
Sa
le
sC
o 
“Y
ou
 a
ls
o 
ha
ve
 to
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 a
re
 w
el
l n
et
w
or
ke
d 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
so
 th
at
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
an
 e
ar
ly
 w
ar
ni
ng
 sy
st
em
 
in
 p
la
ce
. [
...
] I
f y
ou
 d
on
’t 
ha
ve
 a
 fe
w
 p
eo
pl
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ra
nk
s w
ith
 w
ho
m
 y
ou
 sh
ar
e 
a 
st
ro
ng
 b
on
d 
of
 tr
us
t y
ou
 
as
 a
 C
EO
 w
on
’t 
kn
ow
 w
ha
t’s
 g
oi
ng
 o
n.
 [.
..]
 S
3 
do
es
 
[h
av
e 
th
is
 fu
nc
tio
n.
] F
or
 m
e 
it’
s d
ef
in
ite
ly
 S
4,
 w
ho
 is
 a
 
gr
ea
t p
eo
pl
e 
pe
rs
on
, a
nd
 a
ls
o 
S1
, s
he
 k
no
w
s w
ha
t’s
 
go
in
g 
on
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.”
 (C
EO
Sa
le
sC
o)
 
 “
B
ut
 a
ct
ua
lly
, h
e 
di
sc
us
se
s t
he
 id
ea
s e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 w
ith
 S
4 
an
d 
m
ys
el
f [
…
].”
 (S
3 S
al
es
C
o)
 
“S
5 
an
d 
I w
er
e 
al
re
ad
y 
co
lle
ag
ue
s a
t [
an
ot
he
r f
irm
] a
nd
 
th
e 
co
ns
te
lla
tio
n 
w
as
 th
e 
sa
m
e.
 I 
kn
ew
 h
im
 a
nd
 I 
w
as
 
th
e 
on
e 
w
ho
 e
nc
ou
ra
ge
d 
hi
m
 to
 c
om
e 
on
 b
oa
rd
 a
t 
Sa
le
sC
o.
 S
o 
if 
yo
u’
ve
 a
lre
ad
y 
w
or
ke
d 
to
ge
th
er
 fo
r 
m
an
y 
ye
ar
s, 
pr
ob
ab
ly
 1
0 
ye
ar
s, 
it 
is
 re
la
tiv
el
y 
ea
sy
 to
 
le
t t
hi
ng
s t
ak
e 
th
ei
r c
ou
rs
e 
la
te
r.”
 (C
EO
Sa
le
sC
o)
 
C
le
an
C
o 
“S
4 
w
as
 1
2 
ye
ar
s w
or
ki
ng
 fo
r C
le
an
C
o 
[…
] a
nd
 sh
e 
ga
ve
 
us
 a
 lo
t o
f [
in
fo
rm
at
io
n]
 th
at
 [.
..]
 w
as
 v
er
y 
im
po
rta
nt
 fo
r 
us
. S
he
 h
ad
 a
 lo
t o
f d
et
ai
le
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t b
us
in
es
s 
cu
st
om
er
s, 
ab
ou
t t
he
 p
as
t a
nd
 th
at
 w
as
 g
oo
d 
fo
r u
s. 
W
e 
w
er
e 
ab
le
 to
 le
ar
n 
fr
om
 th
at
; [
...
] T
he
n 
w
e 
w
er
e 
ab
le
 to
 
fin
d 
ou
t w
hy
 so
m
e 
th
in
gs
 w
en
t w
ro
ng
.”
 (C
EO
C
le
an
C
o)
 
Th
e 
C
EO
 d
is
cu
ss
ed
 h
is
 p
la
ns
 w
ith
 B
2:
 "
So
 th
e 
fir
st
 
m
ee
tin
gs
, [
…
] w
er
e 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 fo
r B
2,
 v
er
y 
di
ff
ic
ul
t 
on
es
. [
...
] T
o 
an
al
yz
e 
w
ha
t i
s t
he
 a
ct
ua
l s
itu
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
, w
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
de
ta
ils
 th
at
 a
ll 
th
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 
pa
rti
es
 k
no
w
, w
he
re
 w
e 
ar
e 
an
d 
w
he
re
 w
e 
w
an
t t
o 
be
.”
 
(C
EO
C
le
an
C
o)
 
“S
2 
w
as
 th
e 
fir
st
 p
er
so
n 
I w
as
 a
bl
e 
to
 c
ou
nt
 o
n 
10
0%
, y
ou
 
kn
ow
, w
he
n 
I h
av
e 
st
ar
te
d,
 a
fte
r a
 c
ou
pl
e 
of
 m
on
th
s w
e 
ha
d 
th
e 
co
m
m
on
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 a
nd
 I 
kn
ew
 [e
ve
n 
if]
 I 
ca
n 
no
t t
al
k 
to
 h
im
 fo
r t
w
o,
 th
re
e,
 fo
ur
 w
ee
ks
, h
e 
w
ill
 
fo
llo
w
 –
 h
e 
fu
lly
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
w
ha
t's
 g
oi
ng
 o
n.
” 
(C
EO
C
le
an
C
o)
 
 
  
11
1 
A
pp
en
di
x 
4:
 R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
Q
uo
te
s a
nd
 E
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
C
on
st
ra
in
ts
 o
f T
M
T
 C
ha
ng
e 
 
R
el
at
io
na
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
 
St
ru
ct
ur
al
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
  
Pe
rs
on
al
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
 
C
om
C
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 re
la
tio
na
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
  
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 st
ru
ct
ur
al
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
“S
3 
w
ou
ld
 h
av
e,
 le
t's
 sa
y,
 h
ad
 th
e 
ch
an
ce
 to
 g
et
 a
ls
o 
th
e 
C
FO
 jo
b 
if 
he
 li
ke
d 
to
 d
o 
it,
 b
ut
 h
e 
w
as
 a
lw
ay
s a
 v
er
y 
cl
ea
r p
er
so
n 
sa
yi
ng
 I 
lik
e 
m
y 
jo
b,
 I'
m
 a
 c
on
tro
lli
ng
 
pe
rs
on
, I
 d
on
't 
w
an
t t
o 
ta
ke
 m
or
e 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y.
” 
(T
2 C
om
C
o)
 
Se
rv
iC
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 re
la
tio
na
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
  
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 st
ru
ct
ur
al
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
Th
e 
C
EO
 in
iti
al
ly
 c
re
at
ed
 tw
o 
po
si
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
TM
T 
fo
r 
T8
 a
nd
 T
9 
bu
t d
ue
 to
 p
er
so
na
l r
ea
so
ns
 th
e 
tw
o 
pe
op
le
 
co
ul
d 
on
ly
 jo
in
 se
ve
ra
l m
on
th
s l
at
er
.  
Te
ch
C
o 
“[
W
ith
 T
7]
, I
 a
lre
ad
y 
pl
an
ne
d 
en
d 
la
st
 y
ea
r, 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
th
is
 y
ea
r, 
to
 m
ak
e 
so
m
e 
ch
an
ge
s a
nd
 I 
le
ar
ne
d,
 I 
ga
ve
 
al
m
os
t u
p 
th
at
 th
is
 is
 n
ot
 p
os
si
bl
e 
be
ca
us
e 
[…
] t
he
 
bo
ss
 sa
id
 o
h 
no
, n
o,
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
is
 o
ka
y 
an
d 
al
so
 T
7 
an
d 
ot
he
r p
eo
pl
e,
 o
h 
no
 th
ey
 a
re
 w
or
ki
ng
 w
el
l a
nd
 
gr
ea
t. 
(C
EO
Te
ch
C
o)
 
Th
is
 w
as
 a
 li
ttl
e 
bi
t o
f a
 fr
us
tra
tio
n 
po
in
t, 
[…
] b
ec
au
se
 
w
e 
ag
re
ed
 a
lre
ad
y 
la
st
 y
ea
r t
ha
t [
…
] T
6 
w
ou
ld
 ta
ke
 
ov
er
 th
e 
le
ad
 o
f t
he
 k
ey
 a
cc
ou
nt
. A
nd
 th
en
 m
y 
bo
ss
 
sa
id
, "
N
o,
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
to
 d
o 
bo
th
 in
 th
e 
ne
xt
 fe
w
 
m
on
th
s, 
m
in
im
um
, a
nd
 th
en
 w
e 
m
ak
e 
a 
de
ci
si
on
 if
 w
e 
sp
lit
 it
 o
r n
ot
."
 (C
EO
Te
ch
C
o)
  
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 p
er
so
na
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
M
ec
hC
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 re
la
tio
na
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
 
“N
o,
 it
 is
 fo
rb
id
de
n 
by
 th
e 
G
ro
up
 [t
o 
ha
ve
 a
 se
pa
ra
te
 
sa
le
s h
ea
d 
in
 T
M
T]
. I
 h
av
e 
to
 a
cc
um
ul
at
e 
tw
o 
fu
nc
tio
ns
, C
EO
 a
nd
 sa
le
s, 
th
is
 is
 to
 re
du
ce
 p
er
so
nn
el
 
co
st
s.”
 (C
EO
M
ec
hC
o)
 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 p
er
so
na
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
M
an
uC
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 re
la
tio
na
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 st
ru
ct
ur
al
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
A
nd
 a
ga
in
, i
t w
as
 d
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
fin
d 
su
cc
es
so
rs
, o
bv
io
us
ly
, 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
pe
op
le
 th
at
 w
er
e 
se
le
ct
ed
 w
er
e 
no
t t
he
 
on
es
 th
at
 w
ill
 st
ay
 in
 th
is
 p
os
iti
on
 fo
r a
 w
hi
le
. T
he
y 
ar
e 
al
l c
lo
se
 to
 re
tir
em
en
t a
ge
 a
s w
el
l. 
So
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
T6
, y
ou
 h
av
e 
T4
. [
...
] A
nd
 a
s s
uc
h,
 y
ou
 e
nd
 u
p 
w
ith
 
m
or
e 
of
 m
ay
be
 a
n 
in
te
rim
 so
lu
tio
n,
 w
hi
ch
 a
ga
in
 w
ill
 
br
in
g 
a 
lo
t o
f c
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. (
S5
M
an
uC
o)
 
Tr
av
iC
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 re
la
tio
na
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 st
ru
ct
ur
al
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
Th
e 
C
EO
 re
cr
ui
te
d 
tw
o 
TM
T 
m
em
be
rs
 T
4 
an
d 
T5
 w
ith
in
 
th
e 
fir
st
 th
re
e 
m
on
th
s, 
bu
t d
ue
 to
 p
er
so
na
l r
ea
so
ns
 th
e 
tw
o 
pe
op
le
 c
ou
ld
 o
nl
y 
jo
in
 se
ve
ra
l m
on
th
s l
at
er
. S
o 
th
e 
C
EO
 c
om
pl
ai
ne
d:
 “
I d
on
’t 
ha
ve
 e
no
ug
h 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l s
ta
ff
 a
t t
he
 m
om
en
t. 
So
 I 
ha
ve
 a
 g
oo
d 
am
ou
nt
 o
f p
eo
pl
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 d
ire
ct
ly
 to
 m
e 
w
hi
ch
 
ke
ep
s m
e 
qu
ite
 b
us
y 
w
hi
ch
 is
 d
ay
-to
-d
ay
 th
in
gs
. [
…
] 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
t s
o 
m
an
y 
pe
op
le
 h
er
e 
to
 ta
lk
 to
. I
 m
ea
n 
ce
rta
in
 to
pi
cs
 li
ke
 re
du
ci
ng
 st
af
f i
s n
ot
 a
 to
pi
c 
yo
u 
w
an
t t
o 
di
sc
us
s w
ith
 e
ve
ry
bo
dy
 in
 a
 c
or
rid
or
.”
  
  
11
2 
Sa
le
sC
o 
“T
1 
ha
s a
n 
is
su
e 
on
 le
ad
er
sh
ip
, I
 th
in
k,
 a
nd
 o
rg
an
iz
in
g 
hi
m
se
lf 
an
d 
hi
s d
ep
ar
tm
en
t. 
[..
.] 
A
nd
 if
 th
e 
C
EO
 
co
ul
d,
 h
e 
w
ou
ld
 [c
ha
ng
e 
hi
m
], 
bu
t h
e 
ca
n'
t. 
[..
.] 
I 
m
ea
n,
 o
n 
m
y 
le
ve
l [
...
] e
ve
ry
bo
dy
 k
no
w
s t
ha
t, 
or
 
th
in
ks
. S
om
e 
of
 th
e 
re
ac
tio
ns
 o
f t
he
 C
EO
 a
ls
o 
te
ll 
us
 
th
at
 th
e 
fir
st
 th
in
g 
he
 w
ou
ld
 d
o 
is
 [t
o 
m
ak
e 
th
is
 
ch
an
ge
].”
 (S
1 S
al
es
C
o)
 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 st
ru
ct
ur
al
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
“I
 sa
id
, l
et
's 
ta
lk
 o
pe
nl
y 
ab
ou
t t
ha
t, 
[I
 d
on
’t 
w
an
t t
o]
 
ha
ve
 th
e 
po
si
tio
n.
 A
nd
 –
 b
ut
 h
e 
(th
e 
C
EO
) s
ai
d,
 o
ka
y,
 
bu
t I
 w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 y
ou
 m
or
e 
cl
os
el
y 
to
 m
ys
el
f t
ha
t h
e 
ca
n 
w
or
k 
st
ill
 c
lo
se
ly
 to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 m
e.
” 
(S
4 S
al
es
C
o)
 
C
le
an
C
o 
Th
e 
C
EO
 d
es
cr
ib
es
 h
ow
 h
e 
ha
d 
di
ff
ic
ul
tie
s s
ac
ki
ng
 T
1 
du
e 
to
 h
is
 st
ro
ng
 p
er
so
na
l r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
: “
A
nd
 th
at
 w
as
, f
or
 m
e,
 a
t t
ha
t t
im
e,
 v
er
y 
ha
rd
 [t
o 
sa
ck
 T
1]
. [
…
] T
1 
w
as
 a
 k
ey
 p
er
so
n,
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
to
 k
no
w
. H
is
 re
pu
ta
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 is
 v
er
y 
go
od
 
be
ca
us
e 
he
's 
go
t a
 n
ic
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
r."
 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 st
ru
ct
ur
al
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 st
ru
ct
ur
al
 c
on
st
ra
in
ts
. 
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Appendix 5: Immediate Collaborators Concerned with the Requirements and Constraints of 
Establishing the Strategic Apparatus 
 ComsCo ServiCo TechCo MechCo ManuCo TraviCo SalesCo CleanCo 
 
Strategic orientation requirements 
 
  - Competence T2 T6, T8 - - T3, T4 T4, T5 T6, T7, 
S5 
S2, S5 
  - Commitment T2, S2, 
S3 
T8, T3 T4 - T3, T4 T4, T5, 
S3 
T6, T7, 
S5 
S2 
  - Special task force T2, S2 
 
- - S2 S3 - S3, S4, 
S2, S1 
S3 
Personal integration requirements 
 
  - Access to critical  
     information 
S3, S2 - - - S2, S3, 
S4 
T3, S3 S1, S3, 
S4 
T2, S4 
  - Idea testing B2, T2, 
S2, S3 
T6, T5, 
T8 
T6, T5, 
T10 
T2, T5 B2, B3, 
B4, S2, 
S4 
T3, S3, 
B2, B3 
S3, S4, 
B2 
T2, B2 
  - Interpersonal fit T2, S2, 
S3 
T5, T4, 
T8 
T6, T5, 
T10 
T2, T5, 
T1, S2 
S1 T4, T5, 
S3 
S5, S3, 
S4, S1, 
S2 
S2 
Constraints of TMT change 
 
  - Relational - 
 
- T7 - - - T1 T1 
  - Structural - 
 
- T6 S2 - - - - 
  - Personal  S2, S3 
 
T8 - - T1, T6 T4, T5 T3, T4 - 
 
Note: B indicates a member of the board of directors; T indicates a member of the TMT; and S indicates a 
member of the staff or lower-level managers. 
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4 
A
pp
en
di
x 
6:
 R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
Q
uo
te
s a
nd
 E
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
r 
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 T
en
si
on
s 
 
R
ol
e 
co
nf
lic
t 
R
ol
e 
am
bi
gu
ity
 
C
om
C
o 
“T
o 
be
 h
on
es
t, 
I'm
 in
 a
 re
al
ly
 tr
ic
ky
 si
tu
at
io
n 
[..
.].
 O
n 
th
e 
on
e 
ha
nd
, I
 re
al
ly
 li
ke
 to
 w
or
k 
w
ith
 th
e 
C
EO
 b
ec
au
se
 I 
th
in
k,
 in
 h
is
 h
ea
rt,
 h
e's
 a
 g
oo
d 
gu
y.
 H
e's
 p
ol
ite
. H
e 
ha
s t
he
 
sa
m
e 
va
lu
es
 a
s I
 d
o.
 T
he
 to
pi
cs
 a
re
 re
al
ly
 in
te
re
st
in
g,
 re
al
ly
 d
yn
am
ic
. O
n 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
ha
nd
, I
'm
 a
lw
ay
s i
n 
th
e 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
. [
...
] I
'm
 n
ot
 a
 m
em
be
r o
f t
he
 G
ro
up
 E
xe
cu
tiv
e 
B
oa
rd
. I
 d
on
't 
ha
ve
 a
 sa
la
ry
 [a
s t
he
y 
do
].”
 (S
2 C
om
C
o)
 
“I
t’s
 a
 li
ttl
e 
bi
t s
tra
ng
e 
be
ca
us
e 
w
e 
ha
d 
te
n 
ar
ou
nd
 th
is
 ta
bl
e 
an
d 
fo
ur
 a
re
 e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
m
em
be
rs
. A
nd
 e
ve
ry
bo
dy
 ta
lk
s i
n 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
m
od
e.
 S
o,
 a
ga
in
, I
 th
in
k 
it'
s a
 li
ttl
e 
bi
t 
di
ff
ic
ul
t t
o 
ha
nd
le
 it
 li
ke
 th
at
 o
ve
r a
 lo
ng
 ti
m
e.
 In
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g,
 la
st
 y
ea
r i
t w
as
 o
ka
y 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
w
as
 a
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
ph
as
e.
” 
(S
3 C
om
C
o)
 
 
Se
rv
iC
o 
“I
 o
pe
nl
y 
sh
ar
ed
 th
at
 w
ith
 [t
he
 C
EO
] [
...
] t
ha
t I
 fe
el
 it
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
th
e 
be
ne
fit
 to
 th
e 
fir
m
 
[th
at
] h
e 
sh
ou
ld
 ta
ke
 th
e 
de
ci
si
on
s i
f m
ay
be
 o
th
er
 p
eo
pl
e’
s v
ie
w
 [i
.e
., 
al
so
 th
e 
vi
ew
s 
of
 th
os
e 
TM
T 
m
em
be
rs
 th
at
 a
re
 n
ot
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
ap
pa
ra
tu
s]
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
or
e 
fa
ct
or
ed
 in
, o
th
er
 th
an
 th
e 
us
ua
l s
us
pe
ct
s a
ll 
th
e 
tim
e;
 b
ec
au
se
 it
’s
 n
ot
 a
 v
er
y 
di
ve
rs
e 
gr
ou
p.
 […
] t
he
y 
se
e 
th
e 
w
or
ld
 [.
..]
 fr
om
 th
ei
r v
er
y 
sp
ec
ia
l f
oc
us
 a
nd
, I
 th
in
k 
if 
he
 
so
m
et
im
es
 h
ad
 m
or
e 
ba
la
nc
ed
, o
r d
iff
er
en
t v
ie
w
s, 
it 
w
ou
ld
 h
el
p 
th
e 
qu
al
ity
 o
f t
he
 
de
ci
si
on
 b
as
ic
al
ly
 b
ef
or
e 
w
e 
ta
ke
 a
 d
ec
is
io
n.
 [.
..]
 I 
ha
ve
 re
al
ly
 m
or
e 
th
an
 e
no
ug
h 
to
 
do
, i
t’s
 n
ot
 th
at
 I’
m
 k
in
d 
of
 tr
yi
ng
 to
 b
e 
m
or
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
os
e 
di
sc
us
si
on
s, 
bu
t I
 
th
in
k 
it 
w
ou
ld
 e
nh
an
ce
 th
e 
qu
al
ity
.”
 (T
3 S
er
vi
C
o)
 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 te
ns
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 ro
le
 a
m
bi
gu
ity
. 
Te
ch
C
o 
T1
0 
co
m
pl
ai
ns
 a
bo
ut
 T
7 
no
t e
ng
ag
in
g 
in
 T
M
T 
w
or
k:
 “
T7
 h
as
 re
al
ly
 a
 to
ta
lly
 d
iff
er
en
t 
st
an
di
ng
 in
 o
ur
 b
oa
rd
. H
e’
s n
ot
 th
at
 m
uc
h 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 a
ll 
th
e 
[f
irm
-le
ve
l] 
to
pi
cs
 […
]. 
H
e’
s o
nl
y 
fo
cu
se
d 
on
 h
is
 sa
le
s f
un
ct
io
n,
 a
nd
 th
at
’s
 a
ll.
” 
(T
10
Te
ch
C
o)
 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 te
ns
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 ro
le
 a
m
bi
gu
ity
. 
M
ec
hC
o 
 “
I h
av
e 
a 
lit
tle
 b
it 
st
ra
ng
e 
po
si
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. E
ve
ry
on
e 
fe
el
s a
s I
 a
m
 a
 p
ar
t [
if 
th
e 
TM
T]
, b
ut
 I 
am
 n
ot
, s
o 
I t
hi
nk
 fo
r m
e 
no
w
 it
's 
ok
ay
 li
ke
 th
is
. I
 c
an
 m
an
ag
e 
it 
an
d 
I 
lik
e 
it.
 M
ay
be
 if
 I 
w
ou
ld
n’
t h
av
e 
su
ch
 a
 g
oo
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
to
 h
im
 (t
he
 C
EO
), 
I w
ou
ld
 
ha
ve
 so
m
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s p
ro
ba
bl
y.
 I 
w
ou
ld
 sa
y 
w
hy
 m
us
t I
 c
om
e 
ev
er
y 
M
on
da
y 
to
 th
e 
[T
M
T]
 m
ee
tin
gs
 a
nd
 I'
m
 n
ot
 a
 m
em
be
r o
f [
it]
, y
ou
 c
an
 d
o 
it 
yo
ur
se
lf,
 m
y 
pa
rt,
 o
r 
th
in
gs
 li
ke
 th
at
. O
ne
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
al
so
 c
rit
ic
al
 a
bo
ut
 th
is
. S
o 
le
t's
 se
e,
 I 
do
n’
t k
no
w
 w
ha
t's
 
go
in
g 
on
 in
 h
is
 m
in
d 
ab
ou
t f
ut
ur
e 
st
ra
te
gi
es
. I
 th
in
k 
I h
av
e 
m
an
y 
th
in
gs
 to
 le
ar
n 
so
 fo
r 
m
e 
no
w
 it
's 
ok
ay
 li
ke
 th
at
.”
 (S
2 M
ec
hC
o)
 
“O
f c
ou
rs
e 
th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
of
 m
e 
[…
] s
om
et
im
es
 b
rin
gs
 so
m
e 
– 
I w
ou
ld
n’
t s
ay
 th
at
 th
es
e 
ar
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s [
...
]. 
So
 m
ay
be
 in
 so
m
e 
m
on
th
s o
r s
om
e 
ye
ar
s I
 w
ill
 b
e 
fo
rc
ed
 to
 sa
y 
to
 
th
e 
C
EO
, y
ou
 h
av
e 
to
 m
ak
e 
a 
de
ci
si
on
 o
r t
o 
ta
ke
 a
 d
ec
is
io
n 
be
ca
us
e 
m
y 
si
tu
at
io
n,
 it
's 
no
t e
as
y 
lik
e 
th
is
, I
'm
 in
 th
e 
m
id
dl
e 
an
d 
I'm
 in
 th
e 
no
 m
an
's 
la
nd
.”
 (S
2 M
ec
hC
o)
  
 
M
an
uC
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 te
ns
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 ro
le
 c
on
fli
ct
. 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 te
ns
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 ro
le
 a
m
bi
gu
ity
. 
Tr
av
iC
o 
 “
I s
ai
d,
 ‘L
oo
k,
 w
e 
ar
e 
no
t t
al
ki
ng
. W
e 
do
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t m
ee
tin
gs
. W
e 
do
 n
ot
 –
 
ov
er
 th
e 
ph
on
e,
 n
ot
hi
ng
. Y
ou
 k
no
w
, I
 a
m
 h
er
e.
 I 
w
an
t t
o 
ex
ch
an
ge
 id
ea
s. 
Y
ou
 n
ee
d 
to
 
ex
ch
an
ge
 id
ea
s. 
W
ith
 w
ho
m
 a
re
 y
ou
 e
xc
ha
ng
in
g 
id
ea
s?
’”
 (T
1 T
ra
vi
C
o)
  
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 te
ns
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 ro
le
 a
m
bi
gu
ity
. 
Sa
le
sC
o 
A
fte
r a
ll,
 y
ou
 h
ea
r t
ha
t a
 lo
t “
H
e’
s n
ot
 p
ar
t o
f…
” 
A
nd
 th
ey
 (S
3 
an
d 
S4
) g
iv
e 
ot
he
rs
 th
e 
co
ns
ta
nt
 m
es
sa
ge
 “
I’
m
 a
ct
ua
lly
 b
et
te
r t
ha
n 
yo
u.
 I 
sh
ou
ld
 d
o 
yo
ur
 jo
b.
” 
(C
EO
Sa
le
sC
o)
 
“T
hi
s i
s l
ik
e 
a 
cl
ou
d,
 n
ob
od
y 
re
al
ly
 k
no
w
s t
he
ir 
(i.
e.
 S
3 
an
d 
S4
) r
ol
e.
” 
(T
7 S
al
es
C
o)
 
C
le
an
C
o 
 “
S5
 sa
id
 “
I’
d 
w
an
t y
ou
 to
 h
an
dl
e 
th
e 
or
de
rs
 if
 y
ou
 d
id
. I
 w
an
t y
ou
 to
 h
an
dl
e 
or
de
rin
g,
 
m
at
er
ia
l o
rd
er
s a
nd
 th
e 
m
at
er
ia
ls
 m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
[…
]”
 S
o 
I s
ai
d 
“Y
ou
 k
no
w
 w
ha
t, 
I 
th
in
k 
I’
m
 o
ld
 a
nd
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t e
no
ug
h 
to
 k
no
w
 w
ha
t I
 w
an
t. 
[…
] b
ut
 a
s f
ar
 a
s I
 k
no
w
 
it’
s t
he
 C
EO
 w
ho
 a
ss
ig
ns
 th
e 
jo
b 
du
tie
s, 
no
t y
ou
.”
” 
(S
4 C
le
an
C
o)
 
“I
n 
th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 w
as
 so
 n
ic
e 
an
d 
th
en
 h
e 
(S
5)
 w
an
te
d 
to
 p
la
y 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f 
bo
ss
, i
.e
. “
fo
rm
er
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t S
 h
ea
d 
st
an
d-
in
.”
 B
ut
 th
e 
jo
b 
di
dn
’t 
ev
en
 e
xi
st
 a
ny
m
or
e.
 
So
m
eh
ow
 th
in
gs
 e
sc
al
at
ed
 a
fte
r t
ha
t b
ec
au
se
 th
is
 w
as
 re
al
ly
 th
e 
jo
b 
he
 w
an
te
d.
” 
(S
2 C
le
an
C
o)
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5 
A
pp
en
di
x 
7:
 R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e 
Q
uo
te
s a
nd
 E
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
r 
D
ec
re
as
in
g 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
 
Sp
ec
ia
l t
as
k 
fo
rc
e 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
cr
iti
ca
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
Id
ea
 te
st
in
g 
C
om
C
o 
S4
 w
ho
 se
rv
ed
 a
s s
pe
ci
al
 ta
sk
 fo
rc
e 
in
di
ca
te
d 
in
 
in
fo
rm
al
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s t
ha
t t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f p
er
so
na
l 
m
ee
tin
gs
 w
ith
 th
e 
C
EO
 d
is
cu
ss
in
g 
ad
 h
oc
 ta
sk
s 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 y
ea
r 
“B
ut
 th
en
 h
e 
(th
e 
C
EO
) l
ea
rn
ed
 a
nd
 h
e 
go
t e
ve
ry
th
in
g.
 
B
ut
 so
m
et
im
es
, a
ga
in
, I
'd
 sa
y,
 "
O
h,
 w
e 
ha
ve
 to
 ta
lk
,"
 
an
d 
I g
o 
up
 a
nd
 I'
d 
sa
y,
 "
O
ka
y,
 I 
se
e 
it 
th
is
 w
ay
 a
nd
 
th
at
 w
ay
."
 B
ut
 it
's 
no
t s
o 
of
te
n 
at
 th
e 
m
om
en
t.”
 
(S
3 C
om
C
o)
 
Th
e 
C
EO
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 th
at
 a
fte
r t
he
 fi
rs
t y
ea
r h
e 
ha
d 
fe
w
er
 in
de
pt
h 
di
sc
us
si
on
s w
ith
 B
2,
 i.
e.
 "
a 
pr
of
ou
nd
 
di
sc
us
si
on
 o
r a
 p
ro
fo
un
d 
re
fle
ct
io
n 
w
he
re
 y
ou
 m
ay
be
 
do
n'
t h
av
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 X
 to
 b
e 
so
lv
ed
, p
ro
bl
em
 Y
 to
 b
e 
so
lv
ed
, b
ut
 m
ay
be
 in
 a
 b
ro
ad
er
 se
ns
e"
. 
Se
rv
iC
o 
N
ot
 re
le
va
nt
 h
er
e 
as
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 a
 sp
ec
ia
l t
as
k 
fo
rc
e 
in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
(s
ee
 T
ab
le
 3
). 
N
ot
 re
le
va
nt
 h
er
e 
as
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
cr
iti
ca
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
(s
ee
 T
ab
le
 3
). 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 th
e 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 id
ea
 
te
st
in
g.
 
Te
ch
C
o 
N
ot
 re
le
va
nt
 h
er
e 
as
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 a
 sp
ec
ia
l t
as
k 
fo
rc
e 
in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
(s
ee
 T
ab
le
 3
). 
N
ot
 re
le
va
nt
 h
er
e 
as
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
cr
iti
ca
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
(s
ee
 T
ab
le
 3
). 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 th
e 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 id
ea
 
te
st
in
g.
 
M
ec
hC
o 
N
o 
in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 th
e 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 a
 
sp
ec
ia
l t
as
k 
fo
rc
e.
 
N
ot
 re
le
va
nt
 h
er
e 
as
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
cr
iti
ca
l i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
(s
ee
 T
ab
le
 3
). 
N
ot
 re
le
va
nt
 h
er
e 
as
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t f
or
 id
ea
 te
st
in
g 
in
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
(s
ee
 
Ta
bl
e 
3)
. 
M
an
uC
o 
A 
sp
ec
ia
l t
as
k 
fo
rc
e 
(i.
e.
, S
3 
an
d 
hi
s d
ep
ar
tm
en
t) 
w
as
 
se
t u
p 
to
 le
ad
 a
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
pr
oj
ec
t t
ha
t i
nc
lu
de
d 
a 
w
ho
le
 p
ac
ka
ge
 o
f m
an
y 
di
ffe
re
nt
 in
iti
at
iv
es
. A
fte
r t
w
o 
ye
ar
s t
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 w
as
 su
cc
es
sf
ul
ly
 c
om
pl
et
ed
. 
"[
Th
e 
C
EO
] n
ow
 h
as
 se
en
 e
no
ug
h.
 A
t t
he
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
, 
[..
.] 
he
 to
ld
 m
e 
th
at
 o
nc
e,
 "
I'm
 fi
rs
t h
er
e 
an
d 
se
e,
 a
nd
 
th
en
 I 
se
e 
w
ha
t I
 c
an
 c
ha
ng
e 
an
d 
ho
w
 fa
st
 I 
ca
n 
ch
an
ge
."
 A
nd
 I 
th
in
k 
no
w
 h
e 
kn
ow
s p
re
tty
 w
el
l w
he
re
 
he
 w
an
ts
 to
 g
o 
an
d 
ho
w
 h
e 
w
an
ts
 to
 d
o 
it.
” 
(S
6 M
an
uC
o)
 
“T
he
n 
to
 h
el
p 
m
e,
 a
nd
 a
ls
o 
to
 m
ak
e 
su
re
 th
ey
 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 w
ha
t I
 w
as
 d
oi
ng
 b
ut
 I 
to
ok
 it
 a
s a
 h
el
p,
 
th
ey
 im
pl
em
en
te
d 
w
ha
t t
he
y 
ca
lle
d 
a 
B
oa
rd
 st
ra
te
gy
 
de
le
ga
tio
n,
 w
ith
 th
re
e 
B
oa
rd
 D
ire
ct
or
s, 
th
at
 I 
w
ou
ld
 
m
ee
t e
ve
ry
 th
re
e 
w
ee
ks
. [
...
] a
nd
 I 
w
as
 u
pd
at
in
g 
th
em
 
on
 w
ha
t I
 w
as
 d
oi
ng
, a
nd
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
gi
vi
ng
 m
e 
th
ei
r 
fe
ed
ba
ck
. A
nd
 th
en
 in
 N
ov
em
be
r t
he
y 
to
ld
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4 The Role of Substantive Actions in Sensegiving During 
Strategic Change 
Shenghui Ma  
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines top managers’ sensegiving in strategic change. It focuses on how top 
managers’ substantive actions of implementing an intended change contribute to the 
adjustment of interpretive schemes in the organization. Drawing on a longitudinal 
comparative case study of three firms, we find that by creating contexts and resources for 
sensegiving, substantive actions can contribute to scheme change in both direct and indirect 
ways. In a direct way, top managers use substantive actions for sense breaking, sense 
specification, and sense anchoring. In an indirect way, substantive actions influence scheme 
change through the substantive outcomes they produce. Substantive outcomes not only 
reinforce the new schemes but also lead to their adjustments. In general, our findings show a 
pattern of sensegiving as scheme change while taking actions, which is in contrast to the 
typical pattern of scheme change before taking actions described in the literature. Theoretical 
implications of our findings are discussed.  
 
Keywords 
Sensegiving; strategic change; substantive actions; implementation; CEO; top managers 
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4.1 Introduction  
From a cognitive perspective, an organization is constituted by its interpretive system 
(Bartunek, 1984; Daft and Weick, 1984). A fundamental change of the organization requires 
a shift in organizational members’ interpretive schemes or mental models that individuals use 
to interpret and make sense of the situation (Bartunek, 1984; Cornelissen and Werner, 2014; 
Daft and Weick, 1984; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Weick, 
1995). Therefore, a critical role of top managers during strategic change is to make this 
cognitive shift, often through a process of sensegiving that attempts to “influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality” (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991: 442). Since the seminal work of Gioia 
and Chittipeddi (1991), scholars have paid significant attention to the sensegiving of top 
managers as an important aspect of strategic change. These studies provide a rich 
understanding of the symbolic dimension of strategic change, showing that in order to create 
meaning for their intended change, top managers mobilize symbols, metaphors, and 
narratives, challenging existing interpretive schemes and establishing new ones (Bartunek, 
Krim, Necochea, and Humphries, 1999; Corley and Gioia, 2004; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Gioia, Thomas, Clark, and Chittipeddi, 1994; Maitlis and Christianson, 2014; Mantere, 
Schildt, and Sillince, 2012; Sonenshein, 2010).  
 Creating meaning for an intended change requires top managers to tie closely together 
interpretive schemes and actions (Weick 1995: 135). Without the change of organizational 
members’ interpretive schemes, change implementation will be difficult because existing 
schemes can constrain organizational members in taking substantive actions to pursue the 
intended change (Bartunek, 1984); this is a situation in which confusion, uncertainty, 
frustration, and resistance often rise. The literature generally describes a pattern in which top 
managers first strive to adjust the schemes of organizational members and then take 
substantive actions to implement the change (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994). 
In this case, actions of implementation become meaningful to organizational members in 
light of the new schemes. However, in the currently fast-moving business world, 
organizations sometimes have to implement change quickly (Amis, Slack, and Hinings, 
2004), and there is a lack of time to change schemes before taking action. This implies that 
under the time pressure of making strategic change, the pattern of scheme change preceding 
taking action is unlikely to appear; in contrast, scheme change and taking action may happen 
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simultaneously and interact with each other in the implementation process (Bartunek, 1984). 
Thus far, we have little understanding of how substantive actions may shape scheme change 
in sensegiving, largely because most studies focus on the typical pattern described above. 
Although some studies notice the importance of symbolic actions in the process of initiating 
an intended change (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994), there is little attention 
paid to substantive actions in change implementation and the particular mechanisms of how 
they contribute to scheme change.  
 The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to systematically investigate the role of 
substantive actions in top managers’ sensegiving during strategic change. For the purpose of 
this research, substantive action is defined as any significant decision or activity that has a 
direct impact on the modification of existing structures, processes, or practices (Thomas, 
Clark, and Gioia, 1993), which is in contrast to those actions that have only symbolic effect. 
In this paper, we draw on a longitudinal qualitative study of strategic change in three 
companies. In all three cases, substantive actions were taken from the beginning of the 
strategic change, in contrast to the cases examined in many existing studies in which the 
change often began with a long period of initiation without taking substantive actions. The 
cases examined here serve as an ideal context to explore the role of substantive actions. 
Through this in-depth case study, we find that by creating contexts and resources for 
sensegiving, substantive actions can contribute to scheme change in both direct and indirect 
ways. In a direct way, top managers use substantive actions for sense breaking, sense 
specification, and sense anchoring. In an indirect way, substantive actions influence scheme 
change through the substantive outcomes they produce. Substantive outcomes not only 
reinforce the new schemes but also lead to their adjustments.  
 Our findings contribute to the literature by showing the mechanisms of how actions 
contribute to scheme change in top managers’ sensegiving. Existing studies typically focus 
on scheme change before taking actions, through mobilizing symbols, metaphors, and 
narratives (Bartunek et al., 1999; Corley and Gioia, 2004; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia 
et al., 1994; Maitlis and Christianson, 2014; Mantere et al., 2012; Sonenshein, 2010). 
However, the role of actions in sensegiving has been largely neglected. Our findings show 
that by taking substantive actions, top managers create new context and resources for their 
sensegiving. We identify the mechanisms of how substantive actions lead to scheme change 
in both direct and indirect ways. In general, our findings show a pattern of sensegiving as 
scheme change while taking actions, which is in contrast to the typical pattern of scheme 
change before taking actions described in the literature. Our findings suggest that the two 
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aspects of sensegiving, scheme change and action taking, are interwoven during strategic 
change, even though in a particular phase, one might be more prominent than the other. In 
summary, our study contributes to a fuller understanding of top managers’ sensegiving by 
showing additional ways in which schemes and actions can grow closer during strategic 
change.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we review the 
literature on sensegiving in the context of strategic change, noting a gap in the current 
literature. Following that, we describe the methodology of our data collection and analysis. 
Building on our data analysis, we present the findings on how substantive actions contribute 
to scheme change. Then, we discuss the theoretical implications of our findings and 
promising directions for future research.  
4.2 Theoretical Background: Sensegiving in Strategic Change  
Strategic change involves a process of realigning the organization to its environment, 
including major changes in strategic direction and/or changes to key organizational structures 
and processes (Pettigrew, 1992; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997; Van de ven, 1992; Van de 
Ven and Poole, 1995). Because it often adjusts the way in which the organization operates 
and leads to a shift in organizational goals and priorities, strategic change is typically 
accompanied by high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity. In order to gain acceptance for and 
accelerate the desired change, top managers must articulate the need for and the nature of the 
desired change, which often involves adjusting the interpretive schemes of organizational 
members (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). From a cognitive perspective, without changing 
organizational members’ interpretive schemes, strategic change can be difficult to achieve 
(Bartunek, 1984; Daft and Weick, 1984; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991).  
Scholars have investigated various sensegiving strategies through which top managers 
intend to challenge existing interpretive schemes and establish new ones with the goal of 
creating meaning for their desired change. By investigating the early stage of launching a 
change effort in a university, Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) find that “ambiguity-by-design” 
severed as an effective tactic used by the new president to challenge existing interpretive 
schemes. The announcement of a strategic change effort, the use of unfamiliar terms such as 
“strategic planning,” and the imposition of an ambiguous vision infused the organization with 
a high level of ambiguity, uncertainty, and anxiety. The authors show that this ambiguity-by-
design created a meaning void by calling into question the existing schemes and allowed the 
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president to fill the meaning void by suggesting new schemes in line with the desired change. 
In two related studies in the same research context, Gioia and colleagues identify the 
importance of symbolic language, such as visionary image and metaphors, in introducing 
new interpretive schemes (Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Gioia et al., 1994). When making sense 
of the required change, organizational members need to draw on their previous experience 
and understanding. Symbols and metaphors are found particularly useful in disseminating 
new senses because “their inherent ambiguity provides a bridge between the familiar and the 
strange” (Gioia et al., 1994: 365). When mobilized to articulate the nature of the desired 
change, symbols and metaphors can conceal its threatening aspects while revealing its 
difference from the past (Gioia et al., 1994). Given that strategic change is often entangled 
with a change in identity, Gioia and Thomas (1996) suggest that designing a desired future 
image may help facilitate the process of strategic change.  
Taking a narrative perspective, several studies focus on how top managers construct 
particular narratives for meaning construction in strategic change (Dunford and Jones, 2000; 
Sonenshein, 2010). Dunford and Jones (2000) argue that a narrative, by configuring events in 
a temporal manner into a story, gives meaning to events by linking them through theatrical 
threads and anchoring the role of actors in enacting them and influencing final outcomes. In 
each of the three organizations studied, Dunford and Jones (2000) find that with respectively 
inherent schemes, top managers constructed narratives of the change environment and the 
change initiatives. These narratives often drew on the broader discourse in the environment, 
i.e., de-regulation in this study. While Dunford and Jones (2000) emphasize the importance 
of creating a coherent discourse through narratives during strategic change, Sonenshein 
(2010) finds that top managers in the firm he investigated constructed two narratives of the 
change with conflicting meanings: one progressive narrative framing the change as 
significantly different from the past and one stability narrative framing the change as 
insignificantly different. The author explains that, by constructing conflicting narratives, 
“managers hedge their bets by being strategically ambiguous to balance the need to promote 
change with minimizing uncertainty” (Sonenshein, 2010: 503).  
Rather than focusing on the symbolic and discursive resources for sensegiving, 
several studies identify how managers craft and communicate their messages to enhance the 
chance that organizational members will accept and adopt the given sense (Bartunek et al., 
1999; Rouleau and Balogun, 2011). Bartunek et al. (1999) identify that in order to facilitate 
strategic change in a governmental department, the CEO purposefully framed messages 
appealing to the values and norms of organizational members. Rouleau and Balogun (2011) 
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emphasize the role of discursive competence in achieving successful sensegiving. They find 
that for middle managers, the success of their sensegiving depends on their ability to draw on 
the local context and knowledge to set the scene and to perform the conversion. Although 
Rouleau and Balogun (2011) focus on the sensegiving of middle managers, we expect that 
discursive competence should also be important for top managers. 
  Some recent studies focus on the particular mechanisms of sensegiving in strategic 
change: sensebreaking, sense specification, and sensehiding (Mantere et al., 2012; Monin, 
Noorderhaven, Vaara, and Kroon, 2013). Extending the Pratt’s (2000) notion of 
sensebreaking in individual identity, Mantere et al. (2012) and Monin et al. (2013) use the 
term “sensebreaking” to mean “the managerial act of destroying the organizational meanings 
underlying an established interpretive scheme” (Mantere et al., 2012: 174). By studying a 
governmental organization that was planned to merge with parts of its parent organization, 
Mantere et al. (2012) find that in the governmental organization he studied top managers’ 
sensebreaking had a significant effect on organizational members: when the planned merger 
was cancelled before implementation, top managers were not able to restore previous 
interpretive schemes that were discredited by the sensebreaking effort. By studying how the 
norm of justice evolves during a post-merger integration, Monin et al. (2013) find that 
sensebreaking involves questioning existing schemes not only by mobilizing discourses but 
also by enacting rule-breaking decisions and actions. In this study, the authors find that top 
managers were also engaged in sense specification and sensehiding. Sense specification 
refers to giving specific sense to the new scheme, a new norm of justice in this study, through 
different forms “ranging from more abstract coining of principles to exemplary decisions and 
actions, symbolization, and quantification” (Monin et al., 2013: 262). Sensehiding refers to 
“silencing alternative discourses or marginalizing particular voices,” often through 
deliberately selecting some vocabularies over others in communication.  
In summary, existing studies identify the importance of top managers’ sensegiving in 
facilitating strategic change and generate valuable insights on how it is conducted in 
organizations. However, the role of substantive actions in sensegiving as contributing to 
scheme change has largely been neglected. By substantive actions, we refer to any significant 
decision or activity that implements the desired change with a substantive impact on the 
modification of existing structures, processes, or practices (Thomas et al., 1993). Existing 
studies typically describe a picture in which top managers first strive to change interpretive 
schemes before taking substantive actions, a process often referred to as the stage of initiating 
or preparing the change (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Gioia et al., 
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1994; Mantere et al., 2012). Although these studies sometimes touch on how actions 
influence sensegiving, the notion of actions is often used to broadly refer to symbolic 
decisions or activities (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994), in contrast to 
substatnive actions that have direct effect on implementating the chagne. The reason of 
negelcting the role of substantive actions may be due to fact that most of these studies focus 
on the initiation stateg of strategic change, duirng which substantive actions often do not 
appear. While some recent studies look at top managers’ sensegiving when implementing 
change, most of them still focus on the discursive resources of image, metaphors, and 
narratives and the discursive competence of mobilizing them (Dunford and Jones, 2000; 
Monin et al., 2013; Sonenshein, 2010). As a result, the particular role of actions in 
contributing to scheme change has not yet been carefully and systematically analyzed.  
The lack of understanding of how substantive actions contribute to sensegiving in 
strategic change is inappropriate for at least three reasons. First, changing schemes before 
taking action is sometimes not possible when the organization is under pressure to implement 
the change, especially in business organizations that face a fast-changing environment (Amis 
et al., 2004). In this context, top managers may have to start taking substantive actions before 
they have time to establish new schemes, therefore action taking and scheme change will 
likely interact with each other during change implementation. Second, several studies suggest 
that in the stage of change implementation, the new schemes that were previously established 
in the stage of change initiation can break down, as organizational members see top 
managers’ actions and their outcomes as inconsistent with these new schemes (Denis, 
Langley, and Cazale, 1996). Maintaining a coherent discourse around the flux of actions 
during change implementation can be challenging (Dunford and Jones, 2000). Therefore, it 
seems necessary to examine how top managers take into account various actions in 
sensegiving in relation to new schemes they want to establish or maintain during change 
implementation. Third, the study by Monin et al. (2013) offers some indications of the face 
that substantive actions may play particular roles in sensegiving. Even though the authors do 
not focus on the role of substantive actions, their data shows that substantive actions are 
particularly useful in creating sensegiving opportunities because they “broke previously 
established rules”; for example, integrating two sales offices in the context of post-merger 
integration destroys the existing schemes of how to operate sales (Monin et al., 2013: 277). 
However, existing studies have not paid enough attention to the particular roles of substantive 
actions in sensegiving, but rather typically understand their symbolic role as that of symbolic 
language (Gioia et al., 1994).  
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To address the gaps in the existing literature, our study sets out to systematically 
examine the role of substantive actions in top managers’ sensegiving during strategic change. 
For this purpose, we draw on three firms that went through strategic change recently.  
4.3 Methods 
This research is explorative in nature and is intended more closely for theory building than 
for theory testing (Eisenhardt, 1989). A longitudinal multiple-case study is adopted for three 
reasons. First, in-depth case studies seem useful for exploring the key concepts and 
mechanisms of how substantive actions contribute to sensegiving in strategic change that are 
not well documented in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 2002; Strauss and Corbin, 
1998; Yin, 1994). Second, in order to understand how new schemes are established or 
modified over time, a longitudinal approach is necessary in order to be able to capture the 
temporal patterns and to account for the precedence of events (Langley, 1999; Van de ven, 
1992). This longitudinal approach is also consistent with previous research on sensegiving 
activities (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Maitlis and Lawrence, 
2007). Third, multiple cases allow for a replication logic that can generate a rich theoretical 
framework and simultaneously improve the generalizability of the findings (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994). The comparative design is rare in current sensegiving studies 
and can allow us to identify and contrast different sensegiving patterns (Maitlis and 
Lawrence, 2007).    
 Because this research is aimed at theory building, three firms were selected by 
theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994). The 
literature suggests that an ideal context for studying strategic change and sensegiving is in the 
context of new CEOs taking charge (Denis et al., 1996; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et 
al., 1994), therefore we looked for firms that appointed a new CEO recently. We started our 
study in the firm AgriCo, as we got to know that the new CEO was under pressure to take 
immediate actions and was not left much time to accomplish any change to the existing 
schemes first. In such a situation AgriCo served as an extreme case in which substantive 
actions and their influence on sensegiving could be observed (Yin, 1994). In contrast to the 
typical pattern described in the literature (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994), in 
this case, we found that top managers tried to establish new schemes while implementing 
change rather than before implementing change. In order to explain the mechanisms of how 
substantive actions contribute to sensegiving, as observed in the case of AgriCo, we followed 
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the logic of theoretical sampling to select other cases for comparison. As suggested by 
Eisenhardt (1989: 545), “the goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases which are likely 
to replicate or extend the emergent theory.” Therefore, we followed eight other firms that 
also had appointed a new CEO and attempted to identify cases in which similar patterns of 
strategic change and sensegiving take place as in AgriCo. Of these, two firms were selected 
for comparison because in each, as similarly in AgriCo, the new CEO started implementing a 
strategic change shortly after taking office and the effort of sensegiving was significant 
during the change implementation. As a result, our final sample included three firms. Table 6 
provides an overview of the characteristics of these firms. In contrast to a single case study, 
comparing different cases is likely to generate more comprehensive insights into how actions 
affect the ways in which sensegiving is conducted and therefore to enrich our theorization 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Furthermore, as shown in Table 6, the three firms vary in 
terms of industry, status as a whole corporation or subsidiary, scope of operation, age, annual 
revenue, and number of employees. The replication of cases with these variations is expected 
to improve the robustness and generalizability of our findings (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007; Yin, 1994).  
 
Table 6: Characteristics of three cases 
 Industry  Status of  
the firm 
Scope of  
operation 
Age  
(years) 
Revenue  
(USD, 
million) 
Number of 
employees 
AgriCo Agriculture Corporate Multinational 10-50 >10,000  10,000-
100,000 
ManuCo Manufacturing Corporate Multinational 50-100 >10,000  10,000-
100,000 
ServiCo Service Subsidiary  National 50-100 100-1,000  1000-10,000 
Note: The age, revenue, and number of employees are indicated in range to preserve anonymity of the firms. 
 
4.3.1 Data Collection  
In each case, we began our data collection following the arrival of the new CEO and tracked 
the development of the strategic change process. The most intense period of data collection 
covers the first 24 months of the strategic change process, which is followed by collecting 
public data and informal interviews to track further developments. As summarized in Table 7, 
our data have several sources: 1) interviews with the CEO, top managers, and other 
informants, 2) internal and external documents, and 3) informal interviews, observations, and 
office tours. Interviews and documents constituted our main data sources, as in many other 
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sensegiving studies (Dunford and Jones, 2000; Monin et al., 2013; Sonenshein, 2010). 
Although an ideal approach of collecting rich data about sensegiving could be ethnographic 
study (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007), it would 
be difficult in this research as the offices and activities of our case companies are largely 
geographically distributed. However, we tried to mitigate this by collecting data from various 
sources and the triangulation of sources can enhance the accuracy and richness of the 
information we collected and, therefore, of the theory developed (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). Because AgriCo served as the core case of our study and the two other cases were 
selected for the purpose of comparison, the data collected from them was less rich than that 
from AgriCo. However, the data collected from them was comprehensive enough to allow us 
to compare them with AgriCo.  
 
Table 7: Summary of data sources 
   Firm  
Data Source AgriCo ManuCo ServiCo 
Interviews    
 CEO 9 5 7 
 Other top managers 11 2 6 
 Middle managers  25 10 1 
 Total (76) 45 17 14 
Documents (pages)    
 Internal minutes & reports 495 263 15 
 Public press 268 72 36 
 Total 763 335 51 
Other sources    
 Informal interviews 22 10 15 
 Meetings observed 4 0 0 
 Office tours 2 1 1 
 
 
Interviews constitute the first source of our data. In total, we have collected 76 
interviews with the CEO and other organizational members in the three firms. Interviews are 
particularly useful in terms of identifying key actions of the desired change, the sensegiving 
activities of top managers, reactions of lower-level managers, and key events and 
developments in the change process. More importantly, interviews allow us to examine the 
intentions of top managers in sensegiving and the understanding of lower-level managers. 
Because in each case, the change was initiated and driven mainly by the new CEO, we focus 
particularly on the CEO’s sensegiving activities. In the first interviews, we tried to 
  127 
retrospectively capture the background of the strategic change and what the new CEO had 
done to date. Following that, our interviews with the CEOs generally took place on a regular 
basis to ensure that we could closely track the strategic change process (Van de ven, 1992). 
On average, seven interviews were conducted with each CEO during the data collection 
period. In addition to interviewing the CEOs, we also interviewed other organizational 
members to gain a comprehensive picture of the development in each case and to mitigate the 
bias with interviewing the CEO as a single informant (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 
1994). Other top managers were selected as informants, especially those who were involved 
in driving the change process and engaged in sensegiving to facilitate the change. In addition, 
we interviewed middle managers who were directly influenced by the strategic change to 
track their reactions to top managers’ actions and sensegiving. Although our focus was on the 
sensegiving of top managers, it is important to observe how the reactions of middle managers 
influence the further sensegiving of top managers (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). 
Given the explorative nature of this research, semi-structured, open-ended interviews 
were conducted with a set of main themes about the background of the strategic change, 
important decisions and major actions related to the desired change, the activities that top 
managers executed in facilitating the change, lower managers’ understanding and reactions to 
the change, and the development of the change process over time. In interviews with the CEO 
and top managers, we particularly focused on their substantive actions of implementing the 
change, their effort to create meaning for the change at stake, and the problems they 
encountered and how they dealt with them. In interviews with lower-level managers, we paid 
particular attention to their understanding and reactions during the change process. Several 
techniques were used to mitigate the informant bias in interviews. First, our interviews 
followed the real-time development of the organization and thus minimized the recall bias 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990). Second, as we interviewed the CEOs several times and interviewed 
many different members of each firm, we had the opportunity to crosscheck uncertain points. 
Third, in order to limit information bias, we began each interview by identifying the timeline 
of actions, issues, and events. This subsequently allowed us to ask questions following the 
timeline with the identified facts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Huber, 1985; Miller, Cardinal, and Glick, 
1997). The interviews lasted approximately 60-90 minutes each and were audiotaped. The 
taped interviews were sent to a professional firm for transcription and then analyzed to guide 
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the follow-up interviews. In total, the 76 interviews we conducted resulted in a transcript of 
more than 1,520 single-spaced pages6.  
The second data source includes archival data collected internally from the firm and 
externally from public sources. Internal documents included executive meeting agendas and 
minutes, CEOs’ and other top managers’ speeches in important meetings, internal reports, 
and internal communication. These documents provide useful insights into how the change 
and related actions were framed and communicated in the organization because for reasons of 
clarity, top managers often have to rely on texts or formal channels to explain strategies to 
various stakeholders (Paroutis, Mckeown, and Collinson, 2013). In addition, these documents 
were particularly helpful to establish an accurate timeline of key changes, decisions, events, 
and facts during the change process. They were also used to triangulate with the information 
obtained from interviews.!External archives include annual reports, industry analyst reports, 
the firm’s news releases, the CEO’s interviews given to the media, and any media news 
related to the changes during our data collection period. The external documents provided us 
with additional information and perspectives regarding particular changes and developments 
in the organization and how they were communicated to external stakeholders, which were 
helpful for prompting questions in the interviews. 
In addition to formal interviews and documents, whenever possible, we also 
conducted informal interviews, meeting observations, and office tours in each firm. We 
conducted many informal interviews during and after the intense period of data collection. 
The informal interviews were often short, varying from five to 30 minutes, taking place in 
corridors, in cars, at social events, or via telephone calls. They were useful to verify the 
information from formal interviews or to gain more information regarding certain issues. In 
AgriCo, we joined four major management meetings that involved managers at different 
levels and directly focused on the strategic change issues. In addition, during data collection, 
we conducted office tours in each firm in order to understand the atmosphere of the 
workplace, such as the setup of the office rooms and departments. The data collected from 
these additional sources have proven helpful in complementing our main data sources in 
analysis. 
                                                
6 All interviews in AgriCo were conducted and analyzed in Chinese; the quote was translated into English by 
the author when presented in the paper. All the rest of the interviews were conducted in English.  
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4.3.2 Data Analysis  
We adopted an inductive approach to analyzing the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In the 
first stage, we composed a rich description of each case by synthesizing the information on 
the firm from multiple sources (Eisenhardt, 1989). These case descriptions were 25-30 
single-spaced pages in length each. Each began with the background on the strategic change 
and followed a chronological order describing key events, actions and decisions, and 
developments. It also identified the names of individuals, departments, and other facts that 
seemed necessary for further analysis. As guided by our research question, when composing 
the case description, we paid particular attention to 1) each action or decision that had a 
significant impact on how the firm operated, 2) the ways of communicating the change in 
general and each action in particular, 3) the reactions to the change and each major action, 
and 4) any breakdowns and their resolutions. As a result, we were able to create a robust 
timeline of the development of the strategic change process. Once the case descriptions were 
created, as guided by the research question, we began looking for the major actions and 
schemes in each case. Table 8 provides an overview of the main actions and schemes 
identified in each case. In all of the three cases, the strategic change was announced with 
concrete initiatives or targets and actions were taken to implement the change immediately or 
shortly after its announcement; top managers took account of these actions to a large extent in 
their sensegiving.  
In the second stage, we coded the original data in order to identify the role of 
substantive actions in top managers’ sensegiving: how do they contribute to the change in 
interpretative schemes? NVivo for Mac was mobilized for open coding. On the basis of the 
coding, we created an excel sheet of all the coded entries to look for similarities between 
codes within and across cases. The codes were then grouped into interpretive clusters 
according to their similarities and differences: where similar, codes were clustered together 
under a common interpretive umbrella, which formed the first-order categories (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). By identifying the links between these categories, we generated second-
order themes in which the former can be seen as the dimensions of the latter (Gioia, Price, 
Hamilton, and Thomas, 2010). For example, one of themes generated from this process is 
sense anchoring, which includes two categories: the publicity of substantive actions creating 
a sense of irreversibility and sequences of actions creating confidence in new schemes. In this 
process, we followed a replication logic to check all the cases for the occurrence of each 
theme and category (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Figure 4 provides an overview of the 
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theoretical categories and themes generated from this process. In addition, Appendix provides 
exemplary quotes and evidence for each mechanism over the three cases. 
In the last stage of the analysis, we developed a model by linking different theoretical 
themes to explain the patterns we observed. This involved a process of iteration between data 
and theory to make sure the process model can explain the pattern in each single case. We 
will now turn to presenting our findings. We begin with the description of our empirically 
generated model, which will serve as a structure for elaborating on the details of our findings.  
 
Table 8: Strategic change and related actions and schemes in the three cases 
 AgriCo ManuCo ServiCo 
Nature of the 
change 
Restructuring business 
units; Redefining profit 
centers 
Restructuring and cost 
reduction;  
Centralizing corporate 
functions 
Growth strategy 
transforming the way of 
operating different 
divisions  
Major actions Announcing the decision 
of change; 
Changing TMT; 
Redefining the business 
units; 
Implementing various 
projects;  
Creating new functional 
departments; 
Closing some plants; 
Resetting incentive plans; 
Redefining profit centers; 
Creating new platforms 
for internal ventures 
Announcing the decision 
of change; 
Changing TMT; 
Setting up project office; 
Implementing various 
projects; 
Restructuring and 
redefining regions;  
Changing the budgeting 
process;  
Downsizing the 
corporation; 
Changing the functions 
of the corporation; 
Resetting incentive plans 
Announcing the decision 
of change; 
Changing TMT; 
Implementing the 11 
initiatives defined in 
the new strategy; 
Changing the way of 
collaborating with the 
parent firm; 
Changing the budgeting 
process;  
Redefining the new 
strategy 
 
Schemes at the 
beginning 
Scale as a competitive 
advantage;  
Growth 
 
Growth as a priority; 
Business as a cycle; 
Corporate role as 
supporting 
Catching up as a 
generalist;   
 Growth 
Schemes at the 
end 
Two ends as strategic: 
consumers and farms; 
Regional value chain as a 
key to success; 
Growth and profit 
Profitability as a priority; 
Profitability overall; 
Corporate role as 
supervising and 
controlling 
Growth in two particular 
areas as key to success; 
Growth and profit 
!!!
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Figure 4: Data structure of sensegiving mechanisms  
 
4.4 Sensegiving Mechanisms: How Substantive Actions Contribute to 
Scheme Change 
Figure 5 shows the empirically generated model that links the different themes identified 
from the data analysis. In all the three cases of AgriCo, ManuCo, and ServiCo, the new CEOs 
began the change process shortly after taking charge and acted to implement the change. The 
announcement of the change decision and the subsequent actions of implementation 
generated a high level of uncertainty and ambiguity in the organization. For example, in 
AgriCo, the decision to restructure business units was announced with managers of each new 
business unit appointed. People were completely surprised and confused by the prompt 
change. In order to facilitate the change process, top managers in all cases spent significant 
effort creating meaning for the change at stake.  
 
 
Adapting new schemes to 
negative outcomes 
Adjusting new schemes as learning from negative outcomes 
Adjusting new schemes in order to push adapted actions 
Reinforcing by 
substantive outcomes 
Reinforcing by comparing outcomes of different actors/units 
Reinforcing by linking positive outcomes to the implementation 
Sense specification 
Specific actions contextualizing schemes underlying the change 
Specific actions illustrating schemes underlying the change 
Sense anchoring 
Publicity of actions creating a sense of irreversibility 
Sequences of actions creating confidence to new schemes 
Sense breaking Actions disrupting/destroying existing ways of acting and thinking 
Second-order Themes First-order Categories 
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Figure 5: A model of the role of substantive actions in sensegiving 
 
 
We found that the actions of implementation played important roles in top managers’ 
sensegiving, which aimed at changing the interpretive schemes of organizational members. In 
a direct way, actions contributed to scheme change by sense breaking, sense specification, 
and sense anchoring. Actions broke the sense generated according to existing schemes, as 
they disturbed the existing way of acting and thinking. Actions were used to specify what the 
change and its associated new schemes meant by contextualizing and illustrating them in the 
organization. Actions were also mobilized to anchor the understanding of organizational 
remembers to the new schemes by generating a sense of irreversibility and/or confidence in 
the new schemes. In an indirect way, we found that actions influence scheme change through 
substantive outcomes. Actions of implementation generated substantive outcomes, such as 
financial performance and new structures. These outcomes were used by top managers in 
sensegiving to reinforce the new schemes. In addition, we found that negative outcomes 
could lead to the adjustment of new schemes. On the one hand, negative outcomes lead to the 
change to top managers’ schemes as a result of learning and therefore to the schemes they 
wanted to establish in the organization. On the other hand, negative outcomes lead to the 
immediate adaption of actions, which in turn required top managers to adjust the initial 
schemes in order to push the newly adapted actions. 
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 In the following, we will present these our detailed findings following the logic of the 
theoretical model shown in Figure 5. We won’t focus on two particular mechanisms, because 
they are not directly related to our research question. One of them is how substantive actions 
lead to substantive outcomes and the other is how schemes prim or guide substantive actions. 
However, we added them in the model because that way the model shows a more 
comprehensive picture of how schemes and actions are interrelated.  
4.4.1 The Direct Role of Substantive Actions in Changing Schemes 
Sense breaking 
The role of actions in sense breaking refers to a situation in which a decision or an activity of 
change implementation destroyed the existing way of acting and thinking, therefore creating 
a meaning void in the organization. By forcing organizational members to reexamine and 
question the existing schemes, sense breaking was found helpful for creating sensegiving 
opportunities for top managers. In AgriCo, for example, when announcing the decision of 
restructuring business units, the decision was effective immediately, with new business units 
being defined and their heads appointed. This action changed the form of collaboration 
within the organization. The scale of change and its immediate implementation surprised 
lower-level managers. A high level of anxiety and stress arose, as they could not operate in 
the old way but were uncertain about how to work in the new structure. As a result, people 
were forced to reexamine their ways of thinking and acting. A vice head of a new business 
unit explained the impact of the decision on the existing scheme as follows: “[In our history, 
we] never had a change of this scope and this speed. This was actually crashing the 
traditional mentality of AgriCo.” A head of a large previous unit expressed that he and 
colleagues did not know how to operate after the change and had to figure out ways of 
collaborating with other units:  
How can we develop a new framework of collaboration that can make the new structure 
work? […] I spent a long time with my colleagues discussing and figuring that out. …When 
implementing the change, there were lots of things that had to be adjusted. For example, the 
sales manager was pissed off and unwilling to implement the changes because it is too 
complicated [with the new structure]. […] The implementation of every change would 
require adjusting the habits of people. 
 
 As a result of destroying the existing meaning system, sense breaking created 
opportunities for top managers to promote new schemes that could provide meaning to 
change. As observed, after each major action, top managers engaged in intense 
communication to explain the purpose and urgency of the change. This often involved 
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questioning the existing scheme and promoting new schemes. For example, in AgriCo, after 
announcing the new structure, top managers organized many workshops and meetings in 
order to clarify their intentions. The CEO acknowledged the confusion and uncertainty 
people experienced and explained the purpose in an internal meeting: 
In the last few days, because of the structural change, I have received feedback from many 
colleagues via phone calls, emails, and other sources. I think that your confusion, doubt, 
and stress are natural reactions to the change. This is good because that shows that you are 
willing to change but at the same time also have reflections. In order to clarify the purpose 
of the change, I want to discuss with you the whole logic and thinking of the change. I hope 
this will be helpful for your understanding. I will discuss the purposes and the main points 
of the change. 
 
By reacting to the confusion caused by the decision, the CEO took the opportunity to draw on 
new schemes to create meaning for the intended change.  
 
Sense specification 
Sense specification refers to the situation that actions were mobilized to contextualize and 
illustrate the desired change and its underlying schemes. When the general decision or target 
of change was announced, organizational members were often confused by what it really 
meant. We found that top managers took further actions to illustrate what it meant. For 
example, in ManuCo, when the CEO announced the change program with an ambitious 
concrete target of improving profitability, people did not clearly understand what that meant 
for the organization. Shortly after the announcement, the CEO adjusted the top management 
team (TMT) and redefined business regions to align the organization to the target, which 
illustrated what the change meant in terms of organizational adaptation to it. As the CEO 
explained, 
 But as we said the [change program], then they were wondering what it was, then they 
could see the organization as an adaptation of the [the change program].... So we have a 
communication line we then follow, and then people start to understand what it is. […] I 
take it [i.e., the TMT change]. So they start to understand what we are doing. 
  
Similarly in AgriCo and ServiCo, top managers emphasized the importance of actions in 
clarifying the change ambition. In ServiCo, for example, one important change was to 
establish local autonomy of operation in relation to the parent firm. The CEO explained by 
the implementation of eleven initiatives the “added benefit of making […] autonomy mean 
something.”  
In addition to illustrating the vision of the change, top managers used actions to show 
how the general target could be contextualized in the organization in terms of achieving it in 
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particular ways and not in others. For example, in ManuCo, in order to implement the change 
program, the CEO established a project office at the corporate level that steered the progress 
of implementation in the operational subsidiaries. This changed the corporate function from 
supporting to controlling and clarified how the goal of the change could be achieved. An 
executive member explained the centralized approach of implementing the change, which 
contrasted with the traditional approach in the firm, as follows: 
“[T]his is a kind of a main change in this company. In the former time, it was about, let's 
say it was [executive members] developing ideas and programs. But it was in the so-called 
entrepreneurial responsibility of the single [executive] member to implement this vision in 
his area together with his people in their own way. […] This is more the change of the 
management style… There are those staff organization (i.e., the project office), making sure 
hopefully that all these initiatives will be implemented on time.! And it's not only […] the 
responsibility of the single [executive] member to make sure that this will be done in his 
area.” 
 
Therefore, as shown the examples above, taking actions can specify what the new 
scheme underlying the change exactly means and specify how it should be contextualized in 
the organization in particular ways.  
 
Sense anchoring 
Sense anchoring refers to the situation in which top managers mobilized actions to commit 
the organization to the new schemes they tried to establish. First, top mangers used the 
publicity of actions to generate a sense of irreversibility. For example, in ManuCo, the CEO 
announced the change program to the media immediately after announcing it internally to the 
organization. The announcement to external audiences created expectations that organization 
would deliver the outcomes, therefore committing the organization to the change. As a result 
of sensing the irreversibility of public actions, organizational members had to adapt their 
schemes to the new reality. The manager of the project office explained this situation as 
follows:  
He [the CEO] created the burning platform, which is externally communicating what we 
want to achieve. This is way hotter than if you just do it internally. This is committing the 
company. […] It was announced and announced publicly. So you don't go back and say, 
ooh, I don't like this or that. You take what's there and then you shape around it and then 
make it happen. 
 
The communication manager explained that as the target was announced publicly, the 
financial community expected the organization to fulfill it within the timeframe announced. 
He explained,  
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I think the financial community, I mean the big thing for [the CEO] is really to push the 
[change program] through the organization because if this does not go to the ground, then 
you will not have the results. So that’s from an internal point of view very important...On 
the other hand, for the external part, it’s important that at least we fulfill, step by step, [the 
target]. 
 
Similarly, the structural change in AgriCo was also announced publicly. In ServiCo, the 
CEO organized workshops to disseminate the growth strategy involving all the organizational 
members. The publicity of such a bold decision created a sense that the change is irreversible 
and therefore helpful for tying the understanding of organizational members to the new 
reality.  
The second way of sense anchoring is using the sequence of actions as consistent with 
new schemes in order to build organizational members’ confidence in these schemes. We 
found that top managers took sequences of bold actions and framed them consistently with 
steps of the change program to show that the change is ongoing and becoming a fact. For 
example, in internal communication in AgriCo, the CEO often recalled the recent actions to 
show the progress of change. As one instance, the CEO explained in an internal meeting how 
different actions were linked to the new scheme of competitive capability: 
We need to focus on competitive capability in specific markets, not the general scale. 
Therefore, we carried a series of changes: the restructuring of business units, the 
adjustments of four regions, redefining profit centers, increasing the investment in markets 
abroad, and today, the change in the executive team.  
 
By taking bold decisions and actions that were communicated as consistent steps of the 
change program, top managers create a reality that the change is becoming a fact.  
4.4.2 The Indirect Role of Substantive Actions in Changing Schemes  
In AgriCo, ManuCo, and ServiCo, the actions taken by top managers generated substantive 
outcomes during the change process. The first type of outcome is performance, both financial 
and operational, such as market share, quality improvement, etc. The second type of outcome 
includes new structures and practices set up or developed during change implementation. We 
found that these substantive outcomes played important roles in top managers’ sensegiving.  
 
Reinforcing new schemes by substantive outcomes 
During change implementation, early success and positive outcomes were used to rationalize 
the change. Some early worries and concerns were recalled and justified by showing the 
intermediate success. In this way, top managers reinforced the new schemes that underlined 
the change. For example, in ManuCo, the CEO explained that he linked the visible outcomes 
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to the change in his year-end message: “I insisted on just recalling; okay, we see the first 
visible effect and recalling why we do what we do.” The CEO even intended to gain early 
success that could demonstrate a visible effect of the change. A top manager explained this 
intention, “the ambition was to take, to earn the low-hanging fruits as fast as possible but 
then to implement in the budget process clear targets and clear actions.” Similarly, in 
AgriCo, the CEO recalled the early reactions to the change and used positive outcomes to 
justify the change in an internal meeting: 
When we announced the change in July, how many people told me: “it is too fast,” “it will 
fail,” “there will be lots of problems,” “it will be a disaster.” But it is with our colleagues 
we have solved all the problems, collaborated with each, and made the transformation. 
[…]We regain our competitive strengths quickly. […] Within two months, we achieved a 
new position and success in the market. All this is because you have believed in the idea of 
focusing on developing and value creation in local markets. 
 
We also found that as different business units and regions might have produced different 
outcomes, top managers drew on the difference to criticize the ones with negative outcomes 
as having not progressed with the change. In AgriCo, for example, in an internal meeting, the 
CEO compared different business units in terms of their progress in the change process and 
criticized the underperforming ones as not implementing the change enough:  
To implement the change, we have a lot of work to do. However, some of you did and some 
did not. We can see that those who did the implementation have achieved good 
performance. Let’s look at the units that implemented the best, such as [Unit J], which made 
radical changes and transformation. Their effort has earned them excellent results. […] 
However, I still see that many subsidiary firms are not willing to change and instead keep 
the traditional way of thinking in operation. As a result, they are not able to achieve good 
performance.  

Therefore, by attributing positive outcomes to the implantation of the change and 
negative outcomes to insufficient implementation, top managers tried to reinforce the new 
schemes underlying the change as rational   
 
Adapting new schemes and actions to negative outcomes 
We found that negative outcomes can lead to the adaption of actions and sometimes also the 
adjustment of the new schemes. In all three cases of AgriCo, ManuCo, and ServiCo, top 
managers adjusted their courses of action during the change implementation. This was 
because top managers were also experimenting with various ideas and initiatives through 
trail-and-error. For example, in AgriCo, the CEO communicated to the organization several 
times that “act fast and don’t worry about making mistakes. […] We can always adjust, but if 
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you don’t act, you would never know where things can go wrong.” As a result of the 
declining financial performance and quality drop in a major product, the CEO made a major 
adjustment to the new structure they implemented six months ago. In ManuCo and ServiCo, 
some initiatives were dropped, as they did not produce positive outcomes. In order to push 
the newly adapted actions, top managers often needed to refine or adjust the initial new 
schemes to make the those actions meaningful. For example, in AgriCo, the CEO needed to 
react immediately to the quality drop and declining performance of one unit after 
restructuring several business units and had to take another decision to re-separate two large 
units that were joined half a year ago. In order to facilitate this adapted action, top managers 
adjusted the new schemes by emphasizing local accountability as a central logic for deciding 
on designing organizational structures.   
 As emerged from our data analysis, we also found that significant negative outcomes 
sometimes led to the adjustment of new schemes directly because top managers learned that 
certain ideas wouldn’t work. For example, in ServiCo, at the beginning, the CEO announced 
a vision of becoming a leader in one of the services instead of catching up with the 
generalists in the market. As the CEO explained, “we wanted to sort of set out an ambition 
for leadership, rather than one of just catching up. And our ambition for leadership was we 
want to become the number one [service A] firm in [the country].” However, after a year, the 
firm was not able to grow quickly enough by focusing only on service A. As a reaction, the 
top management changed the vision to focus on two services, A and B. The CEO explained 
this change as follows: 
[W]e got agreement that we would – it is about [becoming one of the main competitors], not 
that we're going to have a big [Service A] business with a very small [Service B] firm, we 
don’t think that's the right thing. So they've agreed to a strategy, they've agreed to focus on 
both of these. 
 
As a result of adjusting the new schemes, new initiatives were guided by the adjusted 
schemes. In the case of ServiCo, new initiatives to strengthen Service B, such as merging a 
smaller firm, were developed and implemented.  
 As shown in Figure 5, the new schemes and their adjusted versions primed and guided 
the actions of change and newly established activities in the organization. We found that top 
managers were mindful of taking actions that were consistent with the schemes they wanted 
to establish. However, as this link is not the focus of this paper and is well established in the 
literature (Weber and Glynn, 2006), we do not focus on explaining it here.   
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
4.5.1 Mechanisms of Substantive Actions Contributing to Scheme Change  
In this paper, we set out to examine the role of substantive actions in sensegiving during 
strategic change, in terms of how they contribute to the adjustment of interpretive schemes in 
the organization. We find that that by creating contexts and resources for sensegiving, 
substantive actions can contribute to scheme change through two types of mechanisms. The 
first type of mechanism includes sense breaking, sense specification, and sense anchoring, 
which contribute to scheme change in a direct way. Substantive actions can disturb and 
destroy the existing way of thinking and acting, thereby forcing organizational members to 
reexamine their interpretative schemes. As substantive actions often contradict the existing 
schemes, organizational members need new schemes to make sense of organizational reality. 
As a result, breaking the existing sense substantive actions can create a meaning void that 
provides the opportunity for top managers to promote new schemes, according to which the 
strategic change is considered meaningful. This role of substantive actions in sense breaking 
is also indicated by Monin et al. (2013) in their study of the norm of justice in the post-
merger integration process. Although top managers can break the sense of organizational 
members only by discourse (Mantere et al., 2012), our finding suggests that actions are more 
effective, because they directly disturb the existing way of acting and thinking (Monin et al., 
2013). For example, as found in the study by Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), althought the new 
president tried to question the existing scheme by discussing different scenarios and directing 
attention to the desired future image, it was difficult to convince organizational members to 
give up their previously established conceptualization of organizational reality.  
Substantive actions also contribute to scheme change by sense specification: 
illustrating and contextualizing what the change and the new schemes underlying it mean. 
Although the study of Monin et al. (2013) also identifies the concept of sense specification in 
general, it has not focused on the particular role of substantive actions. We find that in the 
context infused with a high level of uncertainty and ambiguity, substantive actions can be 
particularly useful in specifying what the new schemes mean or do not mean because they are 
more concrete and salient than pure discourses.   
Moreover, actions can be useful for anchoring organizational members’ 
understanding of the new schemes underlying the intended change (i.e., sense anchoring). By 
making bold actions public, top managers can commit the organization to the change because 
the publicity helps generate a sense of the irreversibility of the change. As organizational 
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members sense that the change is unlikely to be reversed, they will be more open to accept 
new schemes and stick to them. In addition, sense anchoring also involves taking a sequence 
of actions and framing them as consistent with the new schemes. This way, top managers are 
more likely to be able to build confidence in the new schemes, because organizational 
members can see what happens in the organization become closely tied to the new schemes. 
Sense anchoring has not been identified in the existing literature and thus adds to our 
understanding of sensegiving.  
 The second type of mechanism includes the indirect ways in which actions contribute 
to scheme change. We find that actions lead to substantive outcomes, such as financial and 
operational performance, which can influence scheme change in sensegiving. Top managers 
can use substantive outcomes to reinforce the new schemes by attributing positive outcomes 
to the change implementation and negative outcomes to insufficient implementation. 
Moreover, significant negative outcomes can also lead to the adjustment of new schemes. 
This finding corresponds to the study by Denis et al. (1996) who shows that during change 
implementation, top managers face the challenge to account for negative outcomes (Denis et 
al., 1996). Our study shows that they sometimes have to change their initial plan. And in 
order to facilitate and give meaning to the adjusted courses of actions, they may have to 
adjust the schemes they promoted at the beginning. After all, top managers may actively 
learn by trail-and-error in strategic change. They can refine and adjust their own 
understanding and therefore the schemes they want to establish.  
In summary, our findings contribute to the understanding of how actions generate 
contexts and resources that can be used by top managers for sensegiving. Our findings of the 
significant role of actions in sensegiving correspond to Weick’s (1995) proposition that 
“action produced the controls, orderliness, and structure, all of which improve sensemaking, 
and not the reverse” (p. 168).  
4.5.2 Evolution of New Schemes During Strategic Change  
This study contributes to our understanding of the temporal evolution of interpretive schemes 
during strategic change in two ways. First, we show that top managers sometimes must 
establish new schemes while taking substantive actions, which is in contrast to the prominent 
pattern found by many existing studies. The literature often describes that the sensegiving of 
top managers takes place in the early stage of initiating strategic change, in which top 
managers question the existing schemes and establish new ones before change 
implementation (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Gioia et al., 1994; 
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Mantere et al., 2012). These studies show a pattern of scheme change before taking 
substantive action. Therefore, by drawing on newly established schemes, organizational 
members can see the change as meaningful and support the actions of implementation. For 
example, in the study by Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), top managers started taking 
substantive actions, such as establishing a strategic planning team, only after a whole year of 
initiating the change. However, in the three cases studied here, there did not exist a long 
phase of initiating and preparing for the desired change; instead, top managers took actions to 
implement the change immediately or shortly after announcing the decision. Especially in the 
cases of AgriCo and ManuCo, the change was prompt and implemented immediately after its 
announcement. In such cases, we find that top managers engage in sensegiving while taking 
actions to implement the change; this pattern is very different from the one described above. 
Our findings on the role of substantive actions in contributing to scheme change seem 
particularly relevant for understanding the sensegiving dynamics when top mangers are under 
time pressure to implement strategic change.  
 Second, our study shows that the new schemes that top managers established or tried 
to establish at the early stage of strategic change are subject to further adjustments. We find 
that the new schemes sometimes have to be adjusted to adapt to substantive outcomes during 
change implementation. This finding suggests that to fully understand top managers’ role in 
strategic change, it is necessary to examine top managers’ sensegiving in change 
implementation (Monin et al., 2013), rather than only in the planning or initiating phase of 
strategic change, which has been the focus of previous studies (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Gioia et al., 1994; Mantere et al., 2012). Although some studies 
investigate sensegiving dynamics in strategic change implementation, they typically focus on 
middle managers (Rouleau, 2005; Rouleau and Balogun, 2011). Our findings add to this 
literature by showing how top managers engage in sensegiving during change 
implementation.    
 
4.5.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research  
Like all research, ours has limitations, which also provide opportunities for future research. 
First, due to the purpose and scope of this study, we focus on sensegiving mechanisms 
without linking them to the outcomes of strategic change, such as the degree of success or 
deviation from initial targets. Especially because we show a pattern of sensegiving, i.e., 
scheme change while taking actions of implementation, in contrast to that of scheme change 
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before taking actions as described in the literature (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia and 
Thomas, 1996; Gioia et al., 1994; Mantere et al., 2012), it will be interesting to compare the 
two patterns of sensegiving in terms of how they lead to different outcomes of strategic 
change. Second, this study has not explicitly focused on top managers’ discursive capacities 
and competence in sensegiving (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007; Rouleau and Balogun, 2011). A 
recent study by Rouleau and Balogun (2011) shows the importance of discursive competence 
in achieving successful sensegiving. As actions can generate contexts and resources that did 
not previously exist, it may require particular discursive competence to incorporate these new 
raw materials in establishing a coherent sense for the change. Future research could examine 
the particular discursive capabilities associated with sensegiving that involves substantive 
actions. Moreover, similar to other explorative studies based on case studies, our study’s 
findings are open to be confirmed by future research. Because meaning construction and the 
ways of conducting it is essentially culturally embedded, future research should particularly 
examine whether the sensegiving mechanisms found in this study are applicable in different 
cultural contexts.  
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s o
f c
ha
ng
es
: t
he
 re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g 
of
 b
us
in
es
s u
ni
ts
, 
th
e 
ad
ju
st
m
en
ts
 o
f f
ou
r r
eg
io
ns
, r
ed
ef
in
in
g 
pr
of
it 
ce
nt
er
s, 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
m
ar
ke
ts
 a
br
oa
d,
 
an
d 
to
da
y,
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 th
e 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
te
am
.”
 (C
EO
, 
in
te
rn
al
 m
ee
tin
g)
 
H
e 
[th
e 
C
EO
] c
re
at
ed
 th
e 
bu
rn
in
g 
pl
at
fo
rm
, w
hi
ch
 is
 
ex
te
rn
al
ly
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
w
ha
t w
e 
w
an
t t
o 
ac
hi
ev
e.
 
Th
is
 is
 w
ay
 h
ot
te
r t
ha
n 
if 
yo
u 
ju
st
 d
o 
it 
in
te
rn
al
ly
. 
Th
is
 is
 c
om
m
itt
in
g 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. [
…
] I
t w
as
 
an
no
un
ce
d 
an
d 
an
no
un
ce
d 
pu
bl
ic
ly
. S
o 
yo
u 
do
n'
t g
o 
ba
ck
 a
nd
 sa
y,
 o
oh
, I
 d
on
't 
lik
e 
th
is
 o
r t
ha
t. 
Y
ou
 ta
ke
 
w
ha
t's
 th
er
e 
an
d 
th
en
 y
ou
 sh
ap
e 
ar
ou
nd
 it
 a
nd
 th
en
 
m
ak
e 
it 
ha
pp
en
. (
to
p 
m
an
ag
er
, i
nt
er
vi
ew
) 
“B
ut
 h
e's
 v
er
y,
 v
er
y 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 in
 h
is
 m
es
sa
ge
s. 
I m
ea
n 
if 
yo
u 
lo
ok
 a
t h
is
 m
es
sa
ge
s f
ro
m
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 u
nt
il 
no
w
, 
it'
s a
lw
ay
s t
he
 sa
m
e 
pr
io
rit
ie
s a
nd
 a
lw
ay
s t
he
 sa
m
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
, h
e 
ju
st
 d
em
an
ds
 m
or
e 
an
d 
m
or
e,
 w
hi
ch
 I 
th
in
k 
se
ts
 a
 d
ire
ct
io
n.
” 
(C
EO
 a
ss
is
ta
nt
, i
nt
er
vi
ew
) 
“[
Th
e 
C
EO
] s
ai
d 
on
e 
th
ird
 o
f t
he
 e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 is
 
re
pl
ac
ed
 b
ec
au
se
 w
e 
do
n'
t b
el
ie
ve
 th
ey
 w
ill
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
. I
 m
ea
n,
 th
is
 w
as
 n
ot
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
ed
. T
hi
s w
as
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed
 a
 b
it 
ni
ce
r, 
bu
t e
ve
ry
bo
dy
 u
nd
er
st
oo
d 
th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
.”
 (t
op
 m
an
ag
er
, i
nt
er
vi
ew
) 
“W
ha
t I
'm
 d
oi
ng
, y
ou
 k
no
w
 th
e 
ex
pr
es
si
on
, n
ai
l y
ou
r 
co
lo
rs
 to
 th
e 
m
as
t, 
w
e'r
e 
no
w
 sa
yi
ng
, w
e'r
e 
bl
oo
dy
 
go
in
g 
to
 d
o 
it.
 […
] A
nd
 w
e'r
e 
go
in
g 
to
 b
e 
up
 th
er
e,
 
he
ad
 a
bo
ve
 th
e 
pa
ra
pe
t, 
an
d 
w
e 
ca
n 
be
 c
ha
lle
ng
ed
 o
n 
it,
 a
nd
 p
eo
pl
e 
ca
n 
re
vi
ew
 h
ow
 su
cc
es
sf
ul
ly
 w
e'r
e 
do
in
g 
as
 to
 w
he
th
er
 w
e'r
e 
re
al
ly
 ta
ki
ng
 th
e 
rig
ht
 
ac
tio
ns
 th
at
 a
re
 n
ee
de
d 
to
. S
o 
th
is
 is
 q
ui
te
 a
 d
iff
er
en
t 
– 
a 
m
uc
h 
cl
ea
re
r a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 I 
m
ea
n,
 I 
gu
es
s i
t's
 re
al
ly
 
th
e 
ne
xt
 st
ag
e 
of
 e
vo
lu
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
fir
m
.”
 (C
EO
, 
in
te
rv
ie
w
) 
“W
ha
t I
 p
ut
 o
ut
 th
er
e 
w
as
, y
ou
 k
no
w
, y
ou
 c
an
 a
ll 
sa
y 
ye
s, 
bu
t h
er
e 
ar
e 
th
e 
fiv
e 
as
ks
 I 
ha
ve
 o
f y
ou
. A
nd
 if
 
yo
u'
re
 n
ot
 p
re
pa
re
d 
to
 –
 if
 b
y 
Ju
ne
 w
e 
ha
ve
n'
t m
ad
e 
re
al
 p
ro
gr
es
s o
n 
ea
ch
 o
f t
he
se
, t
he
n 
I k
no
w
 y
ou
 d
on
’t 
m
ea
n 
it.
 R
ig
ht
, s
o,
 y
ou
 k
no
w
, t
hi
s i
s m
y 
te
st
 n
ow
.”
 
(C
EO
, i
nt
er
vi
ew
) 
R
ei
nf
or
ci
ng
 
sc
he
m
es
 b
y 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
ou
tc
om
es
  
“T
he
 p
ro
gr
es
s o
f t
he
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
[in
 e
as
t r
eg
io
n]
 is
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
. M
os
t i
m
po
rta
nt
 a
sp
ec
ts
 a
re
 th
re
e:
 […
]. 
I 
am
 v
er
y 
ha
pp
y 
ab
ou
t t
he
se
 th
re
e 
po
in
ts
, e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 th
e 
m
os
t i
m
po
rta
nt
 I 
ca
n 
se
e 
is
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
[h
ea
d 
of
 th
e 
re
gi
on
], 
al
l t
he
 h
ea
ds
 o
f t
he
 u
ni
ts
, a
ll 
th
e 
fa
ct
or
ie
s, 
an
d 
m
an
ag
er
s o
f o
ur
 su
bs
id
ia
rie
s, 
yo
u 
ha
d 
th
e 
co
m
pe
te
nc
e 
of
 m
an
ag
in
g 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 m
ad
e 
th
e 
tra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
n 
of
 y
ou
r a
tti
tu
de
 a
nd
 b
eh
av
io
rs
. T
hi
s i
s 
th
e 
m
y 
fir
st
 c
om
m
en
t o
n 
th
e 
ea
st
 re
gi
on
.”
 (C
EO
, 
in
te
rn
al
 m
ee
tin
g)
 
“W
he
n 
w
e 
an
no
un
ce
d 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 Ju
ly
, h
ow
 m
an
y 
pe
op
le
 to
ld
 m
e:
 “
it 
is
 to
o 
fa
st
,”
 “
it 
w
ill
 fa
il,
” 
“t
he
re
 
w
ill
 b
e 
lo
ts
 o
f p
ro
bl
em
s,”
 “
it 
w
ill
 b
e 
a 
di
sa
st
er
.”
 B
ut
 it
 
is
 w
ith
 o
ur
 c
ol
le
ag
ue
s w
e 
ha
ve
 so
lv
ed
 a
ll 
th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s, 
co
lla
bo
ra
te
d 
w
ith
 e
ac
h,
 a
nd
 m
ad
e 
th
e 
tra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 […
]. 
W
e 
re
ga
in
 o
ur
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
st
re
ng
th
s q
ui
ck
ly
. [
…
] W
ith
in
 tw
o 
m
on
th
s, 
w
e 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 a
 n
ew
 p
os
iti
on
 a
nd
 su
cc
es
s i
n 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t. 
A
ll 
th
is
 is
 b
ec
au
se
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
be
lie
ve
d 
in
 th
e 
id
ea
 o
f 
fo
cu
si
ng
 o
n 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 a
nd
 v
al
ue
 c
re
at
io
n 
in
 lo
ca
l 
m
ar
ke
ts
.”
 (C
EO
, i
nt
er
na
l m
ee
tin
g)
 
In
 e
ve
ry
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 re
su
lts
 p
ub
lis
he
d,
 th
e 
pr
og
re
ss
 o
f t
he
 
ch
an
ge
 p
ro
je
ct
 a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
fin
al
 ta
rg
et
s w
er
e 
up
da
te
d,
 
su
ch
 a
s w
ha
t h
av
e 
be
en
 a
ch
ie
ve
d 
in
 te
rm
s o
f b
ot
h 
op
er
at
io
na
l a
nd
 fi
na
nc
ia
l o
ut
co
m
es
.  
“I
 in
si
st
ed
 o
n 
ju
st
 re
ca
lli
ng
; o
ka
y,
 w
e 
se
e 
th
e 
fir
st
 
vi
si
bl
e 
ef
fe
ct
 a
nd
 re
ca
lli
ng
 w
hy
 w
e 
do
 w
ha
t w
e 
do
.”
 
(C
EO
, i
nt
er
vi
ew
) 
“t
he
 a
m
bi
tio
n 
w
as
 to
 ta
ke
, t
o 
ea
rn
 th
e 
lo
w
-h
an
gi
ng
 fr
ui
ts
 
as
 fa
st
 a
s p
os
si
bl
e 
bu
t t
he
n 
to
 im
pl
em
en
t i
n 
th
e 
bu
dg
et
 
pr
oc
es
s c
le
ar
 ta
rg
et
s a
nd
 c
le
ar
 a
ct
io
ns
.”
 (t
op
 m
an
ag
er
, 
in
te
rv
ie
w
) 
 
So
m
e 
po
si
tiv
e 
ou
tc
om
es
 w
er
e 
re
fle
ct
ed
 o
n 
in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 y
ea
r t
o 
pu
sh
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 fu
rt
he
r. 
Th
e 
C
EO
 
ex
pl
ai
ne
d:
 “
So
 tr
an
sf
or
m
 th
e 
[s
er
vi
ce
 le
ad
er
sh
ip
] 
te
am
, g
et
 c
lie
nt
s a
nd
 m
ar
ke
ts
 a
t t
he
 h
ea
rt 
of
 th
e 
bu
si
ne
ss
, t
ho
se
 a
re
 th
e 
so
rts
 o
f t
hi
ng
s t
ha
t w
e 
w
er
e 
fo
cu
se
d 
on
 b
ut
 m
ak
in
g 
th
em
 re
al
ly
 re
al
 a
nd
 p
ic
ki
ng
 
so
m
e 
of
f t
ha
t w
e 
co
ul
d 
sh
ow
 tr
em
en
do
us
 p
ro
gr
es
s 
ag
ai
ns
t i
n 
ye
ar
 o
ne
. S
o 
th
er
e’
s m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
ab
ou
t 
m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l a
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 e
xe
cu
tin
g 
on
 th
em
 ra
th
er
 
th
an
 ju
st
 g
ra
nd
, g
ra
nd
 p
la
ns
.”
 
Th
e 
C
EO
 th
ou
gh
t t
ha
t h
e 
co
ul
d 
ha
ve
 ta
ke
n 
m
or
e 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
ac
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 y
ea
r, 
be
ca
us
e 
sh
ow
in
g 
ou
tc
om
es
 is
 im
po
rt
an
t: 
“o
ne
 o
f t
he
 le
ar
ns
 
fo
r m
e 
I t
hi
nk
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
to
 b
e 
cl
ea
r a
bo
ut
 w
ha
t w
e 
re
al
ly
 n
ee
d 
to
 d
o,
 th
at
 is
 g
oi
ng
 to
 d
em
on
st
ra
te
 re
al
 
pr
og
re
ss
.”
 
  
14
7 
A
da
pt
in
g 
sc
he
m
es
 to
 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ou
tc
om
es
 
Be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
co
or
di
na
tio
n 
co
nf
lic
t, 
qu
al
ity
 d
ro
pp
ed
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 in
 fo
ur
 m
on
th
s. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 th
e 
C
EO
 
re
ad
ju
st
ed
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 p
la
n,
 a
s s
he
 e
xp
re
ss
ed
 “
O
f 
co
ur
se
 I 
ha
d 
to
 b
as
e 
on
 re
al
ity
 a
nd
 m
ad
e 
ad
ju
st
m
en
t t
o 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
.”
 B
ec
au
se
 o
f t
hi
s a
da
pt
io
n,
 th
e 
sc
he
m
es
 
w
er
e 
al
so
 fr
am
ed
 d
iff
er
en
tly
 to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 fo
r t
ha
t, 
em
ph
as
iz
in
g 
on
 th
e 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
ne
w
 p
ro
fit
 
ce
nt
er
. 
“[
A
]c
t f
as
t a
nd
 d
on
’t 
w
or
ry
 a
bo
ut
 m
ak
in
g 
m
is
ta
ke
s. 
[…
] 
W
e 
ca
n 
al
w
ay
s a
dj
us
t, 
bu
t i
f y
ou
 d
on
’t 
ac
t, 
yo
u 
w
ou
ld
 
ne
ve
r k
no
w
 w
he
re
 th
in
gs
 c
an
 g
o 
w
ro
ng
.”
 (C
EO
, 
in
te
rn
al
 m
ee
tin
g)
 
So
m
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 w
er
e 
no
t s
uc
ce
ss
fu
l a
nd
 th
e 
C
EO
 
ad
ju
st
ed
 h
is
 a
pp
ro
ac
he
s i
n 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 y
ea
r. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
er
e 
w
as
 n
ot
 d
is
ce
rn
ed
 a
dj
us
tm
en
t o
f s
ch
em
es
.  
“[
W
]e
 g
ot
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t t
ha
t w
e 
w
ou
ld
 –
 it
 is
 a
bo
ut
 
[b
ec
om
in
g 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s]
, n
ot
 th
at
 
w
e'r
e 
go
in
g 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
bi
g 
[S
er
vi
ce
 A
] b
us
in
es
s w
ith
 a
 
ve
ry
 sm
al
l [
Se
rv
ic
e 
B
] f
irm
, w
e 
do
n’
t t
hi
nk
 th
at
's 
th
e 
rig
ht
 th
in
g.
 S
o 
th
ey
'v
e 
ag
re
ed
 to
 a
 st
ra
te
gy
, t
he
y'
ve
 
ag
re
ed
 to
 fo
cu
s o
n 
bo
th
 o
f t
he
se
.”
 (C
EO
, i
nt
er
vi
ew
) 
“P
ar
t o
f i
t l
as
t y
ea
r w
as
 y
ou
 k
in
d 
of
 w
en
t i
n 
w
ith
 a
 
pl
an
 w
hi
ch
 I 
se
ns
e 
w
as
 ju
st
 to
o,
 y
ou
 k
no
w
, t
oo
 fi
zz
y,
 
to
o 
am
bi
tio
us
, a
nd
 I 
ju
st
 v
ow
ed
, p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 w
he
n 
w
e 
ha
d 
a 
ba
d 
fir
st
 q
ua
rte
r, 
I m
ad
e 
a 
pr
om
is
e 
to
 
m
ys
el
f t
he
n 
th
at
 w
e 
w
ou
ld
 d
o 
- a
pp
ro
ac
h 
th
is
 in
 a
 
di
ff
er
en
t w
ay
 th
is
 ti
m
e 
as
 w
el
l.”
 (C
EO
, i
nt
er
vi
ew
) 
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